Outline.
1. Evil (Sin) and the Sovereignty of God?
2. Excursus: Double Predestination is not Equal Ultimacy (The Nature of Non-Election).
2.1. Sources.
3. Endnotes (Additional Testimony).
1. Evil (Sin) and the Sovereignty of God? Return to Outline.
John Piper:
My assumption will be that if the Bible teaches clearly and repeatedly that God governs sinful human choices, then he can do it without becoming unholy or unjust or impure or evil. If finite humans can find ways to handle radioactive uranium to produce useful energy without being contaminated by the deadly radiation, it is likely that the infinitely wise God can handle the deadly evil of sin without contamination or harm in bringing about his wise and holy purposes. If finite humans searching for a preventive vaccine can handle the lethal viruses of new diseases without being infected themselves, it is likely that the infinitely wise and good God can handle the disease of sin without being infected. Whether he does or not, we will discover not from logical likelihoods but from what the Scriptures teach.
…
It is a mistake to assume that ultimate human self-determination is a feature of biblical thinking. Ultimate self-determination, as a trait of man’s will, might be taught in Scripture, or it might not be. That needs to be decided from the teaching of Scripture, not from philosophical assumptions we bring to the text. This book is about what the Bible teaches. In the present chapter (as well as chapters 28-33), we ask, What does it teach about God’s providence over the sinful human will? I am arguing that it teaches that God, in his infinite wisdom and goodness and holiness and justice, knows how to govern the good and evil choices of all humans without himself sinning and without turning human preferences and choices into morally irrelevant, robot-like actions.
Therefore, in what follows, we should make every effort not to assume that ultimate, divine control over evil makes God evil or strips man of moral accountability. The question we should be asking is, What does the text teach about reality? Let us not bring to the text our philosophical assumptions that dictate what God’s wisdom and goodness and justice must do.
(John Piper, Providence, [Wheaton: Crossway, 2020], pp. 413-414, 417.) [i.]
Note: See further: John Piper, Providence, [Wheaton: Crossway, 2020], pp. 385-509.
Note: See further: Sovereignty of God, also Compatibilism, A Biblical Defense, and Compatibilism — God’s Sovereignty and Human Responsibility.
2. Excursus: Double Predestination is not Equal Ultimacy (The Nature of Non-Election). Return to Outline.
Non-Election: Negatively Defined.
Non-election (John 12:39-40; Mark 4:10-12; Matthew 11:25; Isaiah 44:18; Romans 11:7-10) should not be understood as God actively creating evil in an individual who is otherwise morally upright or neutral (1 John 1:5; Psalm 92:15). Rather, in His sovereign will, God works in and through individuals according to their inherently sinful and fallen nature (James 1:13-14; 1 John 2:16).1
Non-Election: Positively Defined.
Non-election (Matthew 15:13) may be defined as God’s eternal decree to withhold His special grace from certain individuals and punish them for their sins2 (2 Thessalonians 2:10-12; 1 Samuel 2:25), thereby manifesting His justice and glory (Romans3 9:17, 22-23). Although God loves all His creatures (Psalm 145:9, 15-16) and wills some measure of good for all of them (Matthew 5:43-45; Luke 6:35-36), He does not will every good for every individual (Exodus 33:19; Romans 9:18). Specifically, in Non-election, God withholds one particular good—eternal life—from certain individuals (John 12:39-40; Mark 4:11-12; 2 Corinthians 4:3-4; Romans 11:7-8). Consequently, in not willing eternal life for some, God is described as “hating” them (Malachi 1:2-3; Romans 9:13).4
Non-Election: Active or Passive?
Non-election is not a positive act of God, like election, but a permissive decree in which God allows sinners to persist in their self-chosen rebellion and suffer the just consequences that follow.5 While it is true that, with respect to an act of the will within the Godhead—ad intra—the choice to pass over one individual is as much an act of volition (positive/active) as the choice to elect another (Romans 9:11-13).6 This is not the case as regards the outworking of that choice in creation—ad extra.7
The Means of Non-Election.8
God “actively” (or positively)9 softens the hearts of His elect by extending His special (invincible) grace (Ezekiel 36:26-27; Philippians 2:13; Isaiah 43:10). Conversely, He does not harden the hearts of the non-elect in the same manner. Rather, He does so “passively” (or negatively)10 by withdrawing His common grace11 (Psalm 81:12; Romans 1:24-28), which He owes to no one (Matthew 20:15; Romans 9:15-18), and allowing the sinful inclinations of the fallen human heart to operate without restraint (Genesis 8:21; Ecclesiastes 9:3). All, outside and apart from Christ, are guilty of sin (Romans 3:23; 5:12) and entitled to nothing other than judgment (Romans 6:23; 2:5-6).12
To use an Aristotelian taxonomy,13 God is the efficient cause of the softening of the elect and the final cause of the hardening of the non-elect. In the former (election), God sovereignly originates a new moral quality in the heart—faith—which was not previously there. In the latter (non-election), nothing new is implanted; instead, God allows an existing quality—unbelief—to persist unchecked.14
The Purpose and Justice of Non-Election.
The reason that God softens some (Jeremiah 24:7; Acts 16:14) and hardens others (Joshua 11:20; Deuteronomy 2:30; Isaiah 63:17) is ultimately for the sake of His Glory (Exodus 14:4, 17-18; Ephesians 1:4-6, 11-14; Romans 9:22-23). However, what this specifically entails and why God chooses to extend His saving grace to some and to pass over others14.5 is something known to Him alone15 (Romans 11:33; Isaiah 55:8-9). In the end, the elect receive mercy, the non-elect receive justice, no one receives injustice16 (Romans 9:14; Genesis 18:25; Job 34:12). “The wages of sin is death” (Romans 6:23), for sin is nothing less than “cosmic treason . . . against a perfectly pure Sovereign.”17 Yet grace is entirely gratuitous; if God were obligated to be gracious to sinners, then “grace would no longer be grace” (Romans 11:6).
2.1. Sources. Return to Outline.
Augustine of Hippo (c. 354-430 A.D.):
What will He give to those whom He has predestined to life, who has given such things even to those whom He has predestined to death? [Quid dabit eis quos prædestinavit ad vitam, qui hæc dedit etiam eis quos prædestinavit ad mortem?]
(Augustine of Hippo, City of God, 22.24; PL, 41:792; trans. NPNF1, 2:504.) See also: ccel.org.
Matthew 15:13:
Every plant that my heavenly Father has not planted will be pulled up by the roots. [πᾶσα φυτεία ἣν οὐκ ἐφύτευσεν ὁ πατήρ μου ὁ οὐράνιος ἐκριζωθήσεται.]
(New American Standard Bible: 1995 Edition.)
R. C. Sproul (1939-2017 A.D.):
There are different views of double predestination. One of these is so frightening that many shun the term altogether, lest their view of the doctrine be confused with the scary one. This is called the equal ultimacy view.
Equal ultimacy is based on a concept of symmetry. It seeks a complete balance between election and reprobation. The key idea is this: Just as God intervenes in the lives of the elect to create faith in their hearts, so God equally intervenes in the lives of the reprobate to create or work unbelief in their hearts. The idea of God’s actively working unbelief in the hearts of the reprobate is drawn from biblical statements about God hardening people’s hearts.
Equal ultimacy is not the Reformed or Calvinist view of predestination. Some have called it “hyper-Calvinism.” I prefer to call it “sub-Calvinism” or, better yet, “anti-Calvinism.” Though Calvinism certainly has a view of double predestination, the double predestination it embraces is not one of equal ultimacy.
To understand the Reformed view of the matter we must pay close attention to the crucial distinction between positive and negative decrees of God. Positive has to do with God’s active intervention in the hearts of the elect. Negative has to do with God’s passing over the non-elect.
The Reformed view teaches that God positively or actively intervenes in the lives of the elect to insure their salvation. The rest of mankind God leaves to themselves. He does not create unbelief in their hearts. That unbelief is already there. He does not coerce them to sin. They sin by their own choices. In the Calvinist view the decree of election is positive; the decree of reprobation is negative.
Hyper-Calvinism’s view of double predestination may be called positive-positive predestination. Orthodox Calvinism’s view may be called positive-negative predestination.
(R. C. Sproul, Chosen by God, [Wheaton: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 1986], pp. 142-143.) [18.]
Augustine of Hippo (c. 354-430 A.D.):
For God thus blinds and hardens, simply by letting alone and withdrawing His aid: and God can do this by a judgment that is hidden, although not by one that is unrighteous. [Sic enim excæcat, sic obdurat Deus, deserendo et non adjuvando: quod occulto judicio facere postest, iniquo non potest.]
(Augustine of Hippo, Lectures or Tractates on the Gospel According to St. John, 53.6; PL, 35:1777; trans. NPNF1, 7:293.) See also: ccel.org. [19.]
Note: Cf. Augustine of Hippo, On the Predestination of the Saints, 2.4 [PL, 44:962; NPNF1, 5:499]; Sermons, 26.5 [PL, 38:173; WSA, III/2:96].
Prosper of Aquitaine (c. 390-455 A.D.):
…God in His unchanging prescience has foreknown to whom He would give to believe or whom He would give to His Son that He might lose no one of them, and that, if He foreknew this, He also foreknew by what gifts He would deign to work our salvation; that the predestination of the saints is nothing else but the foreknowledge and the preparation of God’s grace by which He saves them without fail. As to all the others who are not saved nor rescued by grace from the universal fall of the human race, let us acknowledge that it is by a just decree of God that they are not delivered. And let us learn from the misfortune of the reprobate, of whose damnation we have no right to complain, what is the guilt we ourselves have been forgiven. For there is no iniquity with God, nor does anyone under so just a judge ever perish without guilt. …When we know that some are reprobate, we should not hesitate to attribute their reprobation to their own fault, though, of course, God could have saved them in His mercy had He been pleased to do so. When we see that others are saved, we should not make bold to say that they were worthy of salvation, since of course God could have condemned them in justice had He so chosen. But the reason why He does not save all or saves some in preference to others, there is no need for us to inquire, nor is it possible for us to find out. Without considering the reason of that discrimination, it should be enough for us to know that mercy does not do away with justice, nor justice with mercy, in Him who condemns no one except in justice and saves no one except through mercy. As for the people of Tyre and Sidon, what else can we say than that they were not given to have the faith? The Lord, Truth Itself, says of them that they would have believed if they had been given to see the miracles that had been wrought in other towns which remained in unbelief. Why they were refused that gift, let our cavilers say if they can; let them explain why the Lord worked miracles before people who would not profit by them and did not work them before others who would have profited. We on our part, though we cannot fathom the reason of God’s action nor the depth of His decree, yet know for certain that what He has said is true and what He has done is right, that not only the people of Tyre and Sidon but those also of Corozain and Bethsaida could have been converted and have come from unbelief to faith had God been pleased to work this change in their hearts.
(Prosper of Aquitaine, Answers to the Extracts of the Genoese, Excerpt 8; PL, 51:197-198; trans. ACW, 32:63-64.)
Cf. Prosper of Aquitaine (c. 390-455 A.D.):
Objection: By God’s predestination men are compelled to sin and driven to death by a sort of fatal necessity.
Answer: No Christian who is a Catholic denies God’s predestination. But fatalism many, even non-Christians, reject. Sin, indeed, leads to death, but God compels no one to sin. For He hath commanded no man to do wicked. And: Thou hatest, Lord, all the workers of iniquity; thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie. Accordingly, one who preaches fatalism under cover of predestination is no less worthy of disapproval than one who censures predestination on the plea of fatalism. Fatalism as a theory is groundless and born from falsehood. But faith in predestination is based on many texts of Holy Scripture. And it is altogether wrong to attribute to predestination the evil deeds of men. Their propensity to evil does not come from God’s creation but from the sin of their first parent. And no one is freed from the punishment of this sin except by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which was prepared and predestined in God’s eternal design before the creation of the world.
(Prosper of Aquitaine, Answers to the Objections of the Gauls, Pt. 1, Art. 1; PL, 51:157; trans. ACW, 32:140.)
Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274 A.D.):
I answer that, God does reprobate some. For it was said above (A. 1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (Q. XXII., A. 2). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (Q. XXII., A. 1). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.
Reply Obj. 1. God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good—namely, eternal life—He is said to hate or reprobate them.
Reply Obj. 2. Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined—namely, glory—and of what is received in this life—namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present—namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future—namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way the word of the prophet is true—namely, Destruction is thy own, O Israel.
Reply Obj. 3. Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility; but only conditional impossibility: as was said above (Q. XIX., A. 3), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet by a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.
(Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.23.3; trans. The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas: Part: I: QQ. I.-XXVI: Second and Revised Edition, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, [London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1920], pp. 323-324.) See also: ccel.org.
Martin Luther (1483-1546 A.D.):
Let none think, when God is said to harden or work evil in us (for hardening is working evil) that he does it by, as it were, creating fresh evil in us, as you might imagine an ill-disposed innkeeper, a bad man himself, pouring and mixing poison into a vessel that was not bad, while the vessel itself does nothing, but is merely the recipient, or passive vehicle, of the mixer’s own ill-will. When men hear us say that God works both good and evil in us, and that we are subject to God’s working by mere passive necessity, they seem to imagine a man who is in himself good, and not evil, having an evil work wrought in him by God; for they do not sufficiently bear in mind how incessantly active God is in all his creatures, allowing none of them to keep holiday. He who would understand these matters, however, should think thus: God works evil in us (that is, by means of us) not through God’s own fault, but by reason of our own defect. We being evil by nature, and God being good, when He impels us to act by His own acting upon us according to the nature of His omnipotence, good though He is in Himself, He cannot but do evil by our evil instrumentality; although, according to His wisdom, He makes good use of this evil for His own glory and for our salvation.
(Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, trans. J. I. Packer, O. R. Johnston, [Grand Rapids: Fleming H. Revell, 2000], p. 206.)
John Calvin (1509-1564 A.D.):
Now when human understanding hears these things, its insolence is so irrepressible that it breaks forth into random and immoderate tumult as if at the blast of a battle trumpet.
Indeed many, as if they wished to avert a reproach from God, accept election in such terms as to deny that anyone is condemned. But they do this very ignorantly and childishly, since election itself could not stand except as set over against reprobation. God is said to set apart those whom he adopts into salvation; it will be highly absurd to say that others acquire by chance or obtain by their own effort what election alone confers on a few. Therefore, those whom God passes over, he condemns; and this he does for no other reason than that he wills to exclude them from the inheritance which he predestines for his own children. And men’s insolence is unbearable if it refuses to be bridled by God’s Word, which treats of his incomprehensible plan that the angels themselves adore. However, we have by now been taught that hardening is in God’s hand and will, just as much as mercy is [Rom. 9:14 ff.]. And Paul does not, as do those I have spoken of, labor anxiously to make false excuses in God’s defense; he only warns that it is unlawful for the clay to quarrel with its potter [Rom. 9:20]. Now how will those who do not admit that any are condemned by God dispose of Christ’s statement: “Every tree that my . . . Father has not planted will be uprooted” [Matt. 15:13 p.]? This plainly means that all those whom the Heavenly Father has not deigned to plant as sacred trees in his field are marked and intended for destruction. If they say this is no sign of reprobation, there is nothing so clear that it can be proved to them. . . . I, at least, maintain this teaching of Augustine’s: where God makes sheep out of wolves, he reforms them by a more powerful grace to subdue their hardness; accordingly, God does not convert the obstinate because he does not manifest that more powerful grace, which is not lacking if he should please to offer it.
(John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 3.23.1; trans. LCC, 21:947-948, 949.) [20.]
Note: Cf. Augustine of Hippo, Lectures or Tractates on the Gospel According to St. John, 53.6 [PL, 35:1777; NPNF1, 7:293]; Miscellany of Questions in Response to Simplician, 1.2.14 [PL, 40:119; WSA, I/12:196]; On the Predestination of the Saints, 2.4 [PL, 44:962; NPNF1, 5:499]; Sermons, 26.5 [PL, 38:173; WSA, III/2:96].
Cf. John Calvin (1509-1564 A.D.):
…their perdition depends upon the predestination of God in such a way that the cause and occasion of it are found in themselves.
(John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 3.23.8; trans. LCC, 21:957.)The Westminster Confession of Faith (1647 A.D.):
VI. As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath he, by the eternal and most free purpose of his will, foreordained all the means thereunto. Wherefore they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ, are effectually called unto faith in Christ by his Spirit working in due season; are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by his power through faith unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only.
VII. The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice.
(The Westminster Confession of Faith, 3.6-7; trans. COC, 3:609-610.) See also: ccel.org. [21.]
Cf. The French Confession of Faith (A.D. 1559):
We believe that from this corruption and general condemnation in which all men are plunged, God, according to his eternal and immutable counsel, calleth those whom he hath chosen by his goodness and mercy alone in our Lord Jesus Christ, without consideration of their works, to display in them the riches of his mercy; leaving the rest in this same corruption and condemnation to show in them his justice.
(The French Confession of Faith, 12; trans. COC, 3:366-367.) See also: ccel.org.
Cf. The Belgic Confession (A.D. 1561):
We believe that all the posterity of Adam, being thus fallen into perdition and ruin by the sin of our first parents, God then did manifest himself such as he is; that is to say, merciful and just: merciful, since he delivers and preserves from this perdition all whom he, in his eternal and unchangeable council, of mere goodness hath elected in Christ Jesus our Lord, without any respect to their works: just, in leaving others in the fall and perdition wherein they have involved themselves.
(The Belgic Confession, 16; trans. COC, 3:401.) See also: ccel.org.
Cf. The Canons of the Synod of Dort (A.D. 1619):
What peculiarly tends to illustrate and recommend to us the eternal and unmerited grace of election is the express testimony of sacred Scripture, that not all, but some only, are elected, while others are passed by in the eternal decree; whom God, out of his sovereign, most just, irreprehensible and unchangeable good pleasure, hath decreed to leave in the common misery into which they have willfully plunged themselves, and not to bestow upon them saving faith and the grace of conversion; but permitting them in his just judgment to follow their own way; at last, for the declaration of his justice, to condemn and punish them forever, not only on account of their unbelief, but also for all their other sins. And this is the decree of reprobation which by no means makes God the author of sin (the very thought of which is blasphemy), but declares him to be an awful, irreprehensible, and righteous judge and avenger.
(The Canons of the Synod of Dort, 1.15; trans. COC, 3:584.) See also: ccel.org.
Francis Turretin (1623-1687 A.D.):
VI. The negative act includes two: both preterition, by which in the election of some to glory as well as to grace, he neglected and slighted others (which is evident from the event of election); and negative desertion, by which he left them in the corrupt mass and in their misery. However this is so to be understood: (1) that they are not excepted from the laws of common providence, but remain subject to them; nor are they immediately deprived of all God’s favor, but only of the saving and vivifying (which is the fruit of election); (2) that actual sins of all kinds follow that preterition and desertion; not indeed from the nature of preterition and desertion itself and the force of the denied grace itself, but from the nature of the corrupt free will and the force of corruption in it (as he who does not cure the disease of a sick man is not the cause per se of the disease, nor of the results flowing from it; so sins are the consequents, rather than the effects of reprobation; necessarily bringing about the futurition of the event, but yet not infusing or producing the wickedness; not by removing what is present, but by not supplying what would sustain). If the sun does not illuminate the earth, it is not the accidental cause of darkness. Can God abandoning man and not removing his corruption, be straightway called the accidental cause of his sin? For darkness follows by necessity of nature the non-illumination of the sun, but sins voluntarily follow the denial of grace.
VII. Although God by that desertion denies to man that without which sin cannot be avoided, the causality of sin cannot on that account be attributed to him. (1) God denies it justly and is not bound to give that grace to anyone. (2) From that negation does not follow the capability of sinning (which man has from himself), but only the non-curing of that incapability. (3) God denies the grace which they are unwilling to accept (or to retain) and which they of their own accord despise, since they desire nothing less than being governed by the Holy Spirit. (4) He does not deny that grace that they may sin, but that they may be punished on account of sin.
(Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 4.14.6-7; trans. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology: Volume One: First Through Tenth Topics, trans. George Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison, Jr., [Phillipsburg: P&R, 1992], p. 381.) [22.]
Stephen Charnock (1628-1680 A.D.):
Prop. III. The holiness of God is not blemished by decreeing the eternal rejection of some men. Reprobation, in its first notion, is an act of preterition, or passing by. A man is not made wicked by the act of God; but it supposeth him wicked; and so it is nothing else but God’s leaving a man in that guilt and filth wherein he beholds him. In its second notion, it is an ordination, not to a crime, but to a punishment (Jude 4): ‘an ordaining to condemnation.’ And though it be an eternal act of God, yet, in order of nature, it follows upon the foresight of the transgression of man, and supposeth the crime. God considers Adam’s revolt, and views the whole mass of his corrupted posterity, and chooses some to reduce to himself by his grace, and leaves others to lie sinking in their ruins. Since all mankind fell by the fall of Adam, and have corruption conveyed to them successively by that root, whereof they are branches; all men might justly be left wallowing in that miserable condition to which they are reduced by the apostasy of their common head; and God might have passed by the whole race of man, as well as he did the fallen angels, without any hope of redemption. He was no more bound to restore man, than to restore devils, nor bound to repair the nature of any one son of Adam; and had he dealt with men as he dealt with the devils, they had had, all of them, as little just ground to complain of God; for all men deserved to be left to themselves, for all were concluded under sin; but God calls out some to make monuments of his grace, which is an act of the sovereign mercy of that dominion, whereby ‘he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy’ (Rom. ix. 18); others he passes by, and leaves them remaining in that corruption of nature wherein they were born. If men have a power to dispose of their own goods, without any unrighteousness, why should not God dispose of his own grace, and bestow it upon whom he pleases; since it is a debt to none, but a free gift to any that enjoy it? God is not the cause of sin in this, because his operation about this is negative; it is not an action, but a denial of action, and therefore cannot be the cause of the evil actions of men. God acts nothing, but withholds his power; he doth not enlighten their minds, nor incline their wills so powerfully, as to expel their darkness, and root out those evil habits which possess them by nature. God could, if he would, savingly enlighten the minds of all men in the world, and quicken their hearts with a new life by an invincible grace; but in not doing it, there is no positive act of God, but a cessation of action. We may with as much reason say, that God is the cause of all the sinful actions that are committed by the corporation of devils, since their first rebellion, because he leaves them to themselves, and bestows not a new grace upon them,—as say, God is the cause of the sins of those that he overlooks and leaves in that state of guilt wherein he found them. God did not pass by any without the consideration of sin; so that this act of God is not repugnant to his holiness, but conformable to his justice.
(Stephen Charnock, Discourses Upon the Existence and Attributes of God: A New Edition, [London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853], p. 492.) [23.]
William G. T. Shedd (1820-1894 A.D.):
Reprobation is the antithesis to election, and necessarily follows from it. If God does not elect a person, he rejects him. If God decides not to convert a sinner into a saint, he decides to let him remain a sinner. If God decides not to work in a man to will and to do according to God’s will, he decides to leave the man to will and to do according to his own will. If God purposes not to influence a particular human will to good, he purposes to allow that will to have its own way. When God effectually operates upon the human will, it is election. When God does not effectually operate upon the human will, it is reprobation. And he must do either the one or the other. The logical and necessary connection between election and reprobation is seen also, by considering the two divine attributes concerned in each. Election is the expression of the divine mercy; reprobation of the divine justice. God must manifest one or the other of these two attributes towards a transgressor. St. Paul teaches this in Rom. 11:22: “Behold the goodness and severity of God (the divine compassion, and the divine justice); on them which fell, severity; but towards thee goodness.”
Consequently, whoever holds the doctrine of election, must hold the antithetic doctrine of reprobation.
(William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology: Volume I, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1888], pp. 429-430.) [24.]
Archibald Alexander Hodge (1823-1886 A.D.):
22. Discriminate accurately the two elements involved in the doctrine of Reprobation.
Reprobation is the aspect which God’s eternal decree presents in its relation to that portion of the human race which shall be finally condemned for their sins.
It is, 1st, negative, inasmuch as it consists in passing over these, and refusing to elect them to life; and, 2d, positive, inasmuch as they are condemned to eternal misery. In respect to its negative element, reprobation is simply sovereign, since those passed over were no worse than those elected, and the simple reason both for the choosing and for the passing over was the sovereign good pleasure of God.
In respect to its positive element, reprobation is not sovereign, but simply judicial, because God inflicts misery in any case only as the righteous punishment of sin. “The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath—for their sins. “Con. Faith,” Chap. iii., Sec. 7.
23. Show that these positions are necessarily involved in the general doctrine of Decrees and in the special doctrine of the election of some men to eternal life.
As above stated, this doctrine of reprobation is self-evidently an inseparable element of the doctrines of decrees and of election. If God unconditionally elects whom he pleases, he must unconditionally leave whom he pleases to themselves. He must foreordain the non-believing, as well as the believing, although the events themselves are brought to pass by very different causes.
(Archibald Alexander Hodge, Outlines of Theology: Rewritten and Enlarged, [New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1878], p. 222.) [25.]
3. Endnotes (Additional Testimony). Return to Outline.
With regard to the sinful acts of men, the Scriptures teach, (1.) That they are so under the control of God that they can occur only by his permission and in execution of his purposes. He so guides them in the exercise of their wickedness that the particular forms of its manifestation are determined by his will. In 1 Chron. x. 4-14 it is said that Saul slew himself but it is elsewhere said that the Lord slew him and turned the kingdom unto David. So also it is said, that he hardened the heart of Pharaoh; that He hardened the spirit of Sihon the king of Heshbon; that He turned the hearts of the heathen to hate his people; that He blinds the eyes of men, and sends them strong delusion that they may believe a lie; that He stirs up the nations to war. “God,” it is said, in Rev. xvii. 17, “hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God shall be fulfilled.” (2.) The Scriptures teach that the wickedness of men is restrained within prescribed bounds. Ps. lxxvi. 10, “Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee: the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain.” 2 Kings xix. 28, “Because thy rage against me, and thy tumult is come up into mine ears, therefore I will put my hook in thy nose, and my bridle in thy lips, and I will turn thee back by the way by which thou camest.” (3.) Wicked actions are overruled for good. The wicked conduct of Joseph’s brethren, the obstinacy and disobedience of Pharaoh, the lust of conquest and thirst for plunder by which the heathen rulers were controlled in their invasions of the Holy Land; above all, the crucifixion of Christ, the persecutions of the Church, the revolutions and wars among the nations, have been all so overruled by Him who sitteth as ruler in the heavens, as to fulfil his wise and merciful designs. (4.) The Scriptures teach that God’s providence in relation to the sins of men, is such that the sinfulness thereof proceedeth only from the creature and not from God; who neither is nor can be the author or approver of sin. 1 John ii. 16, “All that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father (not from Him as its source or author), but is of the world.” James i. 13, “Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man.” Jer. vii. 9, “Will ye steal, murder, and commit adultery, and swear falsely, and burn incense unto Baal, and walk after other gods whom ye know not; and come and stand before me in this house, which is called by my name, and say, We are delivered to do all these abominations?”
Thus the fact that God does govern all his creatures and all their actions, is clearly revealed in the Scriptures. And that fact is the foundation of all religion. It is the ground of the consolation of his people in all ages; and it may be said to be the intuitive conviction of all men, however inconsistent it may be with their philosophical theories, or with their professions. The fact of this universal providence of God is all the Bible teaches. It nowhere attempts to inform us how it is that God governs all things, or how his effectual control is to be reconciled with the efficiency of second causes. All the attempts of philosophers and theologians to explain that point, may be pronounced failures, and worse than failures, for they not only raise more difficulties than they solve but in almost all instances they include principles or lead to conclusions inconsistent with the plain teachings of the word of God. These theories are all founded on some à priori principle which is assumed on no higher authority than human reason.
(Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology: Vol. I, [New York: Charles Scribner and Company, 1872], pp. 589-590.) See also: ccel.org.
Cf. Herman Bavinck:
From the foregoing it has become evident in what sense reprobation must be considered a part of predestination. From the perspective of the comprehensive character of the counsel of God, we have every right to speak of a “double predestination.” Also sin, unbelief, death, and eternal punishment are subject to God’s governance. Not only is there no benefit in preferring the terms “foreknowledge” and “permission” over the term “predestination,” but Scripture, in fact, speaks very decisively and positively in this connection. It is true that Scripture seldom speaks of reprobation as an eternal decree. All the more, however, does it represent reprobation as an act of God in history. He rejects Cain (Gen. 4:5), curses Canaan (Gen. 9:25), expels Ishmael (Gen. 21:12; Rom. 9:7; Gal. 4:30), hates Esau (Gen. 25:23-26; Mal. 1:2-3; Rom. 9:13; Heb. 12:17), and permits the Gentiles to walk in their own ways (Acts 14:16). Even within the circle of revelation there is frequent mention of a rejection by the Lord of his people and of particular persons (Deut. 29:28; 1 Sam. 15:23, 26; 16:1; 2 Kings 17:20; 23:27; Ps. 53:5; 78:67; 89:38; Jer. 6:30; 14:19; 31:37; Hos. 4:6; 9:17). But also in that negative event of rejection there is frequently present a positive action of God, consisting in hatred (Mal. 1:2-3; Rom. 9:13), cursing (Gen. 9:25), hardening (Exod. 4:21; 7:3; 9:12; 10:20, 27; 11:10; 14:4; Deut. 2:30; Josh. 11:20; 1 Sam. 2:25; Ps. 105:25; John 12:40; Rom. 9:18), infatuation (1 Kings 12:15; 2 Sam. 17:14; Ps. 107:40; Job 12:24; Isa. 44:25; 1 Cor. 1:19), blinding and stupefaction (Isa. 6:9; Matt. 13:13; Mark 4:12; Luke 8:10; John 12:40; Acts 28:26; Rom. 11:8). God’s reign covers all things, and he even has a hand in people’s sins. He sends a lying spirit (1 Kings 22:23; 2 Chron. 18:22), through Satan stirs up David (2 Sam. 24:1; 1 Chron. 21:1), tests Job (ch. 1), calls Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus his servants (2 Chron. 36:22; Ezra 1:1; Isa. 44:28; 45:1; Jer. 27:6; 28:14; etc.) and Assyria the rod of his anger (Isa. 10:5ff.). He delivers up Christ into the hands of his enemies (Acts 2:23; 4:28), sets him for the fall of many, and makes him a fragrance from death to death, a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offense (Luke 2:34; John 3:19; John 9:39; 2 Cor. 2:16; 1 Pet. 2:8). He abandons people to their sins (Rom. 1:24), sends a spirit of delusion (2 Thess. 2:11), raises up Shimei to curse David (2 Sam. 16:10; cf. Ps. 39:9), uses Pharaoh to show his power (Rom. 9:17), and heals the man blind from birth to manifest his glory (John 9:3). Certainly in all these works of God one must not overlook people’s own sinfulness. In the process of divine hardening humans harden themselves (Exod. 7:13, 22; 8:15; 9:35; 13:15; 2 Chron. 36:13; Job 9:4; Ps. 95:8; Prov. 28:14; Heb. 3:8; 4:7). Jesus speaks in parables not only in order that people will fail to understand but also because people refuse to see or hear (Matt. 13:13). God gives people up to sin and delusion because they have made themselves deserving of it (Rom. 1:32; 2 Thess. 2:11). And it is ex posteriori that believers see God’s governing hand in the wicked deeds of enemies (2 Sam. 16:10; Ps. 39:9-10). Nevertheless, in all these things also the will and power of God become manifest, and his absolute sovereignty is revealed. He makes weal and creates woe; he forms the light and creates the darkness (Isa. 45:7; Amos 3:6); he creates the wicked for the day of evil (Prov. 16:4), does whatever he pleases (Ps. 115:3), does according to his will among the inhabitants of the earth (Dan. 4:35), inclines the heart of all humans as he wills (Prov. 16:9; 21:1), and orders their steps (Prov. 20:24; Jer. 10:23). Out of the same lump of clay he makes one vessel for beauty and another for menial use (Jer. 18; Rom. 9:20-24), has compassion upon whomever he wills and hardens the heart of whomever he wills (Rom. 9:18). He destines some people to disobedience (1 Pet. 2:8), designates some for condemnation (Jude 4), and refrains from recording the names of some in the Book of Life (Rev. 13:8; 17:8).
These numerous strong pronouncements of Scripture are daily confirmed in the history of humankind. The defenders of reprobation, accordingly, have always appealed to these appalling facts, of which history is full.153 Present in this world there is so much that is irrational, so much undeserved suffering, so many inexplicable disasters, such unequal and incomprehensible apportionment of good and bad fortune, such a heartbreaking contrast between joy and sorrow, that any thinking person has to choose between interpreting it—as pessimism does—in terms of the blind will of some misbegotten deity, or on the basis of Scripture believingly trusting in the absolute, sovereign, and yet—however incomprehensible—wise and holy will of him who will some day cause the full light of heaven to shine on those riddles of our existence.
…Now, in the context of this dreadful reality, far from coming up with a solution, Calvinism comforts us by saying that in everything that happens, it recognizes the will and hand of an almighty God, who is also a merciful Father. While Calvinism does not offer a solution, it invites us humans to rest in him who lives in unapproachable light, whose judgments are unsearchable, and whose paths are beyond tracing out. (Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: Volume 2: God And Creation, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004], §. 246, pp. 393-394, 395.) Return to Article.
[5.] A. H. Strong: “The decree of reprobation is not a positive decree, like that of election, but a permissive decree to leave the sinner to his self-chosen rebellion and its natural consequences of punishment. Election and sovereignty are only sources of good. Election is not a decree to destroy,—it is a decree only to save. When we elect a President, we do not need to hold a second election to determine that the remaining millions shall be non-Presidents. It is needless to apply contrivance or force. Sinners, like water, if simply let alone, will run down hill to ruin. The decree of reprobation is simply a decree to do nothing—a decree to leave the sinner to himself.” (Augustus Hopkins Strong, Systematic Theology: In Three Volumes: Volume Three, [Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press, 1909], pp. 789-790.) Return to Article.
[6.] John Dick: “When, out of many objects which are presented to him, a person makes a selection, he as positively rejects some as he chooses others. He does not pass by any without taking notice of them; but, having them all at once, or in succession, under his eye, he takes and leaves, for reasons which are satisfactory to himself. Not to choose, is a negative phrase, but it does not imply the absence of a determination of the mind. It is not to words, but to things, that we ought to attend; and any man, who reflects upon the operation of his own mind in a similar case, will perceive that the will is exercised in passing by one object, as much as in choosing another.” (John Dick, Lectures on Theology: In Two Volumes: Vol. I, [Philadelphia: J. Whetham & Son, 1841], p. 368.) Return to Article.
[8.] R. C. Sproul: “To understand the Reformed view of the matter we must pay close attention to the crucial distinction between positive and negative decrees of God. Positive has to do with God’s active intervention in the hearts of the elect. Negative has to do with God’s passing over the non-elect. The Reformed view teaches that God positively or actively intervenes in the lives of the elect to insure their salvation. The rest of mankind God leaves to themselves. He does not create unbelief in their hearts. That unbelief is already there. He does not coerce them to sin. They sin by their own choices. In the Calvinist view the decree of election is positive; the decree of reprobation is negative.” (R. C. Sproul, Chosen by God, [Wheaton: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 1986], pp. 142-143.) Return to Article.
[9.] Augustine: “Since, therefore, one person is moved to faith in one way while another is moved in another way, and frequently the same thing said to one person at one time moves him but said to another at another time does not move him, and it moves one and does not move another, who would dare to say that God lacked that way of calling by which Esau as well could have applied his mind and joined his will to that faith in which Jacob was made righteous? If the resistance of a person’s will can be so great that a mental revulsion hardens him against any manner of calling, it may be asked whether this very hardening comes from a divine punishment, when God has abandoned a person by not calling him in such a way that he will be moved to faith. For who would say that the manner in which he might be persuaded to have faith was lacking to the Almighty?” (Augustine of Hippo, Miscellany of Questions in Response to Simplician, 1.2.14, PL, 40:119; trans. WSA, I/12:196.) Thomas Aquinas: “Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.23.3; trans. The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas: Part: I: QQ. I.-XXVI: Second and Revised Edition, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, [London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1920], p. 324.) Return to Article.
[11.] William G. T. Shedd: “Reprobation relates to regenerating grace, not to common grace. It is an error to suppose that the reprobate are entirely destitute of grace. All mankind enjoy common grace. There are no elect or reprobate in this reference. Every human being experiences some degree of the ordinary influences of the Spirit of God. St. Paul teaches that God strives with man universally. He convicts him of sin, and urges him to repent of it, and forsake it. Rom. 1:19, 20; 2:3, 4; Acts 17:24-31. …The reprobate resist and nullify common grace; and so do the elect. The obstinate selfishness and enmity of the human heart defeats the Divine mercy as shown in the ordinary influences of the Holy Spirit, in both the elect and non-elect. Acts 7: 51… The difference between the two cases is, that in the instance of the elect, God follows up the common grace which has been resisted, with the regenerating grace which overcomes the resistance; while in the instance of the reprobate, he does not. It is in respect to the bestowment of this higher degree of grace, that St. Paul affirms that God “hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth” [i.e. does not soften].” (William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology: Volume I, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1888], pp. 431-432.) William Bates: “...it is from the perverseness of the will, and the love of sin, that men do not obey the gospel. For the Holy Spirit never withdraws his gracious assistance, till resisted, grieved, and quenched by them. It will be no excuse, that divine grace is not conferred in the same eminent degree upon some as upon others that are converted, for the impenitent shall not be condemned for want of that singular powerful grace that was the privilege of the elect, but for receiving in vain that measure of common grace that they had. If he that received one talent had faithfully improved it, he had been rewarded with more; but upon the slothful and ingrateful neglect of his duty, he was justly deprived of it, and cast into a dungeon of horror, the emblem of hell.” (William Bates, The Four Last Things: Namely, Death, Judgment, Heaven and Hell, Practically Considered and Applied in Several Discourses, [Burlington: Chauncey Goodrich, 1832], p. 399.) William G. T. Shedd: “God opposes no obstacle to the efficacy of the atonement, in the instance of the non-elect, (a) He exerts no direct efficiency to prevent the non-elect from trusting in the atonement. The decree of reprobation is permissive. God leaves the non-elect to do as he likes, (b) There is no compulsion from the external circumstances in which the providence of God has placed the non-elect. On the contrary, the outward circumstances, especially in Christendom, favor instead of hindering trust in Christ’s atonement. And so, in a less degree, do the outward circumstances in Heathendom. “The goodness, forbearance, and long-suffering of God [tend to] lead to repentance,” Rom. 2:4; Acts 14:17; 17:26-30. (c) The special grace which God bestows upon the elect does not prevent the non-elect from believing; neither does it render faith any more difficult for him. The non-elect receives common grace, and common grace would incline the human will if it were not defeated by the human will. If the sinner should make no hostile opposition, common grace would be equivalent to saving grace.[fn. 1: To say that common grace if not resisted by the sinner would be equivalent to regenerating grace, is not the same as to say that common grace if assisted by the sinner would be equivalent to regenerating grace. In the first instance, God would be the sole author of regeneration; in the second he would not be.]” (William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology: Volume II, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1888], pp. 482-483.) Stephen Charnock: “God is holy and righteous, because he doth not withdraw from man, till man deserts him. To say, that God withdrew that grace from Adam, which he had afforded him in creation, or any thing that was due to him, till he had abused the gifts of God, and turned them to an end contrary to that of creation, would be a reflection upon the Divine holiness. God was first deserted by man before man was deserted by God; and man doth first contemn and abuse the common grace of God, and those relics of natural light, that ‘enlighten every man that comes into the world’ (John i. 9); before God leaves him to the hurry of his own passions. Ephraim was first joined to idols, before God pronounced the fatal sentence, ‘Let him alone’ (Hos. iv. 17): and the heathens first changed the glory of the incorruptible God, before God withdrew his common grace from the corrupted creature (Rom. i. 23, 24); and they first ‘served the creature more than the Creator,’ before the Creator gave them up to the slavish chains of their vile affections (ver. 25, 26). Israel first cast off God before God cast off them; but then he ‘gave them up to their own hearts’ lusts, and they walked in their own counsels’ (Ps. lxxxi. 11, 12).” (Stephen Charnock, Discourses Upon the Existence and Attributes of God: A New Edition, [London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853], p. 507.) Return to Article.
[12.] Augustine: “Nevertheless, so far as it concerns justice and grace, it may be truly said to the guilty who is condemned, also concerning the guilty who is delivered, “Take what thine is, and go thy way;” “I will give unto this one that which is not due;” “Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? is thine eye evil because I am good?” And how if he should say, “Why not to me also?” He will hear, and with reason, “Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God?” And although assuredly in the one case you see a most benignant benefactor, and in your own case a most righteous exactor, in neither case do you behold an unjust God. For although He would be righteous even if He were to punish both, he who is delivered has good ground for thankfulness, he who is condemned has no ground for finding fault.” (Augustine of Hippo, A Treatise on the Gift of Perseverance, 8.17; PL, 45:1003; trans. NPNF1, 5:531.) Stephen Charnock: “The holiness of God is not blemished by decreeing the eternal rejection of some men. Reprobation, in its first notion, is an act of preterition, or passing by. A man is not made wicked by the act of God; but it supposeth him wicked; and so it is nothing else but God’s leaving a man in that guilt and filth wherein he beholds him. In its second notion, it is an ordination, not to a crime, but to a punishment (Jude 4): ‘an ordaining to condemnation.’ And though it be an eternal act of God, yet, in order of nature, it follows upon the foresight of the transgression of man, and supposeth the crime. God considers Adam’s revolt, and views the whole mass of his corrupted posterity, and chooses some to reduce to himself by his grace, and leaves others to lie sinking in their ruins. Since all mankind fell by the fall of Adam, and have corruption conveyed to them successively by that root, whereof they are branches; all men might justly be left wallowing in that miserable condition to which they are reduced by the apostasy of their common head; and God might have passed by the whole race of man, as well as he did the fallen angels, without any hope of redemption. He was no more bound to restore man, than to restore devils, nor bound to repair the nature of any one son of Adam; and had he dealt with men as he dealt with the devils, they had had, all of them, as little just ground to complain of God; for all men deserved to be left to themselves, for all were concluded under sin; but God calls out some to make monuments of his grace, which is an act of the sovereign mercy of that dominion, whereby ‘he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy’ (Rom. ix. 18); others he passes by, and leaves them remaining in that corruption of nature wherein they were born. If men have a power to dispose of their own goods, without any unrighteousness, why should not God dispose of his own grace, and bestow it upon whom he pleases; since it is a debt to none, but a free gift to any that enjoy it? God is not the cause of sin in this, because his operation about this is negative; it is not an action, but a denial of action, and therefore cannot be the cause of the evil actions of men. God acts nothing, but withholds his power; he doth not enlighten their minds, nor incline their wills so powerfully, as to expel their darkness, and root out those evil habits which possess them by nature. God could, if he would, savingly enlighten the minds of all men in the world, and quicken their hearts with a new life by an invincible grace; but in not doing it, there is no positive act of God, but a cessation of action. We may with as much reason say, that God is the cause of all the sinful actions that are committed by the corporation of devils, since their first rebellion, because he leaves them to themselves, and bestows not a new grace upon them,—as say, God is the cause of the sins of those that he overlooks and leaves in that state of guilt wherein he found them. God did not pass by any without the consideration of sin; so that this act of God is not repugnant to his holiness, but conformable to his justice.” (Stephen Charnock, Discourses Upon the Existence and Attributes of God: A New Edition, [London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853], p. 492.) Francis Turretin: “Although God by that desertion denies to man that without which sin cannot be avoided, the causality of sin cannot on that account be attributed to him. (1) God denies it justly and is not bound to give that grace to anyone. (2) From that negation does not follow the capability of sinning (which man has from himself), but only the non-curing of that incapability. (3) God denies the grace which they are unwilling to accept (or to retain) and which they of their own accord despise, since they desire nothing less than being governed by the Holy Spirit. (4) He does not deny that grace that they may sin, but that they may be punished on account of sin.” (Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 4.14.7; trans. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology: Volume One: First Through Tenth Topics, trans. George Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison, Jr., [Phillipsburg: P&R, 1992], p. 381.) Return to Article.
Note:
It is further objected by some that “if there is no difference between men which God takes into account in determining whom to elect and whom to reject or pass by; if men are, as regards the reasons, or conditions of His decisions so absolutely alike that omniscience can discern no difference between them, then to say that He discriminates between them in view of certain inscrutable reasons lying in His own nature, is to use words to which no possible meaning can be attached. According to this representation the purpose to save certain individuals and to “pass by” the rest, must be regarded as purely arbitrary — there being no motive for electing or rejecting one man rather than another.” (G. W. Northrup, Sovereignty of God: Part I, [Louisville: Baptist Book Concern, 1894], p. 38.) However, such reasoning is flawed. The issue is not that individuals lack distinguishing characteristics in the eyes of God; rather, it is that the basis for God’s extension of grace to some and judgment to others is not found in persons (1 Corinthians 4:7) but in the sovereign will of the all-wise and all-knowing Creator of the universe (Job 42:2-3; Isaiah 40:28; 55:8-9; Romans 11:33-34; Psalm 145:3; 147:5). God’s reasons are ultimately rooted in His sovereign will, wisdom, and immutable character, not in contingent, measurable differences among His creatures.
It will not do to say that “If God had appointed some other man than Abraham to be the founder of the Jewish nation, or some other man than Paul to be the apostle to the Gentiles, or some other man than Luther to inaugurate the Reformation, the course of events in the world would have differed beyond our power of conception from its actual course.” (Idem, pp. 42-43) Abraham, Paul, and Luther did not come into existence apart from the will of God. Abraham was born when, where, under what circumstances and with the particular disposition he had, because God willed it to be so before the foundations of the world were ever laid (Isaiah 46:9-10; Daniel 4:34-35; Ephesians 1:4-6, 11-12; Psalm 115:3; Colossians 1:16-17). Every event in redemptive history unfolds under God’s sovereign direction.
Furthermore, the notion that the world might have been different is highly dubious. As Johnathan Edwards contends, “If God’s will is steadily and surely determined in everything by supreme wisdom, then it is in everything necessarily determined to that which is most wise. And, certainly, it would be a disadvantage and indignity to be otherwise. For if the Divine will was not necessarily determined to that which, in every case, is wisest and best, it must be subject to some degree of undersigning contingence; and so in the same degree liable to evil. To suppose the Divine will liable to be carried hither and thither at random, by the uncertain wind of blind contingence, which is guided by no wisdom, no motive, no intelligent dictate whatsoever (if any such thing were possible), would certainly argue a great degree of imperfection and meanness, infinitely unworthy of the Deity. If it be a disadvantage for the Divine will to be attended with this moral necessity, then the more free from it, and the more left at random, the greater dignity and advantage. And, consequently, to be perfectly free from the direction of understanding, and universally and entirely left to senseless, unmeaning contingence, to act absolutely at random, would be the supreme glory.” (Johnathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, [Liverpool: Edward Howell, 1877], pp. 333-334.) God is bound by His character. Just as He cannot sin (1 John 1:5; Habakkuk 1:13; James 1:13) or lie (Hebrews 6:18; 1 Samuel 15:29)—for doing so would contradict His very nature, which is impossible—so too, He cannot do anything other than that which is most wise (Proverbs 3:19). For God cannot be other than what He is. His actions are not subject to random chance or human-like contingency because, by definition, God cannot act contrary to His nature (just as He cannot sin or lie). This logical necessity undergirds the claim that His decisions—even if inscrutable to us—are perfectly coherent within His divine character. Thus, even if we cannot comprehend the full rationale behind His election of some and reprobation of others, we can trust that it is consistent with His perfectly holy and wise character.
The term anthropomorphization comes from the greek ἄνθρωπος (human) — from which we get the word anthropology (the study of the origin and development of human societies and cultures) — and μορφή (shape or form) — from which we derive the term morphology (the study of form). Anthropomorphization is the projection of the human form (traits, characteristics, etc.) onto non-human entities — for example, the teapot Mrs. Potts in the Disney animated film Beauty and the Beast (teapots cannot walk about or talk, humans can). We must be careful to avoid anthropomorphizing God when dealing with those things which are beyond our comprehension. That I, in my fallen human finitude, cannot perceive how or why God might determine to extend mercy to some and justice to others, does not mean that an infinitely wise and powerful Creator lacks reasons for doing so (Romans 9:10-16). We must not project our human limitations onto God. Our inability to fully understand His ways does not imply that His decisions are arbitrary or senseless; rather, they stem from an infinite wisdom that transcends human understanding. Return to Article.Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude that reprobation is the symmetrical antithesis of election. John nowhere states that Jesus chose men to be condemned; rather, he chose some out of the ‘world’. The primary mission of the Son is to save (3.17; 12.47), and this mission springs from God’s love (3.16). This love comes to transform men who constitute the ‘world’ into men who do not. Jesus does not come to assign some neutral men to life and other neutral men to condemnation. He comes rather to a world already condemned (3.36) and proceeds to save.
(D. A. Carson, Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical Perspectives in Tension, [Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981], p. 196. Cf. Idem, pp. 195-197.)
Cf. Louis Berkhof (1873-1957 A.D.):
Reprobation may be defined as that eternal decree of God whereby He has determined to pass some men by with the operations of His special grace, and to punish them for their sins, to the manifestation of His justice. The following points deserve special emphasis: (1) It contains two elements. According to the most usual representation in Reformed theology the decree of reprobation comprises two elements, namely, preterition or the determination to pass by some men; and condemnation (sometimes called precondemnation) or the determination to punish those who are passed by for their sins. As such it embodies a twofold purpose: (a) to pass by some in the bestowal of regenerating and saving grace; and (b) to assign them to dishonor and to the wrath of God for their sins. The Belgic Confession mentions only the former, but the Canons of Dort name the latter as well. Some Reformed theologians would omit the second element from the decree of reprobation. Dabney prefers to regard the condemnation of the wicked as the foreseen and intended result of their preterition, thus depriving reprobation of its positive character; and Dick is of the opinion that the decree to condemn ought to be regarded as a separate decree, and not as a part of the decree of reprobation. It seems to us, however, that we are not warranted in excluding the second element from the decree of reprobation, nor to regard it as a different decree. The positive side of reprobation is so clearly taught in Scripture as the opposite of election that we cannot regard it as something purely negative, Rom. 9:21,22; Jude 4. However, we should notice several points of distinction between the two elements of the decree of reprobation: (a) Preterition is a sovereign act of God, an act of His mere good pleasure, in which the demerits of man do not come into consideration, while precondemnation is a judicial act, visiting sin with punishment. Even Supralapsarians are willing to admit that in condemnation sin is taken into consideration. (b) The reason for preterition is not known by man. It cannot be sin, for all men are sinners. We can only say that God passed some by for good and wise reasons sufficient unto Himself. On the other hand the reason for condemnation is known; it is sin. (c) Preterition is purely passive, a simple passing by without any action on man, but condemnation is efficient and positive. Those who are passed by are condemned on account of their sin. (2) We should guard against the idea, however, that as election and reprobation both determine with absolute certainty the end unto which man is predestined and the means by which that end is realized, they also imply that in the case of reprobation as well as in that of election God will bring to pass by His own direct efficiency whatsoever He has decreed. This means that, while it can be said that God is the author of the regeneration, calling, faith, justification, and sanctification, of the elect, and thus by direct action on them brings their election to realization, it cannot be said that He is also the responsible author of the fall, the unrighteous condition, and the sinful acts of the reprobate by direct action on them, and thus effects the realization of their reprobation. God’s decree undoubtedly rendered the entrance of sin into the world certain, but He did not predestinate some unto sin, as He did others unto holiness. And as the holy God He cannot be the author of sin. The position which Calvin takes on this point in his Institutes is clearly indicated in the following deliverances found in Calvin’s Articles on Predestination:
“Although the will of God is the supreme and first cause of all things and God holds the devil and all the impious subject to His will, God nevertheless cannot be called the cause of sin, nor the author of evil, neither is He open to any blame.
“Although the devil and reprobates are God’s servants and instruments to carry out His secret decisions, nevertheless in an incomprehensible manner God so works in them and through them as to contract no stain from their vice, because their malice is used in a just and righteous way for a good end, although the manner is often hidden from us.
“They act ignorantly and calumniously who say that God is made the author of sin, if all things come to pass by His will and ordinance; because they make no distinction between the depravity of men and the hidden appointments of God.” (3) It should be noted that that with which God decided to pass some men by, is not His common but his special, His regenerating, grace, the grace that changes sinners into saints. It is a mistake to think that in this life the reprobate are entirely destitute of God’s favor. God does not limit the distribution of His natural gifts by the purpose of election. He does not even allow election and reprobation to determine the measure of these gifts. The reprobate often enjoy a greater measure of the natural blessings of life than the elect. What effectively distinguishes the latter from the former is that they are made recipients of the regenerating and saving grace of God.
(L. Berkhof, Systematic Theology: Fourth Revised and Enlarged Edition, [Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1976], pp. 116-117.) See also: ccel.org.Cf. John Dick (1764-1833 A.D.):
If we inquire into the reason why God passed over some in his eternal decree, while he extended mercy to others, we must content ourselves with the words of our Lord, which were spoken in reference to the execution of his purpose:—“Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight.”[Matth. xi. 26.] It may be supposed, indeed, that we need not resolve the decree of reprobation into the sovereignty of God, as a sufficient reason for it may be found in the moral character of its objects, who, being considered as fallen and guilty creatures, may be presumed to have been rejected on this account. But although this may seem at first sight to have been the cause of their reprobation, yet upon closer attention we shall see reason to change our opinion. It is obvious that, if they had not been considered as fallen, they would not have been rejected . . . although their fall is presupposed to their reprobation, it will appear that the former was not the reason of the latter, if we recollect that those, who were chosen to salvation, were exactly in the same situation. Both classes appeared in the eyes of God to be guilty, polluted, and worthy of death. Their sinfulness, therefore, could not be the reason of rejection in the one case, since it did not cause rejection in the other. If it was the reason why some were passed by, it would have been a reason why all should be passed by. As, then, it did not hinder the election of some, it could not be the cause which hindered the election of others. You ought not to think that there is too much refinement and subtlety in this reasoning. If you pay due attention to the subject, you will perceive that, as the moral state of all was the same, it could not be the cause of the difference in their destination. If there was sin in the reprobate, there was sin also in the elect; and we must therefore resolve their opposite allotment into the will of God, who gives and withholds his favour according to his pleasure:—“He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.”[Rom. ix. 18.]
Since, therefore, one person is moved to faith in one way while another is moved in another way, and frequently the same thing said to one person at one time moves him but said to another at another time does not move him, and it moves one and does not move another, who would dare to say that God lacked that way of calling by which Esau as well could have applied his mind and joined his will to that faith in which Jacob was made righteous?
If the resistance of a person’s will can be so great that a mental revulsion hardens him against any manner of calling, it may be asked whether this very hardening comes from a divine punishment, when God has abandoned a person by not calling him in such a way that he will be moved to faith. For who would say that the manner in which he might be persuaded to have faith was lacking to the Almighty?
(Augustine of Hippo, Miscellany of Questions in Response to Simplician, 1.2.14, PL, 40:119; trans. WSA, I/12:196.)
Cf. Augustine of Hippo (c. 354-430 A.D.):
Faith, then, as well in its beginning as in its completion, is God’s gift; and let no one have any doubt whatever, unless he desires to resist the plainest sacred writings, that this gift is given to some, while to some it is not given. But why it is not given to all ought not to disturb the believer, who believes that from one all have gone into a condemnation, which undoubtedly is most righteous; so that even if none were delivered therefrom, there would be no just cause for finding fault with God. Whence it is plain that it is a great grace for many to be delivered, and to acknowledge in those that are not delivered what would be due to themselves; so that he that glorieth may glory not in his own merits, which he sees to be equalled in those that are condemned, but in the Lord. But why He delivers one rather than another,—“His judgments are unsearchable, and His ways past finding out.” For it is better in this case for us to hear or to say, “O man, who art thou that repliest against God?” than to dare to speak as if we could know what He has chosen to be kept secret. Since, moreover, He could not will anything unrighteous.
(Augustine of Hippo, A Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints, 16; PL, 44:972-973; trans. NPNF1, 5:506.) See also: ccel.org.
Cf. Augustine of Hippo (c. 354-430 A.D.):
Nevertheless, so far as it concerns justice and grace, it may be truly said to the guilty who is condemned, also concerning the guilty who is delivered, “Take what thine is, and go thy way;” “I will give unto this one that which is not due;” “Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? is thine eye evil because I am good?” And how if he should say, “Why not to me also?” He will hear, and with reason, “Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God?” And although assuredly in the one case you see a most benignant benefactor, and in your own case a most righteous exactor, in neither case do you behold an unjust God. For although He would be righteous even if He were to punish both, he who is delivered has good ground for thankfulness, he who is condemned has no ground for finding fault.
(Augustine of Hippo, A Treatise on the Gift of Perseverance, 8.17; PL, 45:1003; trans. NPNF1, 5:531.) See also: ccel.org.
Cf. Augustine of Hippo (c. 354-430 A.D.):
But I do not know the reason why one or another is more or less helped or not helped by that grace; this only I know, that God does this with perfect justice, and for reasons which to Himself are known as sufficient.
(Augustine of Hippo, Letter 95.6 [to Paulinus and Therasia]; trans. NPNF1, 1:403. Cf. WSA, II/1:419.) See also: ccel.org.Cf. Augustine of Hippo (c. 354-430 A.D.):
…“Who hath made thee to differ? and what hast thou that thou receivedst not?” For though the capacity to have faith is of nature, is it also of nature to have it? “For all men have not faith,” although all men have the capacity to have faith. But the apostle does not say, “And what hast thou capacity to have, the capacity to have which thou receivedst not?” but he says, “And what hast thou which thou receivedst not?” Accordingly, the capacity to have faith, as the capacity to have love, belongs to men’s nature; but to have faith, even as to have love, belongs to the grace of believers. That nature, therefore, in which is given to us the capacity of having faith, does not distinguish man from man, but faith itself makes the believer to differ from the unbeliever. And thus, when it is said, “For who maketh thee to differ? and what hast thou that thou receivedst not?” if any one dare to say, “I have faith of myself, I did not, therefore, receive it,” he directly contradicts this most manifest truth,—not because it is not in the choice of man’s will to believe or not to believe, but because in the elect the will is prepared by the Lord. Thus, moreover, the passage, “For who maketh thee to differ? and what hast thou that thou receivedst not?” refers to that very faith which is in the will of man.
“Many hear the word of truth; but some believe, while others contradict. Therefore, the former will to believe; the latter do not will.” Who does not know this? Who can deny this? But since in some the will is prepared by the Lord, in others it is not prepared, we must assuredly be able to distinguish what comes from God’s mercy, and what from His judgment. “What Israel sought for,” says the apostle, “he hath not obtained, but the election hath obtained it; and the rest were blinded, as it is written, God gave to them the spirit of compunction,—eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear, even to this day. And David said, Let their table be made a snare, a retribution, and a stumblingblock to them; let their eyes be darkened, that they may not see; and bow down their back always.” Here is mercy and judgment,—mercy towards the election which has obtained the righteousness of God, but judgment to the rest which have been blinded. And yet the former, because they willed, believed; the latter, because they did not will believed not. Therefore mercy and judgment were manifested in the very wills themselves. Certainly such an election is of grace, not at all of merits. For he had before said, “So, therefore, even at this present time, the remnant has been saved by the election of grace. And if by grace, now it is no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace.” Therefore the election obtained what it obtained gratuitously; there preceded none of those things which they might first give, and it should be given to them again. He saved them for nothing. But to the rest who were blinded, as is there plainly declared, it was done in recompense. “All the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth.” But His ways are unsearchable. Therefore the mercy by which He freely delivers, and the truth by which He righteously judges, are equally unsearchable.
[20.] Cf. Amandus Polanus (1561-1610 A.D.):
Reprobation is equal to election, 1. in the efficient causes. For God is author of both, God’s good pleasure or freewill is the motive cause of both.
2. In the matter. For both is the decree of God.
3. In the ends: for both are for the glory of God and salvation of the elect.
4. In the common subject, which is mankind, in as much as it was to be corrupted & thrown into eternal death by their own default. As then election is the decree of delivering such as are given to Christ by mercy out of the common destruction: so Reprobation is the decree to leave such as are not given to Christ in that common destruction by justice. Therefore as election found not men worthy but made them so, so reprobation cast none into eternal death, but by just judgment leaves them that are plunged into it by their own sin and fault in it. For as God decreed not to choose any that was just already, but the sinner to be made just by grace, so likewise he did not decree to reprobate the just, but the sinner to be justly condemned for sin.
5. In the adjuncts both were from eternal: both are firm and immutable: both not to be altered, whether you respect God’s counsel, or the persons themselves elected or reprobated. So that neither the counsel of God can possibly be made frustrate, nor the elect become reprobates, nor the reprobates elect.
The inequality or unlikeliness of reprobation and election, appears in these.
1. In the form. For as election is a decree of pitying and delivering out of the universal ruin, and taking into salvation: so reprobation is a decree of not pitying but relinquishing in the common waste, and of not vouchsafing of salvation.
2. In the effects. For inward calling, faith, justification, glorification, good works, and eternal salvation, are the effects of election: but debarring from the grace of inward calling, and faith, and justification, glorification, good works, and the blessing of salvation, and sins, and the punishments of the same, are not the effects of reprobation.
3. In the proper subjects. For election is of such as shall be saved, reprobation of them that are to be condemned.
4. In the ensuing adjuncts. For though sin be not the cause of reprobation, yet it is of damnation: for no man is condemned but for sin: but the good works of the godly, as they are not the cause of election so neither of salvation, but only the way that God hath prepared for the godly to walk in. Eph. 2.10. We are his workmanship framed in Christ Jesus to good works, which God hath prepared that we should walk in them: Now as the way is not the cause of the mark, so are not good works the cause of salvation.
(Amandus Polanus, Treatise of Amandus Polanus, Concerning God’s Eternal Predestination, [Cambridge: John Legat, Printer to the University of Cambridge, 1599], pp. 201-203.) [I have modernized the original spelling.] Return to Article.[21.] Cf. R. C. Sproul (1939-2017 A.D.):
In the case of the elect, God extends mercy. In the case of the reprobate, he withholds it. “I will have mercy on whomever I will have mercy” (Rom. 9:15). There is no equal ultimacy in the distribution of God’s mercy and grace. He extends his mercy and withholds it as he pleases. We all enter this world as fallen, sinful creatures. God exercises his saving grace on the elect, and the rest he leaves in their fallen, sinful state.
(R. C. Sproul, Truths We Confess: Volume One: The Triune God, [Phillipsburg: P&R, 2006], p. 104.)Cf. Robert Letham:
Election and reprobation are asymmetrical. They equally depend on the will of God but with crucial differences. Reprobation is a matter of divine justice and contemplates the sins and eventual just condemnation of those passed by (WCF, 3.7). Each of the reprobate will receive what he or she deserves, for “the wages of sin is death.” In graphic contrast, election is entirely according to God’s grace, undeserved and unearned. Election is in Christ; reprobation is in ourselves.
(Robert Letham, Systematic Theology, [Wheaton: Crossway, 2019], 14.1.1, p. 407.)
Cf. Robert Shaw (1795-1863 A.D.):
Our Confession speaks of God’s passing by some, and also ordaining them to wrath; and we apprehend there is an important distinction betwixt the two. If the reason be inquired why God passed by some of mankind sinners, while he elected others to life, it must be resolved into the counsel of his own will, whereby he extends or withholds mercy as he pleases. No doubt those whom God passed by were considered as fallen and guilty creatures; but if there was sin in them, there was sin also in those who were chosen to salvation; we must, therefore, resolve their opposite allotment into the will of God: “He hath mercy upon whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.”—Rom. ix. 18. As it would have been just in God to pass by the whole of our race, and to deal with them as he did with the angels who sinned, it must be manifest that, in electing some to life, he did no injustice to the non-elect, whose case would have been just as bad as it is, even supposing the others had not been chosen at all. But if the reason be inquired why God ordained to dishonour and wrath those whom he passed by, this must be resolved into their own sin. In this act God appears as a judge, fixing beforehand the punishment of the guilty; and his decree is only a purpose of acting towards them according to the natural course of justice. Their own sin is the procuring cause of their final ruin, and therefore God does them no wrong. The salvation of the elect is wholly “to the praise of his glorious grace,” and the condemnation of the non-elect is “to the praise of his glorious justice.”
(Robert Shaw, An Exposition of the Confession of Faith of the Westminster Assembly of Divines: Eighth Edition, [Glasgow: Blackie and Son, 1857], pp. 57-58.)
Cf. Archibald Alexander Hodge (1823-1886 A.D.):
This Section teaches the following propositions:
1st. That as God has sovereignly destinated certain persons, called the elect, through grace to salvation, so he has sovereignly decreed to withhold his grace from the rest; and that this withholding rests upon the unsearchable counsel of his own will, and is for the glory of his sovereign power.
2d. That God has consequently determined to treat all those left in their sins with exact justice according to their own deserts, to the praise of his justice, which demands the punishment of all unexpiated sin.
This decree of reprobation, as it is called, is the aspect which God’s eternal purpose presents in its relation to that portion of the human family which shall be finally condemned for their sins.
It consists of two elements: (1.) Negative, inasmuch as it involves a determination to pass over these, and to refuse to elect them to life. (2.) Positive, inasmuch as it involves a determination to treat them on the principles of strict justice precisely as they deserve. In its negative aspect, reprobation is simply not election, and is absolutely sovereign, resting upon his good pleasure alone, since those passed over are no worse than those elected. In respect to its positive element, reprobation is not in the least sovereign, but purely judicial, because God has determined to treat the reprobate precisely according to their deserts in the view of absolute justice. Our Standards are very careful to guard this point explicitly. This Section says that God has ordained the non-elect “to dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice.” The same is repeated in almost identical language in the answer to the thirteenth question of the Larger Catechism.
This doctrine, instead of being inconsistent with the principles of absolute justice, necessarily follows from the application of those principles to the case in hand. (1.) All men alike are “by nature the children of wrath,” and justly obnoxious to the penalty of the law antecedently to the gift of Christ to be their Saviour. It is because they are in this condition that vicarious satisfaction of divine justice was absolutely necessary in order to the salvation of any, otherwise, the Apostle says, “Christ is dead in vain.” Hence if any are to be saved, justice itself demands that their salvation shall be recognized as not their right, but a sovereign concession on the part of God. None have a natural right to salvation. And the salvation of one cannot give a right to salvation to another. (2.) Salvation is declared to be in its very essence a matter of grace, and if of grace, the the selection of its subjects is inalienably a matter of divine discretion. Lam. iii. 22; Rom. iv. 4; xi. 6; Eph. i. 6, 7; John iii. 16; 1 John iii. 16; iv. 10.
(Archibald Alexander Hodge, A Commentary on the Confession of Faith, [Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1869], pp. 107-109.)
Cf. William G. T. Shedd (1820-1894 A.D.):
The first characteristic of the Confessional statement that we mention is, that it brings sin within the scope, and under the control of the Divine decree. Sin is one of the “whatsoevers” that have “come to pass,” all of which are “ordained.” Some would have the doctrine that sin is decreed stricken from the Confession, because in their view it makes God the author of sin. The Confession denies this in its assertion that by the Divine decree “violence is not offered to the will of the creature, nor is the liberty of second causes taken away, but rather established.” In so saying, the authors had in mind the common distinction recognized in Calvinistic creeds and systems, between the efficient and the permissive decree, though they do not use the terms here. The latter, like the former, makes an event certain, but by a different mode from that of the former. When God executes his decree that Saul of Tarsus shall be “a vessel of mercy,” he works efficiently within him by his Holy Spirit “to will and to do.” When God executes his decree that Judas Iscariot shall be “a vessel of wrath fitted for destruction,” he does not work efficiently within him “to will and to do,” but permissively in the way of allowing him to have his own wicked will. He decides not to restrain him or to regenerate him, but to leave him to his own obstinate and rebellious inclination and purpose; and accordingly “the Son of man goeth as it was determined, but woe unto that man by whom he is betrayed” (Luke 22: 22; Acts 2: 23). The two Divine methods in the two cases are plainly different, but the perdition of Judas was as much foreordained and free from chance, as the conversion of Saul. Man’s inability to explain how God can make sin certain, but not compulsory, by a permissive decree, is no reason for denying that he can do it or that he has done it. Appendix, Note 2.
It is sometimes argued that the Confession excludes the tenet of the permissive decree, by its declaration that the “providence of God extendeth itself even to the first fall, and all other sins of angels and men, and that not by a bare permission” (Conf. v. 4). The “bare permission” which the Assembly rejects here is that of the Tridentine theologians, who asserted that sin arises from the “mere permission” of God. The Reformed theologians understood this to mean, that in respect to the fall of angels and men God is an idle and helpless spectator (deo otioso spectante), and that sin came into the universe without any positive decision and purpose on his part. This kind of “permission” implies that God could not have prevented sin had he so decided, and is really no permission at all; because no one can properly be said to permit what he cannot prevent. In order to exclude this view of “permission,” the Assembly assert “such [a permission] as hath joined with it a most holy, wise, and powerful bounding and otherwise ordering and governing of [the sins of angels and men], in a manifold dispensation, to his own holy ends; yet so as the sinfulness thereof proceedeth only from the creature, not from God, who neither is nor can be the author of sin.” This last clause declares that God’s relation to the sin which he decrees, is not that of efficiency, but permission. For if God worked directly and efficiently in angel or man “to will,” when he wills wickedly, the “sinfulness of sin” would “proceed from God,” and God would be “the author of sin.” The permissive decree is taught also in Larger Catechism, 19. “God by his providence permitted some of the angels, wilfully and irrecoverably, to fall into sin and damnation, limiting and ordering that, and all their sins, to his own glory.”
The permissive decree is supported by Scripture, in the statement that God “in times past suffered (εἴασε) all nations to walk in their own ways” (Acts 14:16); that “the times of this ignorance God overlooked” (ὑπεριδών) (Acts 17:30); that God “gave rebellious Israel their own desire” (Psalm 78: 29); that “he gave them their request” (Psalm 106: 15). This phraseology is never employed when holiness is spoken of. The Bible never says that God permits man to be holy, or to act righteously. He efficiently influences and actuates him to this.
(William G. T. Shedd, Calvinism: Pure And Mixed: A Defence of the Westminster Standards, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1893], pp. 32-34.)
Cf. William G. T. Shedd (1820-1894 A.D.):
The doctrine of the permissive decree has great value in two respects: (a) In taking sin out of the sphere of chance. (b) In explaining the tenet of preterition, or “foreordination to everlasting death.”
First, by the permissive decree, sin is brought within the Divine plan of the universe, and under the Divine control. Whatever is undecreed must be by hap-hazard and accident. If sin does not occur by the Divine purpose and perinission, it occurs by chance. And if sin occurs by chance, the deity, as in the ancient pagan theologies, is limited and hampered by it. He is not “God over all.” Dualism is introduced into the theory of the universe. Evil is an independent and uncontrollable principle. God governs only in part. Sin with all its effects is beyond his sway. This dualism God condemns as error, in his words to Cyrus by Isaiah, “I make peace and create evil;” and in the words of Proverbs 16: 4, “The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil” “We believe,” says the Belgic Confession, Art. 13, “that God after he had created all things did not forsake them, or give them up to fortune or chance, but that he rules and governs them according to his holy will, so that nothing happens in this world without his appointment; nevertheless, God neither is the author of, nor can be charged with, the sins which are committed.”
Secondly, by the permissive decree, the preterition of some sinners and thereby their “foreordination to everlasting death” is shown to be rational as well as Scriptural, because God, while decreeing the destiny of the non-elect, is not the author of his sin or of his perdition. Preterition is a branch of the permissive decree, and stands or falls with it. Whoever would strike the doctrine of preterition from the Standards, to be consistent must strike out the general doctrine that sin is decreed. If God could permissively decree the fall of Adam and his posterity without being the cause and author of it, he can also permissively decree the eternal death of an individual sinner without being the cause and author of it. In preterition, God repeats, in respect to an individual, the act which he performed in respect to the race. He permitted the whole human species to fall in Adam in such a manner that they were responsible and guilty for the fall, and he permits an individual of the species to remain a sinner and to be lost by sin, in such a manner that the sinner is responsible and guilty for this.
The Westminster Standards, in common with the Calvinistic creeds generally, begin with affirming the universal sovereignty of God over his entire universe: over heaven, earth, and hell; and comprehend all beings and all events under his dominion. Nothing comes to pass contrary to his decree. Nothing happens by chance. Even moral evil, which he abhors and forbids, occurs by “the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God;” and yet occurs through the agency of the unforced and self-determining will of man as the efficient.
Why should such a tenet as this, taught by Scripture and supported by reason, be stricken out of the Confession; or if not stricken out, so minimized as to declare that God decrees holiness but not sin, elects but does not pass by? On the contrary, why should it not be proclaimed boldly and everywhere, that above all the sin, and the misery caused by sin, in this world of mankind, there sits on the throne a wise, benevolent, and omnipotent Sovereign who for reasons sufficient in his view permitted, but did not cause or compel, the fall of angels and men, with the intention of guiding the issue of it all to an ultimate end worthy of himself—namely, the manifestation of his two great attributes of mercy and justice: of mercy, in the salvation from sin of “a great multitude whom no man can number;” of justice, in leaving a multitude that can be numbered to the sin which they love and prefer, and its righteous punishment.
(William G. T. Shedd, Calvinism: Pure And Mixed: A Defence of the Westminster Standards, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1893], pp. 37-39.)
Cf. William G. T. Shedd (1820-1894 A.D.):
What is preterition? It is God’s passing by a sinner in the bestowment of regenerating, not of common grace. All men are blessed with common grace. There is no election or reprobation in this reference. God’s mercy in this form and degree of it is universal and indiscriminate. But common grace fails to save the sinner, because of his love of sin, his aversion to holiness, and his unbelief. The martyr Stephen’s words are applicable to every man in respect to common grace: “Ye stiff-necked, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost” (Acts 7:51). Consequently, in order to save any sinner whatsoever requires a still higher grade of grace which, in the phrase of the Larger Catechism (67), “powerfully determines” his will by regenerating it. Here is where the Divine discrimination comes in. It is with reference to this kind and degree of grace that God says: “I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy” (Ex. 33:19; Rom. 9:15). And this is the Scripture truth which is now on trial in the Presbyterian Church. This is the particular doctrine which excites animosity in some minds, and which it is contended must be cut out of the Confession like cancerous matter that is killing the body. Let us consider the objections that are made to it.
(William G. T. Shedd, Calvinism: Pure And Mixed: A Defence of the Westminster Standards, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1893], pp. 43-44.)
Cf. William G. T. Shedd (1820-1894 A.D.):
1. It is objected that preterition is inconsistent with the infinite compassion of God for the souls of all men, and cannot be squared with such assertions as, “As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but that the wicked turn from his way and live: turn ye, turn ye, for why will ye die? God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him might not perish but have everlasting life.”
The first reply to this is, that these and many similar affirmations of the Divine pity for the sinful soul and desire for its salvation, are written in the same inspired volume that contains such assertions as the following: “Many shall seek to enter in and shall not be able. He hath blinded their eyes and hardened their hearts, that they should not see with their eyes, and be converted, and I should heal them. The Son of man goeth as it was determined; but woe unto that man by whom he is betrayed. I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy. The children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand not of works but of him that calleth, it was said, The elder shall serve the younger. The disobedient stumble at the word, whereunto also they were appointed.” Since both classes of passages come from God, he must perceive that they are consistent with each other whether man can or not. Both, then, must be accepted as eternal truth by an act of faith, by every one who believes in the inspiration of the Bible. They must be presumed to be self-consistent, whether it can be shown or not.
But, secondly, there are degrees of mercy. Because God does not show the highest degree of it to a particular sinner, it does not follow that he does not show him any at all. He may grant him the mercy of common grace, and when this is resisted and nullified by his hostile self-will and obstinate love of sin, he may decide not to bestow the mercy of special grace, and yet not be chargeable with destitution of love and compassion towards him.[fn. 1: Man is compelled to speak of God’s decision or decree in this way, though strictly there is no before or after for him. All his decrees are eternal and simultaneous. Yet there is an order of nature. Special grace supposes the failure of common grace.] Any degree of love is love; and any degree of compassion is compassion. To contend that the Divine love must be of exactly the same degree towards all creatures alike or else it is not love, is untenable. It is certain that God can feel love and pity towards the souls of all men, as his creatures and as sinners lost by their own fault, and manifest it in that measure of grace which “leads to repentance” (Rom. 2: 4), and would result in it if it were not resisted, and yet not actually save them all from the consequences of their own action. The Scriptures plainly teach that God so loved the whole world that he gave his only-begotten Son to make expiation for “the sins of the whole world;” and they just as plainly teach that a part of this world of mankind are sentenced, by God, to eternal death for their sins. The Arminian and the Calvinist both alike deny the doctrine of universal salvation, yet believe that this is compatible with the doctrine of God’s universal benevolence. Both deny the inference that if God does not save every human being, he does not love the soul of every human being; that if he does not do as much for one person as he does for another, he is unmerciful towards him. It is a fallacy to maintain, that unless God does all that he possibly can to save a sinner, he does not do anything towards his salvation; as it would be fallacious to maintain, that unless God bestows upon a person all the temporal blessings that are within his power, he does not show him any benevolence at all. This fallacy lies under the argument against preterition. It is asserted that if God “passes by” a sinner in the bestowment of regenerating grace, he has no love for his soul, no desire for its salvation, and does nothing towards its welfare. But if God really felt no compassion for a sinner, and showed him none, he would immediately punish him for his sin, and the matter would end here. The sinner’s doom would be fixed. Just retribution would follow transgression instantaneously, and forever. And who can impeach justice? “As all men have sinned in Adam, and are obnoxious to eternal death, God would have done no injustice by leaving them all to perish, and delivering them over to condemnation on account of sin, according to the words of the Apostle: ‘That every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God’” (Dort Canons, I. i.). But God does not do this. He suffers long and is forbearing with every sinner without exception. There is not a transgressor on earth, in Christendom or Heathendom, who is not treated by his Maker better than he deserves; who does not experience some degree of the Divine love and compassion. God showers down upon all men the blessings of his providence, and bestows upon them all more or less of the common influences and operation of the Holy Spirit. This is mercy to the souls of men universally, and ought to move them to repent of sin and forsake it. This common grace and universal benevolence of God is often spoken of in Scripture. “Despisest thou, O man, the riches of God’s goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering, not knowing [recognizing] that the goodness of God leads [tends to lead] thee to repentance; but after thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath?” (Rom. 2:4, 5). Here is the common grace of God enjoyed by men universally, and thwarted by their love of sin, and obstinate self-will in sin. But is God unmerciful and destitute of compassion towards this man, if he decides to proceed no further with him, but leave him where he is, and as he is? Is all that God has done for him in the way of long-suffering, forbearance, kindness, and inward monitions in his conscience, to count for nothing? If this treatment of the sinner is not benevolence and compassion, what is it? It is mercy in God to reveal to every man the law of God, nay even “the wrath of God against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who hold the truth in unrighteousness,” for by this revelation the man is warned and urged to turn from sin and live. This is one way in which God says to the sinner, “Turn ye, turn ye, for why will ye die? As I live I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth.” It is mercy in God, and is so represented by St. Paul, when he “does not leave himself without witness, in that he does good, sending rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling men’s hearts with good and gladness, and makes of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and determines the bounds of their habitation, that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from every one of us” (Acts 14:17; 17:26, 27). That this gracious and fatherly interest in their souls’ welfare is repelled and nullified by their preference for sin and love of worldly pleasure, and comes to nauglit, does not alter the nature of it as it lies in the heart of God. It is Divine mercy and love for human souls, notwithstanding its ill success.
Common grace is great and undeserved mercy to a sinner, and would save him if he did not resist and frustrate it. In and by it, “God commandeth all men everywhere to repent,” and whoever repents will find mercy. In and by it, God commands every hearer of the written word to believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and whoever believes shall be saved. The common grace of God consists of the written, or in the instance of the heathen the unwritten word, together with more or less of the convicting operation of the Holy Spirit. Says Hodge (ii. 667), “The Bible teaches that the Holy Spirit, as the Spirit of truth, of holiness, and of life in all its forms, is present with every human mind, enforcing truth, restraining from evil, exciting to good, and imparting wisdom, or strength, when, where, and in what measure seemeth to him good. In this sphere, also, he ‘divideth to every man severally as he will.’” Whoever is in any degree convinced of sin, and is in any degree urged by his conscience to confess and forsake it, is a subject of common grace. And whoever stifles conviction, refuses confession, and “holds down the truth in unrighteousness,” resists common grace. St. Paul charges this sin upon both the heathen and the evangelized. Common grace, we repeat, is great and undeserved mercy to a sinner, and by it God evinces his pity for his soul, and his desire for its salvation. But man universally, unevangelized and evangelized, nullifies this form and degree of the Divine mercy, by his opposition. The opponent of preterition comes in here at this point, and contends that God is bound to go yet further than common grace with sinful man, and subdue his enmity by creating him anew in the spirit of his mind; and that if he “passes him by,” and leaves him where he is, and as he is, he has no love for his soul. The sovereignty of God in this matter of bestowing regenerating grace is denied. To bestow it upon Jacob but not upon Esan, upon some but not upon all, is said to be injustice and partiality.
Scripture denies that God is under obligation to follow up his defeated common grace with his irresistible special grace. It asserts his just liberty to do as he pleases in regard to imparting that measure of grace which produces the new birth, and makes the sinner “willing in the day of God’s power.” The passages have already been cited. And reason teaches the same truth. Mercy from its very nature is free and optional in its exercise. God may manifest great and unmerited compassion to all men in common grace and the outward call, and limit his compassion if he please to some men in special grace and the effectual call. He may call upon all men to repent and believe, and promise salvation to all that do so, and yet not incline all men to do so. No one will say that a man is insincere in offering a gift, if he does not along with it produce the disposition to accept it. And neither should one assert this of God. God sincerely desires that the sinner would hear his outward call, and that his common grace might succeed with him. He sincerely desires that everyone who hears the message: “Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters; yea, come buy wine and milk without money,” would come just as he is, and of his own free will, “for all things are ready.” The fact that God does not go further than this with all men and conquer their aversion, is consistent with this desire. No one contends that God is not universally benevolent because he bestows more health, wealth, and intellect upon some than upon others. And no one should contend that he is not universally merciful, because he bestows more grace upon some than upon others. The omnipotence of God is able to save the whole world of mankind, and to our narrow vision it seems singular that he does not; but be this as it may, it is false to say that if he does not exert the whole of his power, he is an unmerciful being towards those who abuse his common grace. That degree of forbearance and long-suffering which God shows towards those who resist it, and that measure of effort which he puts forth to convert them, is real mercy towards their souls. It is the sinner who has thwarted this benevolent approach of God to his sinful heart. Millions of men in all ages are continually beating back God’s mercy in the outward call and nullifying it. A man who has had common grace, has been the subject of the Divine compassion to this degree. If he resists it, he cannot charge God with unmercifulness, because he does not bestow upon him still greater mercy in the form of regenerating grace. A beggar who contemptuously rejects the five dollars offered by a benevolent man, cannot charge stinginess upon him because after this rejection of the five dollars he does not give him ten. Any sinner who complains of God’s “passing him by” in the bestowment of regenerating grace after his abuse of common grace, virtually says to the High and Holy One who inhabits eternity, “Thou hast tried once to convert me from sin; now try again, and try harder.”[fn. 1: An advocate of revision remarks that “the Calvinist is doubtless right in saying that God is under no obligations to save us. Still, even if this be the case, God may be, and I believe is under obligations to afford every man an opportunity to be saved; that he has no right to ‘pass by’ anyone.” Two criticisms upon this suggest themselves. First, God in the outward call does afford every man an opportunity to be saved. To every evangelized man he says, “Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved.” This is “an opportunity to be saved.” To every unevangelized man he says, “Repent of thy sins, and I will forgive them.” This is “an opportunity to be saved.” That in both instances the opportunity is rejected, does not destroy the fact. Secondly, if God is “under obligations to afford the opportunity to be saved,” then salvation is an act of justice and the performance of a duty. In affording man the opportunity to be saved, God discharges his obligations. In this case, “grace is no more grace” (Rom. 9:6).]
God’s desire that a sinner should “turn and live” under common grace, is not incompatible with his purpose to leave him to “eat of the fruit of his own ways, and be filled with his own devices”—which is the same thing as “foreordaining him to everlasting death.” A decree of God may not be indicative of what he desires and loves. He decrees sin, but abhors and forbids it. He decrees the physical agony of millions of men in earthquake, flood, and conflagration, but he does not take delight in it. His omnipotence could prevent this suffering in which he has no pleasure, but he decides for adequate reasons not to do so. Similarly he could prevent the eternal death of every single member of the human family, in which he takes no pleasure, but decides not to do so for reasons that are wise in his sight. The distinction between the revealed will and the secret will of God is a valid one;[fn. 1: God’s revealed will, or will of desire, is expressed in Isa. 55:1; Ezek. 33:11; 1 Tim. 2:4; Tit. 2:11. His secret will, or will of decision and purpose in particular instances, is expressed in Mat. 13:11; John 6: 37, 44, 65; Rom. 9:16, 18, 19.] and the latter of these wills may be no index of the former, but the exact contrary of it. This is particularly the case when evil is the thing decreed.[fn. 2: The difference between will as general desire and inclination, and will as a particular volition or decision in a special instance, is seen in human action, and is well understood. For sufficient reasons, a man may decide in a particular case to do by a volition something entirely contrary to his uniform and abiding inclination. He is uniformly averse and disinclined to physical pain, but he may decide to have his leg amputated. This decision is his “decree,” and is no index of what he is pleased with.]
(William G. T. Shedd, Calvinism: Pure And Mixed: A Defence of the Westminster Standards, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1893], pp. 44-52.)
Cf. Heinrich Heppe (1820-1879 A.D.):
25.—But while by praeteritio God refuses His redeeming grace to the rejected He does not deprive them of His common grace, which latter would have sufficed man in his original state to attain to eternal blessedness, and of which man continues to receive so much that he has no ground for excuse left at the judgment seat of God.—LEIDEN SYNOPSIS (XXIV, 54-55): “For this to be understood correctly, careful note must be taken that this praeterition does not remove or deny all grace in those passed over, but that only which is peculiar to the elect. But that which through the dispensation of common providence, whether under the law of nature or under gospel grace, is dispensed to men in varying amount, is not by this act of praeterition removed but is rather presupposed; the non-elect are left under the common government of divine providence and the exercise of their own arbitrium.—55: Moreover this dispensation of common providence always involves the communication of outward and inward benefits; which indeed sufficed for salvation in the unimpaired nature, as is clear in the rejected angels and the whole human race considered in the first parent before the fall, But in the corrupt nature so much has survived or been superadded to nature under the gospel, that they have been stripped and deprived of every pretext of excuse before the divine judgment, as the apostle testifies Ac. 14. 27 (they rehearsed all that God had done with them, and how they had opened a door of faith unto the Gentiles), Rom. 1.20 (the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity, that they may be without excuse) 2.1 (Wherefore thou art without excuse, whosoever thou art that judgest: wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself: for thou that judgest practisest the same things); also Jn. 15. 22 (If I had not come and spoken to them, they had not had sin, but now they have no excuse for their sin) 1 Cor. 4. 3 (with me it is a very small thing that I should be judged of you, or of man’s judgment: yea I judge not mine own self) and elsewhere.”—WALAUS 490-491: “But reprobation does not deny in the reprobate all grace or every gift saving in itself: for we see that even to the reprobate many even supernatural things are communicated above the gifts of nature, as the propounding of the gospel, many other charisms, and illumination of the mind, and some improvement of the affections or joy, and a taste of future benefits (Heb. 6; Mt. 13); by these gifts they are set in order for salvation, did they not suppress them themselves and render God’s counsel towards themselves of no effect, as saith Scripture in Lk. 7, and Rom. 1, also Ac. 7, resist the H. Spirit. For it must assuredly be held that they first desert God before they are deserted by God, as Augustine often says. For God endures with much longsuffering vessels of wrath, etc. Rom. 9. 22. In fact we say more with the same Augustine, that it does not conflict with reprobation that even grace sufficient for salvation is given them, as is clear from the example of the reprobate angels, as well as of all men created in Adam in the image of God. Only they are denied grace infallibly effectual for salvation. In Adam all had strength to keep the law, even also to believe in Christ, had it been revealed to them (as even theologians themselves confess who ascend above the fall in this article), and they lost it in him (sc. Adam). Therefore grace sufficient for salvation is consistent with the decree of reprobation.”
(Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. Ernst Bizer, trans G. T. Thomson, [London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1950], pp. 185-186.)
Note: In the concept of praeterition (God passing over the non-elect), God withholds His special redeeming grace but does not deprive the non-elect of His common grace. This common grace, which includes the benefits of God’s providence and the law of nature, is sufficient to leave the non-elect without excuse before God’s judgment. Despite not receiving the grace that guarantees salvation, the non-elect receive enough grace to recognize God’s power and divinity and are thus accountable for their rejection of God. This common grace ensures they cannot claim ignorance or lack of opportunity when judged. The non-elect’s resistance to this grace and their desertion of God precede God’s definitive abandonment of them. Thus, while they lack the infallible, effectual grace for salvation, they still receive sufficient grace to be held responsible for their actions.
Cf. William G. T. Shedd (1820-1894 A.D.):
Common grace is a lower degree of grace than special. The latter succeeds in overcoming the enmity of the carnal mind and the opposition of the sinful will; the former does not succeed. Says John Howe, “When divine grace is working but at the common rate; then it suffers itself oftentimes to be overcome, and yields the victory to the contending sinner.” This was the case with the people of Israel as described by Stephen, “Ye stiff-necked and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost, as your fathers did, so do ye.” Acts 7:51. The same complaint was made against resisting Israel by Isaiah, “They rebelled and vexed his Holy Spirit; therefore he was turned to be their enemy.” Isa. 63:10. The same failure of common grace to subdue the sinner is noted in Gen. 6:10, “My Spirit shall not always strive with man.” Whenever man quenches conviction of sin and plunges into temptation in order to get rid of serious and anxious thoughts, and the Holy Spirit leaves him to his own self-will, this is common grace. The process is described in the solemn words of God himself, “Because I have called and ye have refused; I have stretched out my hand and no man regarded, but ye have set at nought all my counsel and would none of my reproof, I also will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your fear cometh.” Prov. 1:24-26. In common grace, the sinner is too obstinate and self-determined in sin for it to succeed.
In special grace, on the other hand, the Holy Spirit does not leave the sinner to his own self-determination, but continues to operate upon his resisting will until he subdues it. He “makes him willing in the day of his power.” Ps. 110:3. He “works in him to will and to do of his good pleasure.” Phil. 2:18. He “makes him perfect in every good work to do his will, working in him that which is well pleasing in his sight.” Heb. 13:21. This grade of divine grace is higher than common grace. It is denominated “irresistible,” not in the sense that no resistance is made by the sinner, but in the sense that it conquers all his resistance. It is also denominated “effectual,” because it secures salvation. It is also called “regenerating,” because it changes the disposition of the sinful heart and will by “the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost.” Tit. 3: 5.
These two forms and grades of grace, so plainly described in the Scripture texts above cited, are mentioned in the Westminister Confession, vii. 3, “Man by his fall, having made himself incapable of life by that [legal] covenant, the Lord was pleased to make a second, commonly called the covenant of grace, wherein he freely offered unto sinners life and salvation by Jesus Christ, requiring of them faith in him, that they may be saved, and promising to give unto all those that are ordained to life his Holy Spirit, to make them willing and able to believe.” According to this statement there are two things contained in the covenant of grace: (a) An offer to sinners of life and salvation by Jesus Christ, requiring of them faith in him, that they may be saved; and (b) a promise to give unto all those that are ordained to life the Holy Spirit, to make them willing and able to believe. The “offer” in the covenant of grace is made to all sinners without exception, but the “promise” in the covenant is made only to “those that are ordained to life,” or the elect. The “offer” is common grace; the “promise” is special grace. The “offer” is taught in such Scriptures as, “Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth shall be saved.” Mark 16:15. “God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life.” John 3:16. The “promise” is taught in such Scriptures as, “A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you, and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you an heart of flesh.” Ezek. 36:26, 27. “All that the Father giveth me shall come to me; and him that cometh to me [because given by the Father] I will in no wise cast out. No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me, draw him.” John 6:37, 44.
The following then, are some of the marks of distinction between common and special grace: (a) In common grace God demands faith in Christ, but does not give it; in special grace God both demands and gives faith, for “faith is the gift of God.” Eph. 2:8. When God says to a sinner: “Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved,” he makes no promise or pledge to originate faith in him. The sinner, in this case, must originate his own faith, and any sinner that originates it will find that God will be true to his word. (b) In common grace man must of himself fulfil the condition of salvation, namely, believe and repent; in special grace God persuades and enables him to fulfil it. (c) In common grace the call to believe and repent is invariably ineffectual, because man is averse to faith and repentance and in bondage to sin; in special grace the call is invariably effectual, because his aversion and bondage are changed into willingness and true freedom by the operation of the Holy Spirit. (d) Common grace is universal and indiscriminate, having no relation to election and preterition. No man is elected to it, and no man is “passed by” in its bestownent. All men who come to years of self-consciousness are more or less convicted of sin (Rom. 1:32; 2:14, 15), are more or less commanded to repent (Acts 17:30), are more or less urged to repentance (Rom. 2:4), and are more or less striven with by the Holy Spirit (Gen. 6:10; Acts 17:26, 27)—all of which belong to the common operations of divine grace. Special grace, on the contrary, is particular and discriminating, and is connected with election and preterition. God does not originate faith and repentance in all men, nor does he promise to do so. He does not persuade and enable every man without exception to believe and repent. Only those whom he chooses before the foundation of the world are the subjects of that higher degree of the energy of the Holy Ghost by which these wonderful effects are wrought in the sinner. Respecting special grace, God “saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion.” And St. Paul from this draws the inference, “Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth” [leaves in sin]. Rom. 9:15, 18. In accordance with these and similar Scriptures, the Confession (vii. 3) declares that it is only to “those that are ordained to life” that God “promises to give his Holy Spirit to make them willing and able to believe.”
(William G. T. Shedd, Calvinism: Pure And Mixed: A Defence of the Westminster Standards, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1893], pp. 96-100.)
Cf. For the distinction between the Arminian and Augustinian (Calvinistic) conceptualizations of “common” and “special” grace, see: Idem, pp. 100-106.
Cf. Michael F. Bird:
The Calvinistic scheme does not mean that God has no love for the nonelect. God desires all persons to be saved, and none who come to him will ever be rejected. That is God’s general love for all of people. Yet God also has a special love, and he demonstrates that love by choosing a people for salvation even though neither they nor anybody deserved it. God loves generally in his willingness to receive all, and he loves particularly in ensuring that a remnant of humanity will be saved.
(Michael F. Bird, Evangelical Theology: A Biblical and Systematic Introduction: Second Edition, [Grand Rapids: Zondervan Academic, 2020], 5.3.1, p. 577.)
Cf. William G. T. Shedd (1820-1894 A.D.):
2. Secondly, it is objected to preterition that it is partiality. It would be, if sinners had a claim upon God for his regenerating grace. In this case he could make no discrimination, and must regenerate and save all. Partiality is impossible within the sphere of mercy, because the conditions requisite to it are wanting. It can exist only within the sphere of justice, where there are rights and duties; claims and obligations. A debtor cannot pay some of his creditors and “pass by” others, without partiality. But in the sphere of mercy, where there is no indebtedness, and no claim, the patron may give to one beggar and not to another, if he so please, because he “may do what he will with his own”—that is, with what he does not owe to any one. The parable of the talents was spoken by our Lord to illustrate the doctrine of the Divine sovereignty in the bestowment of unmerited gifts; and the regeneration of the soul is one of the greatest of them.
This is a conclusive answer to the charge of partiality and injustice, but some would avoid the charge by striking out the tenet of preterition, and retaining that of election. In this case, election becomes universal. If no men are omitted in the bestowment of regenerating grace, all men are elected. This is universal salvation, because all the elect are infallibly regenerated and saved. And this is the manner in which the Later Lutheranism handles the doctrine. It denies preterition, and strenuously opposes this article of the Reformed creed. If the Presbyterian Church, after having adopted preterition for two centuries, shall now declare that it is an un-Scriptural and erroneous tenet, the meaning of the revision will be, that God has no sovereign liberty to “pass by” any sinners, but must save them all. This is the form in which election is held by Schleiermacher and his school. They contend that there is no reprobation of any sinner whatsoever. All men are elected, because to pass by any is injustice and partiality. “Calling (vocatio),” says Dorner, “is universal, for the Divine purpose of redemption is just as universal as the need and capacity of redemption so that the notion of a Divine decree to pass by a portion of mankind, and to restore freedom of decision only to the rest, is out of the question” (Christian Doctrine, iv. 183). It is this form of Universalism, which postulates the offer of mercy to all men as something due to them, if not in this life then in the next, and denies that the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit is confined to earth and time, but goes on in the intermediate state, that is percolating into the Scotch and American Calvinism from the writings of one class of German divines. Should the presbyteries reject the doctrine of preterition they will help on this tendency. A creed like the Heidelberg, or the Thirty-nine Articles, may not have preterition verbally stated, and yet imply it by its statement of election and by other parts of the symbol. But if a creed like the Westminster, which has both doctrines verbally stated, is subsequently revised so as to strike out preterition, then this tenet cannot be implied. It is positively branded as error, and rejected by the revising Church. If therefore the presbyteries shall assert that God does not “pass by” any sinner in respect to regenerating grace, they will commit themselves to universal salvation in the form above mentioned. Election will no longer be balanced and limited by preterition, but will be unlimited and universal.
And with this will be connected another fatal error: namely, that God is under obligation to elect and regenerate every man. If justice forbids him to “pass by” any sinners, and “ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin,” he is bound to elect all sinners and “predestinate them to everlasting life.” He has no liberty or sovereignty in the case. He cannot say, “I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy, and whom I will I harden [do not soften]” (Rom. 9:18). This transmutes mercy into justice. Pardon becomes a Divine duty. The offer of Christ’s sacrifice, nay even the providing of it, becomes a debt which God owes to every human creature. This is the assumption that lies under all the various modes of Universalism. Sinful men, loving sin, bent on sin, are told that they are entitled to the offer of mercy and regenerating grace; that they must have a “fair opportunity” of salvation, if not here, then hereafter. Sinful men, full of self-indulgence, confessing no sin and putting up no prayer for forgiveness, and who have all their lifetime suppressed the monitions of conscience and quenched the Holy Spirit’s strivings with them in his exercise of common grace, are taught that if God shall pass them by, and leave them to the sin that they prefer, he is an unmerciful despot.
And here is the point where the practical value of the doctrine of election and preterition is clearly seen. Without it, some of the indispensable characteristics of a genuine Christian experience are impossible. Hence it is that St. Paul continually employs it in producing true repentance for sin, deep humility before God, utter self-distrust, sole reliance on Christ’s sacrifice, and a cheering hope and confidence of salvation, founded not on the sinner’s ability and what God owes him, but on God’s gracious and unobliged purpose and covenant. This is the doctrine which elicits from him the rapturous exclamation, “O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God. For who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of him, and through him, and to him are all things: to whom be glory forever. Amen.” This is the doctrine which instructs the believer to ascribe all his holy acts, even the act of faith itself, to the unmerited and sovereign grace of his redeeming God, and with Charles Wesley to sing:
“Hangs my helpless soul on Thee.”
It is said that the doctrine of preterition is not and cannot be preached. It does not require technical terms and syllogistical reasoning, in order to preach a doctrine. Who so preaches the doctrine of the trinity, or of regeneration, or of original sin, or of vicarious atonement, or of endless punishment? The doctrine of preterition is preached whenever the herald proclaims to the transgressor of God’s law that sin is guilt and not misfortune; that the criminal has no claim upon the pardoning power for pardon; that the Supreme Judge might justly inflict upon him the penalty which his sin deserves; that his soul is helplessly dependent upon the optional unobliged decision of his Maker and Saviour; and that it is nothing but God’s special grace in regeneration that makes him to differ from others who go down to perdition. That these humbling and searching truths are taught more thoroughly at some times than others, is true. That they will empty some pews at all times, is true. It may be that they are less taught now than formerly; and if so, this is not the time either to revise or construct creeds. But whenever the Divine Spirit is present with his illumination, and the Scriptures are plainly preached, they come into the foreground. If they shall be revised out of the Confession, it is certain that they will be taught less and less, and will finally disappear from the religious experience.
The sinner’s acknowledgment that God might justly pass him by, and leave him in his resistance of common grace, is a necessary element in genuine repentance. Whoever denies this, lacks the broken and contrite heart. Such was the sorrow of the penitent thief: “We are in this condemnation justly; for we receive the due reward of our deeds.” Such was the penitence of the prodigal son: “Father, I have sinned against heaven, and am no more worthy to be called thy son; make me as one of thy hired servants.” Such was the temper of the leper: “Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean.” No one of these penitents took the ground that God owed him pardon and regeneration, and that to pass him by and ordain him to the eternal death which sin deserves would be an act dishonorable to God. To deny God’s sovereignty in his exercise of mercy, is to set up a claim for salvation, and whoever does this evinces that he has no true view of sin as ill desert, and no true sorrow for it as such. There is need of this doctrine in all ages, owing to the pride of the human heart, and its unwillingness to bend the knee and renounce all merit and confess all demerit before God. And there is special need of it in our age, when the Christian experience is defective at this point, and redemption is looked upon as something which God owes to mankind, and is bound to provide for them. Unless this important truth is repristinated, and restored to its proper place in the consciousness of the Church, the current of Restorationism will set stronger and stronger, and the result will be a great apostasy in Christendom. This is no time to eradicate it from the Calvinistic creeds, but on the contrary to reaffirm it with confidence, and defend it out of Scripture.
Some say that preterition is liable to be understood as preventing a sinner’s salvation, and would have an explanation added to the doctrine, to the effect that this is not its meaning or intent. We would respect the opinion of any Christian believer who sincerely thinks that the language of the Standards is unguarded, and who does not desire to change their doctrines but only to make sure that they are understood. This is not revision, but explanation; and a declarative statement similar to that of the United Presbyterians, which leaves the Confession untouched, is the least objectionable of all the plans before the Presbyterian Churches. But if it be borne in mind that preterition is by the permissive, not efficient decree, what call is there for such a guarding clause? How does or can God’s decision to leave a sinner to do just what he likes, hinder the sinner from faith and repentance? How does or can God’s purpose to save another sinner, prevent this sinner from smiting on his breast, saying, “God, be merciful to me, a sinner?” “It is not the fault of the gospel,” say the Dort Canons (I., iii. iv. 9), “nor of Christ offered therein, nor of God who calls men by the gospel and confers upon them various gifts, that those who are called by the ministry of the word refuse to come and be converted. The fault lies in themselves.” There is nothing causative in the decree of preterition. John Bunyan’s statement of the matter is plain common sense. “Eternal reprobation makes no man a sinner. The foreknowledge of God that the reprobate will perish, makes no man a sinner. God’s infallible determining upon the damnation of him that perisheth, makes no man a sinner. God’s patience and forbearance until the reprobate fits himself for eternal destruction, makes no man a sinner” (Reprobation Asserted, xi.). Whatever God does by a permissive decree, excludes causation on his part. God is not the author of the sin in which he leaves the sinner; or of the impenitence to which he gives him over. His action in preterition is inaction, rather than action. He decides to do nothing to prevent the free will of the sinner from its own action. With what color of reason can it be said that God forces a man into perdition, when this is all he does to him? that God hinders a man from faith and repentance, when he lets him entirely alone? To put the proposed explanation and caveat into the Confessional doctrine of preterition, would be like writing under Landseer’s lions, “These are not sheep,” or under Paul Potter’s bull, “This is not a horse.”
The preterition of a sinner is not his exclusion from salvation. Exclusion is a positive act; but preterition is a negative one. When God gives special regenerating grace to only one of two persons, he does not work upon the other to prevent him from believing and repenting under the operation of the common grace which he has bestowed upon both alike. He merely leaves the other to his own free will to decide the matter; assuring him that if he repents he will forgive him; that if he believes he will save him. The bestowinent of common grace upon the non-elect shows that non-election does not exclude from the kingdom of heaven by Divine efficiency, because common grace is not only an invitation to believe and repent, but an actual help towards it; and a help that is nullified solely by the resistance of the non-elect, and not by anything in the nature of common grace, or by any preventive action of God. The fault of the failure of common grace to save the sinner, is chargeable to the sinner alone; and he has no right to plead a fault of his own as the reason why he is entitled to special grace. It is absurd for him to contend that God has no right to refuse him regenerating grace, because he has defeated the Divine mercy in common grace. The true way out of the difficulty for the sinner is, not to demand regenerating grace as a debt by denying that God has the right to withhold it, but to confess the sinful abuse and frustration of common grace, and to cry with the leper: “Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean.”
(William G. T. Shedd, Calvinism: Pure And Mixed: A Defence of the Westminster Standards, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1893], pp. 52-59.)
Cf. John Bunyan (1628-1688 A.D.):
1. That eternal reprobation makes no man a sinner.
2. That the fore-knowledge of God that the reprobate would perish makes no man a sinner.
3. That God’s infallibly determining upon the damnation of him that perisheth, makes no man a sinner.
4. God’s patience and long-suffering, and forbearance, until the reprobate fits himself for eternal destruction, makes no man a sinner.
So then, God may reprobate, may suffer the reprobate to sin, may fore-determine his infallible damnation, through the pre-consideration of him in sin, and may also forbear to work that effectual work in his soul that would infallibly bring him out of this condition, and yet neither be the author, contriver, nor means of man’s sin and misery.
praeteritio: preterition; a passing over or passing by; a term used by the infralapsarian Reformed . . . to indicate the non-election of those left by God in the condemned mass of mankind. The divine praeteritio is a negative willing as contrasted with the positive willing of electio (q.v.), or election, and is intended by the infralapsarians to rest all the efficient causes of damnation (damnatio, q.v.) in man.
(Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology, [Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998], p. 243.)
Cf. Richard A. Muller:
reprobatio: reprobation; the eternal decree (decretum, q.v.) of God according to which he wills to leave certain individuals in their corrupt condition, to damn them because of their sin and leave them to eternal punishment apart from the divine presence. Reprobatio is, therefore, distinct from damnatio: whereas the cause of damnatio is the sin of an individual, the cause of reprobatio is the sovereign will of God.
(Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology, [Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998], p. 263.)
Cf. Petrus Van Mastricht (1630-1706 A.D.):
VI. Thus the predestination of reprobation, as an act, in its breadth embraces, as we have already taught, these four things: (1) the purpose of manifesting the glory of his avenging justice (Rom. 9:22), but not of damning and destroying man, which cannot be reckoned as something good (and thus not as an end), either with regard to God or with regard to man. For this reason he declares that he does not delight in the death of the sinner (Ezek. 18:23). And in this is the first distinction between election and reprobation, that election has set for it as an end not only the glory of mercy but also the salvation of the elect (Rom. 9:23), whereas reprobation intends as its end only the manifestation of justice, nor does it consider the just damnation of the reprobate except as a means. (2) The purpose of creating and permitting the fall, which is common to the reprobate together with the elect, so that here neither Cain, nor Judas, nor anyone has anything to complain about, since for him to purpose the glory of his justice, and to this end to create men indefinitely and generally, and to permit their fall, inflicts injury on no one, especially since this reprobation is an immanent act of God, and does not touch anyone. (3) From the fallen to designate definitely, for example, Judas, that in him his justice may be made manifest. But this designation cannot be called election, because it is not from love, nor is it a communication of any sort of good, but only a privation of both. And in this act consists reprobation more strictly and most properly so-called, because it rejects and removes those with whom it is occupied from that love by which the elect are designated for salvation. Just as therefore in election there is love with separation, so in reprobation there is a negation of love with separation. And in this is what they call the negative hatred of reprobation, to which is joined, as it were, the positive hatred by which God wills certain ones to be deprived of eternal life and justly condemned on account of their sins (Rom. 9:13). And in this is the second distinction between election and reprobation, that the love of election immediately communicates good to the creature, whereas the hatred of reprobation only denies good and does not inflict evil except by the intervening merit of the creature. (4) The intention of preparing and directing those means by which justice can be manifested in the reprobate. The most especially proper means of this kind are the permission of sin, and abandonment in sin (Rom. 9:18; 2 Thess. 2:11-12), and just condemnation on account of sin. And here is the third distinction between election and reprobation, that election is the cause not only of salvation but also of all its means, whereas reprobation is not properly speaking the cause of either damnation or of the sin which merits damnation, but the antecedent only. Moreover, here is also apparent the fourth distinction between the two, that in reprobation the means do not have among themselves a relation of cause and effect, since the permission of sin is not the cause of abandonment, hardening, and punishment, but rather, sin itself, whereas in election, calling is the cause of justification, and justification the cause of glorification. Meanwhile, it must be observed that the means of reprobation are for the most part negative, such as non-redemption (John 10:26), non-calling, or at least non-effectual calling (Matt. 20:16; 22:14), non-giving of faith (Acts 13:48; cf. John 12:39-40), non-obstruction of sin, abandonment in it (Rom. 9:18), non-remission of it (John 20:23). Meanwhile, there are also positive means: blinding, hardening (Isa. 6:9; John 12:39-40), and just condemnation on account of sin (John 12:39-40; Rom. 9:22; Jude 4). Yet all these means, whether they are negative or positive, through a positive act of the divine will are directed to their end.
(Petrus Van Mastricht, Theoretical-Practical Theology, 3.4.6; trans. Petrus Van Mastricht, Theoretical-Practical Theology: Volume 3: The Works of God and the Fall of Man, trans. Todd M. Rester, ed. Joel R. Beeke, [Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2021], pt. 1, bk. 3, ch. 4, §. 6.) Preview.
Cf. Benedict Pictet (1655-1724 A.D.):
We have said that some are elected and destined to salvation; God therefore does not have mercy upon all. Now those on whom he does not have mercy, are said to be reprobated, or rejected. That some men are thus reprobated, the scripture teaches; for St. Paul speaks of “the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction,” (Rom. ix. 22,) and Jude, verse 4, speaks of “ungodly men, before of old ordained to condemnation.” In reprobation, God must be regarded in two characters, as a Sovereign Lord, who doeth what he will with his own, and who may be compared to a potter making out of the same lump one vessel to honour and another to dishonour; and also as a Sovereign Judge, who has power to inflict the punishment that is due. Where, for instance, he passes by Judas, and chooses James, he acts as Supreme Lord; but when he condemns Judas to eternal misery, who fell into every sin, and is passed by in his corruption, he acts as supreme Judge. Sin, therefore, is the cause, on account of which God hath passed by some men; for had there been no sin, no man would have been forsaken; yet if it be asked, why one man is passed by, and not the other, it cannot then be said that sin is the cause of this difference, since both are equally sinners, and therefore equally deserving of rejection, but it must be referred to the sovereign pleasure of God. But if it be inquired why God condemns Anthony, who is guilty of the greatest sins, and is impenitent, the reason is obvious, viz. his very great sins, which God, as a just Judge, punishes, and must necessarily punish. We must not, therefore, judge of reprobation, as of election; election presupposes nothing in man but misery, and is an act of mercy; reprobation is an act of justice, which necessarily presupposes sin.
Men have no cause to complain of God, much less blasphemously to accuse him of injustice and cruelty: they cannot complain of his not having mercy upon all, and of his leaving some in their corruption, while he pities others, and brings them out of the abyss of sin. For he is an independent Being, who owes nothing to his creatures, much less to his sinful creatures. No one, therefore, has any just reason to cavil and murmur. “Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God?” (Rom. ix. 20.)
(Benedict Pictet, Christian Theology, trans. Frederick Reyroux, [London: R. B. Seeley and W. Burnside, 1834], pp. 240-242.)
Reprobation Defined
The other element of predestination is reprobation, to which reference is made in a variety of ways, such as “to be cast away.” “I have chosen thee, and not cast thee away” (Isa 41:9); to be fitted to destruction (Rom 9:22); to be appointed unto wrath (1 Thess 5:9); to be ordained unto condemnation (Jude 4); and not to be written in the book of life (Rev 13:8). These texts prove at once that there is such a thing as reprobation.
We define reprobation to be the predestination of some specific individuals, identified by name, out of sovereign good pleasure to the manifestation of God’s justice in them by punishing them for their sins.
(1) Just as we have shown and shall further prove that election pertains to specific individuals, so this is likewise applicable to reprobation. “...whose names were not written in the book of life” (Rev 17:8). Christ said to specific individuals, “Ye are not of My sheep” (John 10:26). They are designated by the relative pronoun “who,” “For there are certain men … who were before of old ordained to this condemnation” (Jude 4). This is the reason why some are specifically called by name, such as Esau (Rom 9:17), Pharaoh (Rom 9:17), and Judas Iscariot (Acts 1:25). The number of reprobates far exceeds the number of elect, who in contrast to them—even of those that are called—are referred to as “few” (Matt 20:16).
(2) Reprobation proceeds solely from God’s good pleasure. Although the ungodliness of the reprobates is the cause of their damnation, this nevertheless was not the reason why God, to the glory of His justice, was moved to decree their reprobation. It purely proceeds from the good pleasure of God who has the right and the power to do as He pleases with His own. Thus, no one is permitted to say, “Why hast Thou made me thus?” (Rom 9:22). According to His good pleasure He conceals the way of salvation (Matt 11:25-26); “He hath mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth” (Rom 9:22). His purpose stands firm. This is confirmed in Rom 9:11 where it is stated, “for the children being not yet born, neither having done good or evil.” It is therefore according to God’s sovereignty and good pleasure to manifest His justice towards some and His grace to others (Rom 9:22-23), God shall maintain His holiness and justice. Believers know that God is just and righteous in all His doings. Let him who wishes to strive with God concerning this do so.
(3) As the decree itself is a manifestation of the sovereignty of God, its purpose is the manifestation of God’s justice which reveals itself in the execution of this decree. He who decrees the end simultaneously decrees the means unto this end. Sin is the only reason that God has decreed to damn specific individuals. God permits them by their own volition to turn from Him and to enslave themselves to sin. They, having sinned, become subject to the curse threatened upon sin. God, while delivering others from sin and its curse by means of the Surety Jesus Christ, bypasses them, and therefore they neither hear God nor believe in Him. “Ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God” (John 8:47); “But ye believe not, because ye are not of My sheep” (John 10:26). As a righteous Judge God punishes them due to their sin in “the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God” (Rom 2:5). Thus, God shows His wrath over “vessels of wrath fitted to destruction” (Rom 9:22).
(Wilhelmus à Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service: Volume One, trans. Bartel Elshout, [Morgan: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 1992], pp. 220-221.)
Cf. John Brown of Haddington (1722-1787 A.D.):
II. With respect to the REPROBATION of men, it may be observed, I. That God purposed to permit sin. 1. This the Scripture expressly affirms, Gen. 1. 20. Acts ii. 23, 24. iv. 27, 28; hence, 2. He hath foretold multitudes of evil actions, Gen. xv. 16. Deut. xxxi. 16, 20, 29. xxxii. 6, 15-21. Isa. i. v. x. Jer. xxv. Rev. vi. viii. ix. xi.-xiii. 2 Tim. iii. 1-6, 13. 2 Thess. ii. 3-12. 3. In time God actually permits much sin, Acts xiv. 16. 2 Thess. ii. 9-11. Gen. 1. 20. xlv. 5, 7. Psalm lxxxi. 12. Rom. i. 21-32. No sin, which hath been, or is in the world, can be said to have happened without his foreknowledge of it, Acts xv. 18. Isa. xlvi. 10, 11. Psalm cxlvii. 5. or, notwithstanding all that his infinite power could have done to prevent and hinder it, Gen. xviii. 14. Jer. xxxii. 17, 27. Matth. xix. 26. Nay, his permission of it tends to the honour of his absolute sovereignty, infinite wisdom, holiness, and justice,—and to the advantage of established angels and men. II. God in his predestinating purpose, left some men UNELECTED to perish in their sin, to the praise of the glory of his justice. 1. The Scriptures plainly declare this, Prov. xvi. 4. (where PAHHHAL, hath made, signifies to appoint, ordain, prepare, Exod. xv. 17. Psal. xxxi. 19. even as POIEO, Mark iii. 14. Heb. iii. 2.) 1 Pet. ii. 8. (where stumbling denotes sinning) Jude 4. (where KRIMA, condemnation, denotes the sinful cause of condemnation or what is criminal) John ix. 39. Rev. xiii. 8. 2 Cor. iv. 3, 4. Rom. ix. 18-22. 1 Thess. v. 9. 2 Thess. ii. 10-12, 13. 2. In God’s providence, which is an exact copy of his decree, Acts xv. 18. Isa. xlvi. 10. Eph. i. 11. Psalm xxxiii. 11. multitudes. appear plainly left to perish in their sin, Matth. vii. 13, 14. 2 Thess. ii. 10-12. i. 8, 9. Rev. xiii. 3, 8. xvii. 17. Psalm ix. 17. Millions of fallen angels had never a Saviour provided for them, Jude 6. 2 Pet. ii. 4. Hundreds of millions of men, for many ages, have never been informed of the method of redemption through Christ, Psalm exlvii. 19, 20. Prov. xxix. 18. Eph. ii. 12. Acts xiv. 16. xvii. 30.—The far greater part of those that hear the gospel, or at least are called Christians, are, by their rejection of it, ripened for hell, Matth. xx. 16. xxii. 14. vii. 13, 14. John x. 26. xii. 39, 40. 2 Cor. iv. 3, 4. Isa. vi. 9, 10. Acts xxviii. 26, 27. Phil. iii. 18, 19. 2 Tim. iii. 1-5. Rev. xiii. 3, 8. xiv. 9-11. III. It follows that certain particular persons have been, in God’s decree, appointed to wrath, Mal. i. 2, 3. Rom. ix. 11-18. 1 Thess. v. 9. Jude 4. were never favourably known by God, Matth. vii. 23. were never appointed or ordained to eternal life, Rev. xiii. 8. xvii. 8.—Nay, particular election of some necessarily infers a particular reprobation of others.—In which act of reprobation is included, 1. God’s passing by certain persons, leaving them unelected, Matth. vii. 23. Rev. xiii. 8. xvii. 8. 2. A pre-appointment of them to undergo his just wrath, to be inflicted on them as the punishment of their foreseen sinfulness, 1 Thess. v. 9. But it must be remarked, that though men’s sins be foreseen and viewed in God’s pre-appointment of them unto wrath, as the cause of their condemnation and punishment, yet they are not the cause of his leaving them unelected to perish in their sin; for, 1. Reprobates are no worse by nature than those that are elected, 1 Cor. i. 26, 27. iv. 7. John xiii. 18. Eph. ii. 1-3. 2. Their practice was foreseen as no worse than that of many elected persons before their conversion, 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10, 11. Eph. ii. 1-13.1 Tim. i. 13, 16. Tit. ii. 3-6. 3. The wickedness of unelected men is represented as the consequence, though not the proper effect of their reprobation, 2 Co 2 Cor. iv. 3. John x. 26. xii. 39. 1 Pet. ii. 8, 9. Jude 4. Rev. xiii. 8.
REPROBATION may therefore be described, “A simple act of an independent, sovereign, infinitely wise, powerful, righteous, and holy God,—whose thoughts are infinitely high, his judgments unsearchable, and his ways past finding out, Isa. Iv. 9. xl. 13. Rom. xi. 33, 34. Psalm xeii. 5. cxlvii. 5.—in which he, in his eternal and unchangeable counsel, Matth. xxv. 34, 41. Rom. ix. 11. Jam. i. 17. Isa. xlvi. 10. Heb. vi. 17. Eph. i. 11. Psalm xxxiii. 11.—intending to manifest the glory of his absolute sovereignty, almighty power, unsearchable wisdom, unconceivable patience,—and particularly of his infinite holiness and avenging justice, Rom. xi. 36. ix. 11, 15-22. Mat. xx. 15. Rom. xi. 33, 34. ii. 4. Isa. v. 4, 16. Prov. xvi. 4.—did, according to his own good pleasure, purpose in himself, to leave many particular men, no worse in themselves than others,—in their estate of sin and misery, into which they were to be permitted to fall, Rom. ix. 6, 7, 11, 15-18, 29, 21. xi. 20, 21, 22. v. 12. Eph. ii. 3. Matth. xxiv. 40, 41;—and never to know them in the way of peculiar regard, or love them with any good will, or pity them in order to their effectual recovery,—nor to choose, predestinate, distinguish from others, or ordain them to eternal life, Matth. vii. 23. Rom. viii. 29, 30. ix. 13, 15. Mal. i. 2, 3. John xiii. 18. 1 Cor. iv. 7. Acts xiii. 48. 1 Thess. v. 9,—or write their names in his book of life, or set them apart for his sheep, people, children, or vessels of mercy, John x. 26. Rom. ix. 6, 7, 23. Hos. i. 6, 9. Mal. iii. 17;—and hence purposed to withhold from them all his undeserved favours of redemption and reconciliation through Christ,—of effectual calling, faith, justification, adoption, and sanctification, John x. 15, 26. xvii. 9. xii. 37-40. Matth. xi. 25, 26. xiii. 11, 13. Rom. viii. 28-33. 2 Thess. iii. 2. Eph. ii. 8;—though not from them all his favours of common providence, gospel ordinances, spiritual gifts, or strivings of the Holy Ghost, by which they are rendered useful to his elect people, Acts xiv. 17. xvii. 30. Rom. ii. 4. ix. 22. Exod. vii. 16, 17. Lev. xxvi. 3-13. Deut. xxviii. 1-14. Isa. v. 4. Matth. xiii. 9. xxiii. 37. Heb. vi. 4, 5. x. 26, 29. 2 Pet. ii. 20, 21. 1 Cor. xii. 10. Gen. vi. 3. Isa. Ixiii. 10. Acts vii. 51;—and further determined in himself, that they, having rendered themselves miserable by their sin, original or actual, against law or gospel,—and become abusers or despisers of his benefits offered to, or bestowed on them, Rom. v. 12. Eph. ii. 1-3, 12. Rom. ii. 12, 14, 15. Mark xvi. 16. John iii. 18, 36. iv. 40. Rom. ii. 4, 5. xi. 7, 8. Matth. x. 15. xi. 21, 22. Job viii, 4. ix. 4. Psalm lxxxi, 13. Acts xiv. 16.—should,—in an infinitely wise, sovereign, just, and holy manner, answerable to their own freedom of will and their rebellious inclinations, Deut. xxxii. 4. Psalm xlv. 7. Jer. xii. 1. James i. 13. Matth. xxiii. 37, 38. John v. 40. viii. 12. Acts vii. 51,—be, for the punishment of their preceding sins,—spiritually blinded, hardened, and given up to strong delusions, vile affections, and a reprobate sense, Rom. ix. 22. Exod. xiv. 4. John xii. 40. Rom. ix. 15, 17. xi. 7, 8. i. 24, 28. 2 Thess. ii. 11. Isa. lxvi. 4;—and that they, persevering in their wickedness, and convicted by their own consciences of final impenitence, neither able to blame the just severity of God, nor to excuse their own ignorance, or their inability to accept of his offered salvation, Matth. xxvii. 4. Luke xvi. 24. Matth. xxv. 25, 26, 44. Rom. ii. 14, 15. i. 20. ix. 19, 20. Luke xxii. 22. John v. 40; should be eternally damned for their sins, Hos. xiii. 9. Matth. xxv. 41, 42. Isa. v. 11. Ezek. xviii. 4. Rom. ii. 8, 9. vi. 23. Eph. v. 5, 6. Col. iii. 6. 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10. Gal. v. 19, 20, 21.—as vessels of wrath fitted to destruction,—children of wrath,—children of perdition,—hated of God,—appointed to evil and wrath,—separated, and before-ordained to condemnation, Rom. ix. 22. Eph. ii. 3. 2 Thess. ii. 3. John xvii. 12. Lam. iii. 37, 38. Mal. i. 3. Rom. ix. 13. Prov. xvi. 4. 1 Thess. v. 9. 1 Pet. ii. 8. Jude 4.”
This awful doctrine of Reprobation, as well as of the Election of men, ought, with great prudence and holy awe, to be taught in the church. 1. It hath been proved that the Holy Ghost hath plainly taught it in his word, Rom. ix. 11-22. xi. 1-7. 2. Every thing taught in the Scripture, lawfully used, tends to promote men’s holiness in heart and life, Rom. xv. 4. 2 Tim. iii. 16, 17. 1 Pet. ii. 1, 2. James i. 21. Psalm cxix. 9, 11. 3. Election and reprobation being so closely related and contrasted, the former can neither be taught nor conceived of, separately from the latter. 4. In his providence, which every man ought to observe, Psalm cvii. 43. Hos. xiv. 9. Isa. v. 12. God copies out his decree of reprobation, in the life and in the death of the wicked, Jude 4. 1 Pet. ii. 8. Isa. xlvi. 10, 11. Eph. i. 11. Psalm xxxiii. 11. Acts ii. 23. iv. 27, 28. i. 16-18, 25. Luke xxii. 22. Phil. iii. 18, 19. 5. A proper knowledge of this decree promotes right and reverential views of the sovereignty, power, wisdom, justice, and goodness of God, Matth. xi. 26. Rom. ix. 13, 22, 23. Eph. i. 5, 6. 6. The doctrine of reprobation, if duly taught, tends to alarm the wicked and render their consciences uneasy, till they obtain proper evidence that they are not included in it, and to render sin terrible to them:—And it excites saints to self-examination, and to lively gratitude to God their Redeemer, in a course of gospel holiness, Matth. xxv. 41. Rom. i. 18. 1 Thess. v. 9, 10. 2 Cor. v. 10, 11. Psalm exvi. 16. Luke i. 74, 75,——To render the whole decree of predestination as odious as possible, our opponents strain every nerve to run down that of Reprobation, which is so unpleasant to men’s unrenewed heart.
(John Brown, A Compendious View of Natural and Revealed Religion: In Seven Books, [London: Wm. Baynes, 1817], pp. 159-163.) Return to Article.
[23.] Cf. Stephen Charnock (1628-1680 A.D.):
Prop. VII. The holiness of God is not blemished by withdrawing his grace from a sinful creature, whereby he falls into more sin. That God withdraws his grace from men, and gives them up sometimes to the fury of their lusts, is as clear in Scripture as any thing (Deut. xxix. 4): ‘Yet the Lord hath not given you a heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and ears to hear,’ &c. Judas was delivered to Satan after the sop, and put into his power, for despising former admonitions. He often leaves the reins to the devil, that he may use what efficacy he can in those that have offended the Majesty of God; he withholds further influences of grace, or withdraws what before he had granted them. Thus he withheld that grace from the sons of Eli, that might have made their father’s pious admonitions effectual to them (1 Sam. ii. 25): ‘They hearkened not to the voice of their father, because the Lord would slay them.’ He gave grace to Eli to reprove them, and withheld that grace from them, which might have enabled them against their natural corruption and obstinacy to receive that reproof. But the holiness of God is not blemished by this.
1. Because the act of God in this is only negative. Thus God is said to ‘harden’ men: not by positive hardening, or working any thing in the creature, but by not working, not softening, leaving a man to the hardness of his own heart, whereby it is unavoidable by the depravation of man’s nature, and the fury of his passions, but that he should be further hardened, and ‘increase unto more ungodliness,’ as the expression, is (2 Tim. ii. 19). As a man is said to give another his life, when he doth not take it away when it lay at his mercy; so God is said to ‘harden’ a man, when he doth not mollify him when it was in his power, and inwardly quicken him with that grace whereby he might infallibly avoid any further provoking of him. God is said to harden men when he removes not from them the incentives to sin, curbs not those principles, which are ready to comply with those incentives, withdraws the common assistances of his grace, concurs not with counsels and admonitions to make them effectual; flasheth not in the convincing light which he darted upon them before. If hardness follows upon God’s withholding his softening grace, it is not by any positive act of God, but from the natural hardness of man. If you put fire near to wax or rosin, both will melt; but when that fire is removed, they return to their natural quality of hardness and brittleness; the positive act of the fire is to melt and soften, and the softness of the rosin is to be ascribed to that; but the hardness is from the rosin itself, wherein the fire hath no influence, but only a negative act by a removal of it: so, when God hardens a man, he only leaves him to that stony heart which he derived from Adam, and brought with him into the world. All men’s understandings being blinded, and their wills perverted in Adam, God’s withdrawing his grace is but a leaving them to their natural pravity, which is the cause of their further sinning, and not God’s removal of that special light he before afforded them, or restraint he held over them. As when God withdraws his preserving power from the creature, he is not the efficient, but deficient cause of the creature’s destruction; so, in this case, God only ceaseth to bind and dam up that sin which else would break out.
2. The whole positive cause of this hardness is from man’s corruption. God infuseth not any sin into his creatures, but forbears to infuse his grace, and restrain their lusts, which, upon the removal of his grace, work impetuously: God only gives them up to that which he knows will work strongly in their hearts. And, therefore, the apostle wipes off from God any positive act in that uncleanness the heathens were given up to (Rom. i. 24, ‘Wherefore God gave them up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own hearts.’ And, ver. 26, God gave them up to ‘vile affections;’ but they were their own affections, none of God’s inspiring.) by adding, ‘through the lusts of their own hearts.’ God’s giving them up was the logical cause, or a cause by way of argument; their own lusts were the true and natural cause; their own they were, before they were given up to them, and belonging to none, as the author, but themselves, after they were given up to them. The lust in the heart, and the temptation without, easily close and mix interests with one another: as the fire in a coal pit will with the fuel, if the streams derived into it for the quenching it, be dammed up: the natural passions will run to a temptation, as the waters of a river tumble towards the sea. When a man that hath bridled in a high-mettled horse from running out, gives him the reins; or a huntsman takes off the string that held the dog, and lets him run after the hare,—are they the immediate cause of the motion of the one, or the other?—no, but the mettle and strength of the horse, and the natural inclination of the hound, both which are left to their own motions to pursue their own natural instincts. Man doth as naturally tend to sin as a stone to the centre, or as a weighty thing inclines to a motion to the earth: it is from the propension of man’s nature that he ‘drinks up iniquity like water:’ and God doth no more when he leaves a man to sin, by taking away the hedge which stopped him, but leave him to his natural inclination. As a man that breaks up a dam he hath placed, leaves the streams to run in their natural channel; or one that takes away a prop from a stone to let it fall, leaves it only to that nature which inclines it to a descent; both have their motion from their own nature, and man his sin from his own corruption. The withdrawing the sunbeams is not the cause of darkness, but the shadiness of the earth; nor is the departure of the sun the cause of winter, but the coldness of the air and earth, which was tempered and beaten back into the bowels of the earth by the vigour of the sun, upon whose departure they return to their natural state: the sun only leaves the earth and air as it found them at the beginning of the spring or the beginning of the day. If God do not give a man grace to melt him, yet he cannot be said to communicate to him that nature which hardens him, which man hath from himself. As God was not the cause of the first sin of Adam, which was the root of all other, so he is not the cause of the following sins, which, as branches, spring from that root; man’s free-will was the cause of the first sin, and the corruption of his nature by it the cause of all succeeding sins. God doth not immediately harden any man, but doth propose those things, from whence the natural vice of man takes an occasion to strengthen and nourish itself. Hence, God is said to ‘harden Pharaoh’s heart’ (Exod. vii. 13), by concurring with the magicians in turning their rods into serpents, which stiffened his heart against Moses, conceiving him by reason of that to have no more power than other men, and was an occasion of his farther hardening: and Pharaoh is said to ‘harden himself’ (Exod. viii. 32); that is, in regard of his own natural passion.
3. God is holy and righteous, because he doth not withdraw from man, till man deserts him. To say, that God withdrew that grace from Adam, which he had afforded him in creation, or any thing that was due to him, till he had abused the gifts of God, and turned them to an end contrary to that of creation, would be a reflection upon the Divine holiness. God was first deserted by man before man was deserted by God; and man doth first contemn and abuse the common grace of God, and those relics of natural light, that ‘enlighten every man that comes into the world’ (John i. 9); before God leaves him to the hurry of his own passions. Ephraim was first joined to idols, before God pronounced the fatal sentence, ‘Let him alone’ (Hos. iv. 17): and the heathens first changed the glory of the incorruptible God, before God withdrew his common grace from the corrupted creature (Rom. i. 23, 24); and they first ‘served the creature more than the Creator,’ before the Creator gave them up to the slavish chains of their vile affections (ver. 25, 26). Israel first cast off God before God cast off them; but then he ‘gave them up to their own hearts’ lusts, and they walked in their own counsels’ (Ps. lxxxi. 11, 12). Since sin entered into the world by the fall of Adam, and the blood of all his posterity was tainted, man cannot do any thing that is formally good; not for want of faculties, but for the want of a righteous habit in those faculties, especially in the will; yet God discovers himself to man in the works of his hands; he hath left in him footsteps of natural reason; he doth attend him with common motions of his Spirit; corrects him for his faults with gentle chastisements. He is near unto all in some kind of instructions: he puts many times providential bars in their way of sinning; but when they will rush into it as the horse into the battle, when they will rebel against the light, God doth often leave them to their own course, sentence him that is ‘filthy to be filthy still’ (Rev. xxii. 11), which is a righteous act of God, as he is rector and governor of the world. Man’s not receiving, or not improving what God gives, is the cause of God’s not giving further, or taking away his own, which before he had bestowed; this is so far from being repugnant to the holiness and righteousness of God, that it is rather a commendable act of his holiness and righteousness, as the rector of the world, not to let those gifts continue in the band of a man who abuses them contrary to his glory. Who will blame a father, that, after all the good counsels he hath given to his son to reclaim him, all the corrections he hath inflicted on him for his irregular practice, leaves him to his own courses, and withdraws those assistances, which he scoffed at, and turned the deaf ear unto? Or, who will blame the physician for deserting the patient, who rejects his counsel, will not follow his prescriptions, but dasheth his physic against the wall? No man will blame him, no man will say that he is the cause of the patient’s death, but the true cause is the fury of the distemper, and the obstinacy of the diseased person, to which the physician left him. And who can justly blame God in this case, who yet never denied supplies of grace to any that sincerely sought it at his hands; and what man is there that lies under a hardness, but first was guilty of very provoking sins? What unholiness is it to deprive men of those assistances, because of their sin, and afterwards to direct those counsels and practices of theirs, which he hath justly given them up unto, to serve the ends of his own glory in his own methods?
4. Which will appear further by considering, that God is not obliged to continue his grace to them. It was at his liberty whether he could give any renewing grace to Adam after his fall, or to any of his posterity: he was at his own liberty to withhold it or communicate it: but, if he were under any obligation then, surely he must be under less now, since the multiplication of sin by his creatures: but, if the obligation were none just after the fall, there is no pretence now to fasten any such obligation on God. That God had no obligation at first, hath been spoken to before; be is less obliged to continue his grace after a repeated refusal, and a peremptory abuse, than he was bound to proffer it after the first apostasy. God cannot be charged with unholiness in withdrawing his grace after we have received it, unless we can make it appear that his grace was a thing due to us, as we are his creatures, and as he is governor of the world. What prince looks upon himself as obliged to reside in any particular place of his kingdom? But suppose he be bound to inhabit in one particular city, yet after the city rebels against him, is he bound to continue his court there, spend his revenue among rebels, endanger his own honour and security, enlarge their charter, or maintain their ancient privileges? Is it not most just and righteous for him to withdraw himself, and leave them to their own tumultuousness and sedition, whereby they should eat the fruit of their own doings? If there be an obligation on God as a governor, it would rather lie on the side of justice to leave man to the power of the devil whom he courted, and the prevalency of those lusts he hath so often caressed; and wrap up in a cloud all his common illuminations, and leave him destitute of all common workings of his Spirit.
(Stephen Charnock, Discourses Upon the Existence and Attributes of God: A New Edition, [London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853], pp. 505-508.) Return to Article.[24.] Cf. William G. T. Shedd (1820-1894 A.D.):
Reprobation relates to regenerating grace, not to common grace. It is an error to suppose that the reprobate are entirely destitute of grace. All mankind enjoy common grace. There are no elect or reprobate in this reference. Every human being experiences some degree of the ordinary influences of the Spirit of God. St. Paul teaches that God strives with man universally. He convicts him of sin, and urges him to repent of it, and forsake it. Rom. 1:19, 20; 2:3, 4; Acts 17:24-31. “The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who hold the truth in unrighteousness, so that they are without excuse. And thinkest thou, O man, that thou shalt escape the judgment of God? Or despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance, and long suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance. God hath made of one blood all nations of men, and appointed the bounds of their habitation, that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him and find him: for in him we live and move and have our being.”
The reprobate resist and nullify common grace; and so do the elect. The obstinate selfishness and enmity of the human heart defeats the Divine mercy as shown in the ordinary influences of the Holy Spirit, in both the elect and non-elect. Acts 7: 51, “Ye stiff-necked, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost.” The difference between the two cases is, that in the instance of the elect, God follows up the common grace which has been resisted, with the regenerating grace which overcomes the resistance; while in the instance of the reprobate, he does not. It is in respect to the bestowment of this higher degree of grace, that St. Paul affirms that God “hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth” [i.e. does not soften]. “It is,” says Bates (Eternal Judgment, II.), “from the perverseness of the will and the love of sin, that men do not obey the gospel. For the Holy Spirit never withdraws his gracious assistance, till resisted, grieved, and quenched by them. It will be no excuse, that Divine grace is not conferred in the same eminent degree upon some as upon others that are converted; for the impenitent shall not be condemned for want of that singular powerful grace that was the privilege of the elect, but for receiving in vain that measure of common grace that they had. If he that received one talent had faithfully improved it, he had been rewarded with more; but upon the slothful and ungrateful neglect of his duty, he was justly deprived of it, and cast into a dungeon of horror, the emblem of hell.”
Reprobation comprises preterition, and condemnation or damnation. It is defined in the Westminster Confession, III. 7, as a twofold purpose: (a) “To pass by” some men in the bestowment of regenerating grace; and (b) “To ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin.” The first is preterition; the last is condemnation, or damnation. Preterition must not be confounded with condemnation. This is done by Baier, Compendium, III. xii. 27. Much of the attack upon the general tenet of reprobation arises from overlooking this distinction. The following characteristics mark the difference between the two. (a) Preterition is a sovereign act; condemnation is a judicial act. God passes by, or omits an individual in the bestowment of regenerating grace, because of his sovereign good pleasure (ἐυδοκία). But he condemns this individual to punishment, not because of his sovereign good pleasure, but because this individual is a sinner. To say that God condemns a man to punishment because he pleases, is erroneous; but to say that God omits to regenerate a man because he pleases, is true. (b) The reason of condemnation is known; sin is the reason. The reason of preterition is unknown. It is not sin, because the elect are as sinful as the non-elect. (c) In preterition, God’s action is permissive; inaction rather than action. In condemnation, God’s action is efficient and positive.
1. The decree of preterition, or omission, is a branch of the permissive decree. As God decided to permit man to use his self-determining power and originate sin, so he decided to permit some men to continue to use their self-determining power and persevere in sin. Preterition is no more exposed to objection than is the decree to permit sin at first. “It is no blemish,” says Howe (Decrees, Lect. III.), “when things are thus and so connected in themselves naturally and morally, to let things in many instances stand just as in themselves they are.” Preterition is “letting things stand” as they are. To omit or pretermit is to leave, or let alone. The idea is found in Luke 17:34. “The one shall be taken, the other shall be left.” God sometimes temporarily leaves one of his own children to his own self-will. This is a temporary reprobation. Such was the case of Hezekiah. “In the business of the ambassadors of the princes of Babylon, God left him, to try him, that he might know all that was in his heart,” 2 Chron. 32:31. Compare Ps. 81: 12, 13; and David’s temporary reprobation in the matter of Uriah. Preterition in the bestowment of regenerating (not common) grace, is plainly taught in Scripture. Isa. 6:9, 10; Matt. 11:25, 26; 13:11; 22:14; Luke 17:34; John 10:26; 12:39; Acts 1:16; 2 Thess. 2:11, 12; 2 Tim. 2:20; 1 Pet. 2:8; Rom. 9:17, 18, 21, 22; Jude 4. The passage in Isa. 6: 9, 10 is quoted more often in the New Testament, than any other Old Testament text. It occurs four times in the Gospels (in every instance, in the discourse of our Lord), once in Acts, and once in Romans. Shedd: Romans 9:18, 23, 33.
(William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology: Volume I, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1888], pp. 431-434.)
Cf. William G. T. Shedd (1820-1894 A.D.):
God opposes no obstacle to the efficacy of the atonement, in the instance of the non-elect, (a) He exerts no direct efficiency to prevent the non-elect from trusting in the atonement. The decree of reprobation is permissive. God leaves the non-elect to do as he likes, (b) There is no compulsion from the external circumstances in which the providence of God has placed the non-elect. On the contrary, the outward circumstances, especially in Christendom, favor instead of hindering trust in Christ’s atonement. And so, in a less degree, do the outward circumstances in Heathendom. “The goodness, forbearance, and long-suffering of God [tend to] lead to repentance,” Rom. 2:4; Acts 14:17; 17:26-30. (c) The special grace which God bestows upon the elect does not prevent the non-elect from believing; neither does it render faith any more difficult for him. The non-elect receives common grace, and common grace would incline the human will if it were not defeated by the human will. If the sinner should make no hostile opposition, common grace would be equivalent to saving grace.[fn. 1: To say that common grace if not resisted by the sinner would be equivalent to regenerating grace, is not the same as to say that common grace if assisted by the sinner would be equivalent to regenerating grace. In the first instance, God would be the sole author of regeneration; in the second he would not be.] Acts 7:51, “Ye stiff-necked and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost.” 2 Tim. 3:8, “As Jannes and Jambres withstood Moses, so do these also withstand the truth.” See Howe’s remarks on common grace. Oracles, II. ii.
(William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology: Volume II, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1888], pp. 482-483.)
Cf. William Bates (1625-1699 A.D.):
From hence it follows, that it is from the perverseness of the will, and the love of sin, that men do not obey the gospel. For the Holy Spirit never withdraws his gracious assistance, till resisted, grieved, and quenched by them. It will be no excuse, that divine grace is not conferred in the same eminent degree upon some as upon others that are converted, for the impenitent shall not be condemned for want of that singular powerful grace that was the privilege of the elect, but for receiving in vain that measure of common grace that they had. If he that received one talent had faithfully improved it, he had been rewarded with more; but upon the slothful and ingrateful neglect of his duty, he was justly deprived of it, and cast into a dungeon of horror, the emblem of hell. The sentence of the law has its full force upon impenitent sinners, with intolerable aggravations for neglecting the salvation of the gospel.
(William Bates, The Four Last Things: Namely, Death, Judgment, Heaven and Hell, Practically Considered and Applied in Several Discourses, [Burlington: Chauncey Goodrich, 1832], p. 399.)
Cf. William G. T. Shedd (1820-1894 A.D.):
Not to show mercy to a man is, in St. Paul’s use of the word, to “harden” him. To harden is, not to soften. Hardening is not the efficient action of God, since Pharaoh is said to have hardened his own heart, Ex. viii. 15,32; ix. 34; x. 16. The agency of God in hardening is inaction, rather than action. The Holy Spirit does not strive at all with the human will (Gen. vi. 3), and so permits the already sinful man to confirm himself in sin, by pure and unhindered self-determination. The restraints of conscience, and of the providential circumstances amidst which the man lives, may continue, but are overborne by the sinful will. This is the negative aspect of the hardening. But besides this, there may be a positive withdrawal of these restraints. This is punitive action, intended as retribution for past resistance of restraining circumstances and influences. See the explanation of παρέδωκεν in Rom. i. 24. In the instance of Pharaoh, the hardening included both of these features. God left the king of Egypt to his self-will, and also withdrew the restraints that tended to check it. The charge of necessity, in such a reference is absurd. No more unhindered liberty can be conceived of, than this. The human will is left severely alone, to find the reason and source of its impulse wholly within itself. Sin is a more intense and wilful form of self-determination than holiness is; because, unlike the latter, it is the product of the human will in its solitary action, without any internal influence from God. “If hardness follows upon God’s withholding his softening grace, it is not by any efficient and causative act of God, but from the natural hardness of man. When God hardens a man, he only leaves him to his stony heart. God infuseth not any sin into his creatures, but forbears to infuse his grace, and to restrain their lusts, which, upon the withdrawal of restraints, work impetuously. When a man that hath bridled in a high-mettled horse from running, hath given him the reins; or a huntsman takes off the string that held the dog, and lets him run after the hare, are they the efficient cause of the motion of the one, or the other? No, but the mettle and strength of the horse, and the natural inclination of the hound: both of which are left to their own motions, to pursue their own natural instincts.” Charnocke, Holiness of God. “Five times it is said that God hardened Pharaoh’s heart; three times that Pharaoh hardened his own heart. Pharaoh, then, was hardened differently by God, from what he was by himself. He hardened his own heart by wilfully resisting Moses, and despising God, and the judgments of God. God hardened his heart, by not converting his already hard heart into a heart of flesh.” Pareus, in loco. “The perdition of sinners,” says Calvin (Instit. III. xxiii. 8), “depends upon the divine predestination in such a manner that the cause and matter of it are found in themselves.”
(William G. T. Shedd, A Critical and Doctrinal Commentary Upon the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1879], pp. 291-293.)
Cf. William G. T. Shedd (1820-1894 A.D.):
The 32d verse is a highly important one, because it brings to notice the difference between election and reprobation. According to the preceding statements of St. Paul, men are elected, and saving faith in Christ is the consequence. Election does not presuppose faith. There is no faith prior to the electing act of God, and consequently faith must be produced by this act. Faith is the gift of God (Eph. ii. 8). Hence faith is only the secondary instrumental cause of salvation. But, in the 32d verse, man’s unbelief and rejection of Christ is assigned as the primary and efficient cause of perdition, and, consequently, the divine act of reprobation as the secondary and occasional cause. In the instance of reprobation, there is unbelief already existing; for reprobation supposes the existence of sin. Consequently, the reprobating act does not (like the electing act) originate any new moral quality in the man. It merely lets an existing quality, viz.: unbelief, continue. Reprobation is, therefore, not the efficient and guilty cause of perdition, but only the occasional and innocent cause of it. St. Paul repeats the same truth in xi. 20: “Well: because of unbelief they were broken off.”
The facts, then, in St. Paul’s theory of reprobation are as follows: God does nothing to save the non-elect sinner. His action is inaction. God passes the man by, in the bestowment of regenerating grace. He has a right to do so, because he does not owe this grace to any man. The divine inaction, or preterition, is the occasional cause of the sinner’s perdition: the efficient cause being the obstinate self-determination of the human will; as a man’s doing nothing to prevent a stone from falling, is the occasional cause of its fall, the efficient cause being gravitation. If this self-determination in sin were superable by the human will itself, the inaction of God in reprobation would not make the man’s perdition certain. Although God had decided to do nothing to save him, he might save himself. But this obstinate self-determination to evil is insuperable by the human will (John viii. 34; Rom. viii. 7). Consequently, mere inaction, or doing nothing, on the part of God, results in an everlasting self-determination to sin, on the part of man. The doctrine of reprobation is necessarily connected with that of self-originated sin, and bondage in sin. Viewed in this connection, there is no foundation for the charge of fatalism, frequently made by anti-predestinarian exegetes, of which the following extract from Meyer (in loco) is an example. “The contents of Rom. ix. 6-29, in themselves considered, certainly exclude the notion of a divine decree that is conditioned by the self-determination of the human will, or of an absolute agency of God that depends upon that of the individual man; but, at the same time, they equally exclude the fatalistic determinism, the tremendum mysterium of Calvin, which, as Augustine’s theory had previously done, robs man of his self-determination and freedom in respect to salvation, and makes him the passive object of the arbitrary and absolute will of God.”
God is the author of salvation, because he elects; but he is not the author of perdition, because he reprobates. In the first instance, he is efficiently active, by his Spirit and word; in the second instance, he is permissively inactive. If John Doe throw himself into the water, and is rescued by Richard Roe, the statement would be that he is saved because Richard Roe rescued him. But if John Doe throw himself into the water and is not rescued by Richard Roe, the verdict of the coroner would be suicide, and not homicide: “Drowned because he threw himself in,” and not: “Drowned, because Richard Roe did not pull him out.” Compare Hosea xiii. 9.
(William G. T. Shedd, A Critical and Doctrinal Commentary Upon the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1879], pp. 308-309.) Return to Article.[25.] Cf. Charles Hodge (1797-1878 A.D.):
The Scriptures do not teach philosophy, but a philosophy underlies them. Philosophy is only the scientific explanation and arrangement of the facts of consciousness and the laws of our constitution which those facts reveal. The Scriptures, coming from the author of our constitution, are consistent with those facts and assume those laws. The Scriptures, therefore, recognize the soul as one. They have no name exclusively devoted to the several faculties. The same word is used of the intellect and of the seat of the affections.
The thoughts of the heart, the blindness of the heart, are familiar representations. The heart therefore here is the soul. Its obduracy is a state, not of one faculty, but of all. The same word is sometimes translated to blind and sometimes to harden. As there are two words πώρος (poros,) a stone, and πώρωσις (porosis,) blindness or hardness. Mark iii: 5; Rom. xi: 25.
II. The hardness therefore of which the Scriptures speak is,
1. Not mere callousness or insensibility of feeling.
2. But also the blindness of the mind.
3. Fixedness of the will in opposition to God and his truth.
It is of course a matter of degrees. a. Disobedience and secret opposition to the truth. b. Zealous opposition and hatred of it, manifesting itself at length in blasphemy and persecution.
III. This hardness is a sinful state.
1. From its very nature.
2. In its higher form it is the state or character of the lost and of Satan.
3. It is self-induced; a. As it is the natural result or effect of our depravity. b. As it is the consequence, i. e., the natural consequence of the indulgence of sin. As the natural consequence of the cultivation of virtue, is virtue; of kindness, is kindness; of tenderness, is tenderness; so the natural consequence of the indulgence of sin is sin,—a sinful hardness of heart.
IV. It is none the less a divine judgment and a premonition of reprobation. Any degree of it is reason to fear such reprobation. The higher forms of it are direct evidence of it.
1. It is attributed to God who is said to harden the hearts of men, as we attribute the results of an agent’s acts to the agent himself. We say a father ruins a child. By this we mean that the ruin is the natural effect of the father’s conduct. It need not be intended. In case of God, let it be observed,
1. That God exerts no efficiency in hardening the hearts of sinners, as he does in working grace in men.
2. But it is a punitive withdrawing of the Spirit; the inevitable result of which is obduracy. God determined to let Pharaoh alone, and the result was what it was.
V. This hardness is,
1. Beyond the reach of argument, or motive, or discipline, or culture.
2. It is beyond our own power to cure or to remove. It is, therefore, a. To be greatly dreaded. b. It is to be withstood and operated against. c. It is to be prayed against. d. It is to be avoided by avoiding grieving and quenching the Holy Spirit.
(Charles Hodge, Princeton Sermons: Outlines of Discourses, Doctrinal and Practical, [London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1879], LXVI. Hardness of Heart [No. 10th, 1861.], pp. 100-101.)
Cf. James Petigru Boyce (1827-1888 A.D.):
The Scriptural statements as to Reprobation are that God, in eternity, when he elected some, did likewise not elect others; that as resulting from this non-election, but not as efficiently caused by it, he passes by these in the bestowment of the special favours shown to the Elect, and, as in like manner yet further resulting, condemns men because of sin to everlasting destruction, and while they are in the state of sin and condemnation, he effects or permits the hardening of their heart, so that his truth is not appreciated, but actually rejected.
(James Petigru Boyce, Abstract of Systematic Theology, [Baltimore: H. M. Wharton & Company, 1887], p. 356.)
Cf. R. L. Dabney (1820-1898 A.D.):
I would rather say, that it consists simply of a sovereign, yet righteous purpose to leave out the non-elect, which preterition was foreseen and intended to result in their final righteous condemnation. The decree of reprobation is then, in its essence, a simple preterition. It is indeed intelligent and intentional in God. He leaves them out of His efficacious plan and purpose of mercy, not out of a general inattention or overlooking of them, but knowingly and sovereignly. Yet objectively this act is only negative, because God does nothing to those thus passed by, to make their case any worse, or to give any additional momentum to their downward course. He leaves them as they are. Yea, incidentally. He does them many kindnesses, extends to multitudes of them the calls of His word, and even the remonstrances of His Spirit, preventing them from becoming as wicked as they would otherwise have been. But the practical or efficacious part of His decree is, simply that He will not “make them willing in the day of His power.”
(R. L. Dabney, Syllabus and Notes of the Course of Systematic and Polemic Theology: Second Edition, [St Louis: Presbyterian Publishing Company of St. Louis, 1878], p. 239.)
Cf. Augustus Hopkins Strong (1836-1921 A.D.):
(g) The decree of election implies a decree of reprobation.—Answer: The decree of reprobation is not a positive decree, like that of election, but a permissive decree to leave the sinner to his self-chosen rebellion and its natural consequences of punishment.
Election and sovereignty are only sources of good. Election is not a decree to destroy,—it is a decree only to save. When we elect a President, we do not need to hold a second election to determine that the remaining millions shall be non-Presidents. It is needless to apply contrivance or force. Sinners, like water, if simply let alone, will run down hill to ruin. The decree of reprobation is simply a decree to do nothing—a decree to leave the sinner to himself. The natural result of this judicial forsaking, on the part of God, is the hardening and destruction of the sinner. But it must not be forgotten that this hardening and destruction are not due to any positive efficiency of God,—they are a self-hardening and a self-destruction,—and God’s judicial forsaking is only the just penalty of the sinner’s guilty rejection of offered mercy.
(Augustus Hopkins Strong, Systematic Theology: In Three Volumes: Volume Three, [Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press, 1909], pp. 789-790.)
Cf. John Dick (1764-1833 A.D.):
When, out of many objects which are presented to him, a person makes a selection, he as positively rejects some as he chooses others. He does not pass by any without taking notice of them; but, having them all at once, or in succession, under his eye, he takes and leaves, for reasons which are satisfactory to himself. Not to choose, is a negative phrase, but it does not imply the absence of a determination of the mind. It is not to words, but to things, that we ought to attend; and any man, who reflects upon the operation of his own mind in a similar case, will perceive that the will is exercised in passing by one object, as much as in choosing another.
(John Dick, Lectures on Theology: In Two Volumes: Vol. I, [Philadelphia: J. Whetham & Son, 1841], p. 368.)
Cf. John Dick (1764-1833 A.D.):
Election and rejection are correlative terms, and men impose upon themselves, and imagine that they conceive what it is impossible to conceive, when they admit election and deny reprobation. When of several objects some are chosen, the rest are rejected. It is to no purpose to say that nothing has been done to them, but that they are left in the state in which they were found. In one sense this is true, and in another it is not true; because, as they might have been chosen but were not, there has been an act of the mind refusing to choose them. The person to whom they were presented has said, ‘These I will take, and those I will not take.’
(John Dick, Lectures on Theology: In Two Volumes: Vol. I, [Philadelphia: J. Whetham & Son, 1841], p. 368.)
Note: Dick is correct with respect to an act of the will—ad intra—the choice to pass over one individual is as much an act of volition (positive/active) as the choice to elect another (Romans 9:11-13). Nevertheless, this is not the case as regards the outworking of that choice—ad extra.
God “actively” (or positively) softens the hearts of His elect by extending His special (invincible) grace (Ezekiel 36:26-27; Philippians 2:13). Conversely, He does not harden the hearts of the reprobate (or non-elect) in the same manner. Rather, He does so “passively” (or negatively) by withdrawing His common grace (Psalm 81:12; Romans 1:24-28), which He owes to no one (Matthew 20:15; Romans 9:15-18), and giving the sinful inclinations of the fallen human heart free rein to do as they desire (Genesis 8:21; Ecclesiastes 9:3). All, outside and apart from Christ, are guilty of sin (Romans 3:23; 5:12) and entitled to nothing other than judgment (Romans 6:23; 2:5-6).
To use an Aristotelian taxonomy, God is the efficient cause of the softening of the elect and the final cause of the hardening of the reprobate (or non-elect). In the former (election), God sovereignly originates a new moral quality in the heart—faith—which was not previously there. In the latter (reprobation), nothing new is implanted; instead, God allows an existing quality—unbelief—to persist unchecked.
The reason that God softens some (Jeremiah 24:7; Acts 16:14) and hardens others (Joshua 11:20; Deuteronomy 2:30; Isaiah 63:17) is ultimately for the sake of His Glory (Exodus 14:4, 17-18; Ephesians 1:4-6, 11-14; Romans 9:22-23). However, what this specifically entails and why God chooses to extend His saving grace to some and to pass over others is something known to Him alone (Romans 11:33; Isaiah 55:8-9). In the end, the elect receive mercy, the reprobate (or non-elect) receive justice, no one receives injustice (Romans 9:14; Genesis 18:25; Job 34:12). Return to Article.καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν πρὸ πάντων καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκεν ~ Soli Deo Gloria
No comments:
Post a Comment