Tuesday, March 15, 2022

Evil (Sin) and the Sovereignty of God?


Outline.


1. Evil (Sin) and the Sovereignty of God?

2. Excursus: Double Predestination is not Equal Ultimacy (The Nature of Reprobation).

2.1. Sources.

3. Endnotes (Additional Testimony).



1. Evil (Sin) and the Sovereignty of God? Return to Outline.



John Piper:

     My assumption will be that if the Bible teaches clearly and repeatedly that God governs sinful human choices, then he can do it without becoming unholy or unjust or impure or evil. If finite humans can find ways to handle radioactive uranium to produce useful energy without being contaminated by the deadly radiation, it is likely that the infinitely wise God can handle the deadly evil of sin without contamination or harm in bringing about his wise and holy purposes. If finite humans searching for a preventive vaccine can handle the lethal viruses of new diseases without being infected themselves, it is likely that the infinitely wise and good God can handle the disease of sin without being infected. Whether he does or not, we will discover not from logical likelihoods but from what the Scriptures teach.

     It is a mistake to assume that ultimate human self-determination is a feature of biblical thinking. Ultimate self-determination, as a trait of man’s will, might be taught in Scripture, or it might not be. That needs to be decided from the teaching of Scripture, not from philosophical assumptions we bring to the text. This book is about what the Bible teaches. In the present chapter (as well as chapters 28-33), we ask, What does it teach about God’s providence over the sinful human will? I am arguing that it teaches that God, in his infinite wisdom and goodness and holiness and justice, knows how to govern the good and evil choices of all humans without himself sinning and without turning human preferences and choices into morally irrelevant, robot-like actions.

     Therefore, in what follows, we should make every effort not to assume that ultimate, divine control over evil makes God evil or strips man of moral accountability. The question we should be asking is, What does the text teach about reality? Let us not bring to the text our philosophical assumptions that dictate what God’s wisdom and goodness and justice must do.

(John Piper, Providence, [Wheaton: Crossway, 2020], pp. 413-414, 417.) [i.]


Note: See further: John Piper, Providence, [Wheaton: Crossway, 2020], pp. 385-509.


Note: See further: Sovereignty of God, also Compatibilism, A Biblical Defense, and Compatibilism — God’s Sovereignty and Human Responsibility.



2. Excursus: Double Predestination is not Equal Ultimacy (The Nature of Reprobation). Return to Outline.



     Reprobation: Negatively Defined.


     Reprobation should not be understood as God actively creating evil in an individual who is otherwise morally upright or neutral (1 John 1:5; Psalm 92:15). Rather, in His sovereign will, God works in and through individuals according to their inherently sinful and fallen nature (James 1:13-14; 1 John 2:16).1


     Reprobation: Positively Defined.


     Reprobation may be defined as God’s eternal decree to withhold His special grace from certain individuals and punish them for their sins2 (2 Thessalonians 2:10-12; 1 Samuel 2:25), thereby manifesting His justice and glory (Romans3 9:17, 22-23). Although God loves all His creatures (Psalm 145:9, 15-16) and wills some measure of good for all of them (Matthew 5:43-45; Luke 6:35-36), He does not will every good for every individual (Exodus 33:19; Romans 9:18). Specifically, in reprobation, God withholds one particular good—eternal life—from certain individuals (John 12:39-40; Mark 4:11-12; 2 Corinthians 4:3-4; Romans 11:7-8). Consequently, in not willing eternal life for some, God is described as “hating” or “reprobating” them (Malachi 1:2-3; Romans 9:13).4


     Reprobation: Active or Passive?


     Reprobation is not a positive act of God, like election, but a permissive decree in which God allows sinners to persist in their self-chosen rebellion and suffer the just consequences that follow.5 While it is true that, with respect to an act of the will within the Godhead—ad intra—the choice to pass over one individual is as much an act of volition (positive/active) as the choice to elect another (Romans 9:11-13).6 This is not the case as regards the outworking of that choice in creation—ad extra.7


     The Means of Reprobation.8


     God “actively” (or positively)9 softens the hearts of His elect by extending His special (invincible) grace (Ezekiel 36:26-27; Philippians 2:13). Conversely, He does not harden the hearts of the reprobate (or non-elect) in the same manner. Rather, He does so “passively” (or negatively)10 by withdrawing His common grace11 (Psalm 81:12; Romans 1:24-28), which He owes to no one (Matthew 20:15; Romans 9:15-18), and allowing the sinful inclinations of the fallen human heart to operate without restraint (Genesis 8:21; Ecclesiastes 9:3). All, outside and apart from Christ, are guilty of sin (Romans 3:23; 5:12) and entitled to nothing other than judgment (Romans 6:23; 2:5-6).12

     To use an Aristotelian taxonomy,13 God is the efficient cause of the softening of the elect and the final cause of the hardening of the reprobate (or non-elect). In the former (election), God sovereignly originates a new moral quality in the heart—faith—which was not previously there. In the latter (reprobation), nothing new is implanted; instead, God allows an existing quality—unbelief—to persist unchecked.14


     The Purpose and Justice of Reprobation.


     The reason that God softens some (Jeremiah 24:7; Acts 16:14) and hardens others (Joshua 11:20; Deuteronomy 2:30; Isaiah 63:17) is ultimately for the sake of His Glory (Exodus 14:4, 17-18; Ephesians 1:4-6, 11-14; Romans 9:22-23). However, what this specifically entails and why God chooses to extend His saving grace to some and to pass over others is something known to Him alone15 (Romans 11:33; Isaiah 55:8-9). In the end, the elect receive mercy, the reprobate (or non-elect) receive justice, no one receives injustice16 (Romans 9:14; Genesis 18:25; Job 34:12). Because, in the end, sin “is cosmic treason . . . against a perfectly pure Sovereign.”17



2.1. Sources. Return to Outline.



Augustine of Hippo (c. 354-430 A.D.):

What will He give to those whom He has predestined to life, who has given such things even to those whom He has predestined to death? [Quid dabit eis quos prædestinavit ad vitam, qui hæc dedit etiam eis quos prædestinavit ad mortem?]

(Augustine of Hippo, City of God, 22.24; PL, 41:792; trans. NPNF1, 2:504.) See also: ccel.org.


Matthew 15:13:

Every plant that my heavenly Father has not planted will be pulled up by the roots. [πᾶσα φυτεία ἣν οὐκ ἐφύτευσεν ὁ πατήρ μου ὁ οὐράνιος ἐκριζωθήσεται.]

(New American Standard Bible: 1995 Edition.)


R. C. Sproul (1939-2017 A.D.):

There are different views of double predestination. One of these is so frightening that many shun the term altogether, lest their view of the doctrine be confused with the scary one. This is called the equal ultimacy view.

     Equal ultimacy is based on a concept of symmetry. It seeks a complete balance between election and reprobation. The key idea is this: Just as God intervenes in the lives of the elect to create faith in their hearts, so God equally intervenes in the lives of the reprobate to create or work unbelief in their hearts. The idea of God’s actively working unbelief in the hearts of the reprobate is drawn from biblical statements about God hardening people’s hearts.

     Equal ultimacy is not the Reformed or Calvinist view of predestination. Some have called it “hyper-Calvinism.” I prefer to call it “sub-Calvinism” or, better yet, “anti-Calvinism.” Though Calvinism certainly has a view of double predestination, the double predestination it embraces is not one of equal ultimacy.

     To understand the Reformed view of the matter we must pay close attention to the crucial distinction between positive and negative decrees of God. Positive has to do with God’s active intervention in the hearts of the elect. Negative has to do with God’s passing over the non-elect.

     The Reformed view teaches that God positively or actively intervenes in the lives of the elect to insure their salvation. The rest of mankind God leaves to themselves. He does not create unbelief in their hearts. That unbelief is already there. He does not coerce them to sin. They sin by their own choices. In the Calvinist view the decree of election is positive; the decree of reprobation is negative.

     Hyper-Calvinism’s view of double predestination may be called positive-positive predestination. Orthodox Calvinism’s view may be called positive-negative predestination.

(R. C. Sproul, Chosen by God, [Wheaton: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 1986], pp. 142-143.) [18.]


Augustine of Hippo (c. 354-430 A.D.):

For God thus blinds and hardens, simply by letting alone and withdrawing His aid: and God can do this by a judgment that is hidden, although not by one that is unrighteous. [Sic enim excæcat, sic obdurat Deus, deserendo et non adjuvando: quod occulto judicio facere postest, iniquo non potest.]

(Augustine of Hippo, Lectures or Tractates on the Gospel According to St. John, 53.6; PL, 35:1777; trans. NPNF1, 7:293.) See also: ccel.org. [19.]

Note: Cf. Augustine of Hippo, On the Predestination of the Saints, 2.4 [PL, 44:962; NPNF1, 5:499]; Sermons, 26.5 [PL, 38:173; WSA, III/2:96].


Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274 A.D.):

     I answer that, God does reprobate some. For it was said above (A. 1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (Q. XXII., A. 2). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (Q. XXII., A. 1). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.

     Reply Obj. 1. God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good—namely, eternal life—He is said to hate or reprobate them.

     Reply Obj. 2. Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined—namely, glory—and of what is received in this life—namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present—namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future—namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way the word of the prophet is true—namely, Destruction is thy own, O Israel.

     Reply Obj. 3. Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility; but only conditional impossibility: as was said above (Q. XIX., A. 3), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet by a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.

(Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.23.3; trans. The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas: Part: I: QQ. I.-XXVI: Second and Revised Edition, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, [London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1920], pp. 323-324.) See also: ccel.org.


Martin Luther (1483-1546 A.D.):

     Let none think, when God is said to harden or work evil in us (for hardening is working evil) that he does it by, as it were, creating fresh evil in us, as you might imagine an ill-disposed innkeeper, a bad man himself, pouring and mixing poison into a vessel that was not bad, while the vessel itself does nothing, but is merely the recipient, or passive vehicle, of the mixer’s own ill-will. When men hear us say that God works both good and evil in us, and that we are subject to God’s working by mere passive necessity, they seem to imagine a man who is in himself good, and not evil, having an evil work wrought in him by God; for they do not sufficiently bear in mind how incessantly active God is in all his creatures, allowing none of them to keep holiday. He who would understand these matters, however, should think thus: God works evil in us (that is, by means of us) not through God’s own fault, but by reason of our own defect. We being evil by nature, and God being good, when He impels us to act by His own acting upon us according to the nature of His omnipotence, good though He is in Himself, He cannot but do evil by our evil instrumentality; although, according to His wisdom, He makes good use of this evil for His own glory and for our salvation.

(Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, trans. J. I. Packer, O. R. Johnston, [Grand Rapids: Fleming H. Revell, 2000], p. 206.)


John Calvin (1509-1564 A.D.):

     Now when human understanding hears these things, its insolence is so irrepressible that it breaks forth into random and immoderate tumult as if at the blast of a battle trumpet.

     Indeed many, as if they wished to avert a reproach from God, accept election in such terms as to deny that anyone is condemned. But they do this very ignorantly and childishly, since election itself could not stand except as set over against reprobation. God is said to set apart those whom he adopts into salvation; it will be highly absurd to say that others acquire by chance or obtain by their own effort what election alone confers on a few. Therefore, those whom God passes over, he condemns; and this he does for no other reason than that he wills to exclude them from the inheritance which he predestines for his own children. And men’s insolence is unbearable if it refuses to be bridled by God’s Word, which treats of his incomprehensible plan that the angels themselves adore. However, we have by now been taught that hardening is in God’s hand and will, just as much as mercy is [Rom. 9:14 ff.]. And Paul does not, as do those I have spoken of, labor anxiously to make false excuses in God’s defense; he only warns that it is unlawful for the clay to quarrel with its potter [Rom. 9:20]. Now how will those who do not admit that any are condemned by God dispose of Christ’s statement: “Every tree that my . . . Father has not planted will be uprooted” [Matt. 15:13 p.]? This plainly means that all those whom the Heavenly Father has not deigned to plant as sacred trees in his field are marked and intended for destruction. If they say this is no sign of reprobation, there is nothing so clear that it can be proved to them. . . . I, at least, maintain this teaching of Augustine’s: where God makes sheep out of wolves, he reforms them by a more powerful grace to subdue their hardness; accordingly, God does not convert the obstinate because he does not manifest that more powerful grace, which is not lacking if he should please to offer it.

(John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 3.23.1; trans. The Library of Christian Classics: Volume XXI: Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, [Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960], pp. 947-948, 949.) [20.]

Note: Cf. Augustine of Hippo, Lectures or Tractates on the Gospel According to St. John, 53.6 [PL, 35:1777; NPNF1, 7:293]; Miscellany of Questions in Response to Simplician, 1.2.14 [PL, 40:119; WSA, I/12:196]; On the Predestination of the Saints, 2.4 [PL, 44:962; NPNF1, 5:499]; Sermons, 26.5 [PL, 38:173; WSA, III/2:96].


The Westminster Confession of Faith (1647 A.D.):

     VI. As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath he, by the eternal and most free purpose of his will, foreordained all the means thereunto. Wherefore they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ, are effectually called unto faith in Christ by his Spirit working in due season; are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by his power through faith unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only.

     VII. The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice.

(The Westminster Confession of Faith, 3.7; In: Philip Schaff, Bibliotheca Symbolica Ecclesiæ Universalis: The Creeds of Christendom: With a History and Critical Notes: Fourth Edition—Revised and Enlarged: Volume III, [New York: Harper & Brothers, 1905], pp. 609-610.) See also: ccel.org. [21.]


Francis Turretin (1623-1687 A.D.):

     VI. The negative act includes two: both preterition, by which in the election of some to glory as well as to grace, he neglected and slighted others (which is evident from the event of election); and negative desertion, by which he left them in the corrupt mass and in their misery. However this is so to be understood: (1) that they are not excepted from the laws of common providence, but remain subject to them; nor are they immediately deprived of all God’s favor, but only of the saving and vivifying (which is the fruit of election); (2) that actual sins of all kinds follow that preterition and desertion; not indeed from the nature of preterition and desertion itself and the force of the denied grace itself, but from the nature of the corrupt free will and the force of corruption in it (as he who does not cure the disease of a sick man is not the cause per se of the disease, nor of the results flowing from it; so sins are the consequents, rather than the effects of reprobation; necessarily bringing about the futurition of the event, but yet not infusing or producing the wickedness; not by removing what is present, but by not supplying what would sustain). If the sun does not illuminate the earth, it is not the accidental cause of darkness. Can God abandoning man and not removing his corruption, be straightway called the accidental cause of his sin? For darkness follows by necessity of nature the non-illumination of the sun, but sins voluntarily follow the denial of grace.

     VII. Although God by that desertion denies to man that without which sin cannot be avoided, the causality of sin cannot on that account be attributed to him. (1) God denies it justly and is not bound to give that grace to anyone. (2) From that negation does not follow the capability of sinning (which man has from himself), but only the non-curing of that incapability. (3) God denies the grace which they are unwilling to accept (or to retain) and which they of their own accord despise, since they desire nothing less than being governed by the Holy Spirit. (4) He does not deny that grace that they may sin, but that they may be punished on account of sin.

(Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 4.14.6-7; trans. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology: Volume One: First Through Tenth Topics, trans. George Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison, Jr., [Phillipsburg: P&R, 1992], p. 381.) [22.]


Stephen Charnock (1628-1680 A.D.):

     Prop. III. The holiness of God is not blemished by decreeing the eternal rejection of some men. Reprobation, in its first notion, is an act of preterition, or passing by. A man is not made wicked by the act of God; but it supposeth him wicked; and so it is nothing else but God’s leaving a man in that guilt and filth wherein he beholds him. In its second notion, it is an ordination, not to a crime, but to a punishment (Jude 4): ‘an ordaining to condemnation.’ And though it be an eternal act of God, yet, in order of nature, it follows upon the foresight of the transgression of man, and supposeth the crime. God considers Adam’s revolt, and views the whole mass of his corrupted posterity, and chooses some to reduce to himself by his grace, and leaves others to lie sinking in their ruins. Since all mankind fell by the fall of Adam, and have corruption conveyed to them successively by that root, whereof they are branches; all men might justly be left wallowing in that miserable condition to which they are reduced by the apostasy of their common head; and God might have passed by the whole race of man, as well as he did the fallen angels, without any hope of redemption. He was no more bound to restore man, than to restore devils, nor bound to repair the nature of any one son of Adam; and had he dealt with men as he dealt with the devils, they had had, all of them, as little just ground to complain of God; for all men deserved to be left to themselves, for all were concluded under sin; but God calls out some to make monuments of his grace, which is an act of the sovereign mercy of that dominion, whereby ‘he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy’ (Rom. ix. 18); others he passes by, and leaves them remaining in that corruption of nature wherein they were born. If men have a power to dispose of their own goods, without any unrighteousness, why should not God dispose of his own grace, and bestow it upon whom he pleases; since it is a debt to none, but a free gift to any that enjoy it? God is not the cause of sin in this, because his operation about this is negative; it is not an action, but a denial of action, and therefore cannot be the cause of the evil actions of men. God acts nothing, but withholds his power; he doth not enlighten their minds, nor incline their wills so powerfully, as to expel their darkness, and root out those evil habits which possess them by nature. God could, if he would, savingly enlighten the minds of all men in the world, and quicken their hearts with a new life by an invincible grace; but in not doing it, there is no positive act of God, but a cessation of action. We may with as much reason say, that God is the cause of all the sinful actions that are committed by the corporation of devils, since their first rebellion, because he leaves them to themselves, and bestows not a new grace upon them,—as say, God is the cause of the sins of those that he overlooks and leaves in that state of guilt wherein he found them. God did not pass by any without the consideration of sin; so that this act of God is not repugnant to his holiness, but conformable to his justice.

(Stephen Charnock, Discourses Upon the Existence and Attributes of God: A New Edition, [London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853], p. 492.) [23.]


William G. T. Shedd (1820-1894 A.D.):

     Reprobation is the antithesis to election, and necessarily follows from it. If God does not elect a person, he rejects him. If God decides not to convert a sinner into a saint, he decides to let him remain a sinner. If God decides not to work in a man to will and to do according to God’s will, he decides to leave the man to will and to do according to his own will. If God purposes not to influence a particular human will to good, he purposes to allow that will to have its own way. When God effectually operates upon the human will, it is election. When God does not effectually operate upon the human will, it is reprobation. And he must do either the one or the other. The logical and necessary connection between election and reprobation is seen also, by considering the two divine attributes concerned in each. Election is the expression of the divine mercy; reprobation of the divine justice. God must manifest one or the other of these two attributes towards a transgressor. St. Paul teaches this in Rom. 11:22: “Behold the goodness and severity of God (the divine compassion, and the divine justice); on them which fell, severity; but towards thee goodness.”

     Consequently, whoever holds the doctrine of election, must hold the antithetic doctrine of reprobation.

(William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology: Volume I, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1888], pp. 429-430.) [24.]


Archibald Alexander Hodge (1823-1886 A.D.):

     22. Discriminate accurately the two elements involved in the doctrine of Reprobation.

     Reprobation is the aspect which God’s eternal decree presents in its relation to that portion of the human race which shall be finally condemned for their sins.

     It is, 1st, negative, inasmuch as it consists in passing over these, and refusing to elect them to life; and, 2d, positive, inasmuch as they are condemned to eternal misery. In respect to its negative element, reprobation is simply sovereign, since those passed over were no worse than those elected, and the simple reason both for the choosing and for the passing over was the sovereign good pleasure of God.

     In respect to its positive element, reprobation is not sovereign, but simply judicial, because God inflicts misery in any case only as the righteous punishment of sin. “The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath—for their sins. “Con. Faith,” Chap. iii., Sec. 7.

     23. Show that these positions are necessarily involved in the general doctrine of Decrees and in the special doctrine of the election of some men to eternal life.

     As above stated, this doctrine of reprobation is self-evidently an inseparable element of the doctrines of decrees and of election. If God unconditionally elects whom he pleases, he must unconditionally leave whom he pleases to themselves. He must foreordain the non-believing, as well as the believing, although the events themselves are brought to pass by very different causes.

(Archibald Alexander Hodge, Outlines of Theology: Rewritten and Enlarged, [New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1878], p. 222.) [25.]



3. Endnotes (Additional Testimony). Return to Outline.



[i.] Cf. Charles Hodge:

     With regard to the sinful acts of men, the Scriptures teach, (1.) That they are so under the control of God that they can occur only by his permission and in execution of his purposes. He so guides them in the exercise of their wickedness that the particular forms of its manifestation are determined by his will. In 1 Chron. x. 4-14 it is said that Saul slew himself but it is elsewhere said that the Lord slew him and turned the kingdom unto David. So also it is said, that he hardened the heart of Pharaoh; that He hardened the spirit of Sihon the king of Heshbon; that He turned the hearts of the heathen to hate his people; that He blinds the eyes of men, and sends them strong delusion that they may believe a lie; that He stirs up the nations to war. “God,” it is said, in Rev. xvii. 17, “hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God shall be fulfilled.” (2.) The Scriptures teach that the wickedness of men is restrained within prescribed bounds. Ps. lxxvi. 10, “Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee: the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain.” 2 Kings xix. 28, “Because thy rage against me, and thy tumult is come up into mine ears, therefore I will put my hook in thy nose, and my bridle in thy lips, and I will turn thee back by the way by which thou camest.” (3.) Wicked actions are overruled for good. The wicked conduct of Joseph’s brethren, the obstinacy and disobedience of Pharaoh, the lust of conquest and thirst for plunder by which the heathen rulers were controlled in their invasions of the Holy Land; above all, the crucifixion of Christ, the persecutions of the Church, the revolutions and wars among the nations, have been all so overruled by Him who sitteth as ruler in the heavens, as to fulfil his wise and merciful designs. (4.) The Scriptures teach that God’s providence in relation to the sins of men, is such that the sinfulness thereof proceedeth only from the creature and not from God; who neither is nor can be the author or approver of sin. 1 John ii. 16, “All that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father (not from Him as its source or author), but is of the world.” James i. 13, “Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man.” Jer. vii. 9, “Will ye steal, murder, and commit adultery, and swear falsely, and burn incense unto Baal, and walk after other gods whom ye know not; and come and stand before me in this house, which is called by my name, and say, We are delivered to do all these abominations?”

     Thus the fact that God does govern all his creatures and all their actions, is clearly revealed in the Scriptures. And that fact is the foundation of all religion. It is the ground of the consolation of his people in all ages; and it may be said to be the intuitive conviction of all men, however inconsistent it may be with their philosophical theories, or with their professions. The fact of this universal providence of God is all the Bible teaches. It nowhere attempts to inform us how it is that God governs all things, or how his effectual control is to be reconciled with the efficiency of second causes. All the attempts of philosophers and theologians to explain that point, may be pronounced failures, and worse than failures, for they not only raise more difficulties than they solve but in almost all instances they include principles or lead to conclusions inconsistent with the plain teachings of the word of God. These theories are all founded on some à priori principle which is assumed on no higher authority than human reason.

(Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology: Vol. I, [New York: Charles Scribner and Company, 1872], pp. 589-590.) See also: ccel.org.

Cf. Herman Bavinck:

     From the foregoing it has become evident in what sense reprobation must be considered a part of predestination. From the perspective of the comprehensive character of the counsel of God, we have every right to speak of a “double predestination.” Also sin, unbelief, death, and eternal punishment are subject to God’s governance. Not only is there no benefit in preferring the terms “foreknowledge” and “permission” over the term “predestination,” but Scripture, in fact, speaks very decisively and positively in this connection. It is true that Scripture seldom speaks of reprobation as an eternal decree. All the more, however, does it represent reprobation as an act of God in history. He rejects Cain (Gen. 4:5), curses Canaan (Gen. 9:25), expels Ishmael (Gen. 21:12; Rom. 9:7; Gal. 4:30), hates Esau (Gen. 25:23-26; Mal. 1:2-3; Rom. 9:13; Heb. 12:17), and permits the Gentiles to walk in their own ways (Acts 14:16). Even within the circle of revelation there is frequent mention of a rejection by the Lord of his people and of particular persons (Deut. 29:28; 1 Sam. 15:23, 26; 16:1; 2 Kings 17:20; 23:27; Ps. 53:5; 78:67; 89:38; Jer. 6:30; 14:19; 31:37; Hos. 4:6; 9:17). But also in that negative event of rejection there is frequently present a positive action of God, consisting in hatred (Mal. 1:2-3; Rom. 9:13), cursing (Gen. 9:25), hardening (Exod. 4:21; 7:3; 9:12; 10:20, 27; 11:10; 14:4; Deut. 2:30; Josh. 11:20; 1 Sam. 2:25; Ps. 105:25; John 12:40; Rom. 9:18), infatuation (1 Kings 12:15; 2 Sam. 17:14; Ps. 107:40; Job 12:24; Isa. 44:25; 1 Cor. 1:19), blinding and stupefaction (Isa. 6:9; Matt. 13:13; Mark 4:12; Luke 8:10; John 12:40; Acts 28:26; Rom. 11:8). God’s reign covers all things, and he even has a hand in people’s sins. He sends a lying spirit (1 Kings 22:23; 2 Chron. 18:22), through Satan stirs up David (2 Sam. 24:1; 1 Chron. 21:1), tests Job (ch. 1), calls Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus his servants (2 Chron. 36:22; Ezra 1:1; Isa. 44:28; 45:1; Jer. 27:6; 28:14; etc.) and Assyria the rod of his anger (Isa. 10:5ff.). He delivers up Christ into the hands of his enemies (Acts 2:23; 4:28), sets him for the fall of many, and makes him a fragrance from death to death, a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offense (Luke 2:34; John 3:19; John 9:39; 2 Cor. 2:16; 1 Pet. 2:8). He abandons people to their sins (Rom. 1:24), sends a spirit of delusion (2 Thess. 2:11), raises up Shimei to curse David (2 Sam. 16:10; cf. Ps. 39:9), uses Pharaoh to show his power (Rom. 9:17), and heals the man blind from birth to manifest his glory (John 9:3). Certainly in all these works of God one must not overlook people’s own sinfulness. In the process of divine hardening humans harden themselves (Exod. 7:13, 22; 8:15; 9:35; 13:15; 2 Chron. 36:13; Job 9:4; Ps. 95:8; Prov. 28:14; Heb. 3:8; 4:7). Jesus speaks in parables not only in order that people will fail to understand but also because people refuse to see or hear (Matt. 13:13). God gives people up to sin and delusion because they have made themselves deserving of it (Rom. 1:32; 2 Thess. 2:11). And it is ex posteriori that believers see God’s governing hand in the wicked deeds of enemies (2 Sam. 16:10; Ps. 39:9-10). Nevertheless, in all these things also the will and power of God become manifest, and his absolute sovereignty is revealed. He makes weal and creates woe; he forms the light and creates the darkness (Isa. 45:7; Amos 3:6); he creates the wicked for the day of evil (Prov. 16:4), does whatever he pleases (Ps. 115:3), does according to his will among the inhabitants of the earth (Dan. 4:35), inclines the heart of all humans as he wills (Prov. 16:9; 21:1), and orders their steps (Prov. 20:24; Jer. 10:23). Out of the same lump of clay he makes one vessel for beauty and another for menial use (Jer. 18; Rom. 9:20-24), has compassion upon whomever he wills and hardens the heart of whomever he wills (Rom. 9:18). He destines some people to disobedience (1 Pet. 2:8), designates some for condemnation (Jude 4), and refrains from recording the names of some in the Book of Life (Rev. 13:8; 17:8).

     These numerous strong pronouncements of Scripture are daily confirmed in the history of humankind. The defenders of reprobation, accordingly, have always appealed to these appalling facts, of which history is full.153 Present in this world there is so much that is irrational, so much undeserved suffering, so many inexplicable disasters, such unequal and incomprehensible apportionment of good and bad fortune, such a heartbreaking contrast between joy and sorrow, that any thinking person has to choose between interpreting it—as pessimism does—in terms of the blind will of some misbegotten deity, or on the basis of Scripture believingly trusting in the absolute, sovereign, and yet—however incomprehensible—wise and holy will of him who will some day cause the full light of heaven to shine on those riddles of our existence.

     …Now, in the context of this dreadful reality, far from coming up with a solution, Calvinism comforts us by saying that in everything that happens, it recognizes the will and hand of an almighty God, who is also a merciful Father. While Calvinism does not offer a solution, it invites us humans to rest in him who lives in unapproachable light, whose judgments are unsearchable, and whose paths are beyond tracing out. (Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: Volume 2: God And Creation, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004], §. 246, pp. 393-394, 395.) Return to Article.


[1.] Martin Luther: “Let none think, when God is said to harden or work evil in us (for hardening is working evil) that he does it by, as it were, creating fresh evil in us, as you might imagine an ill-disposed innkeeper, a bad man himself, pouring and mixing poison into a vessel that was not bad, while the vessel itself does nothing, but is merely the recipient, or passive vehicle, of the mixer’s own ill-will. When men hear us say that God works both good and evil in us, and that we are subject to God’s working by mere passive necessity, they seem to imagine a man who is in himself good, and not evil, having an evil work wrought in him by God; for they do not sufficiently bear in mind how incessantly active God is in all his creatures, allowing none of them to keep holiday. He who would understand these matters, however, should think thus: God works evil in us (that is, by means of us) not through God’s own fault, but by reason of our own defect. We being evil by nature, and God being good, when He impels us to act by His own acting upon us according to the nature of His omnipotence, good though He is in Himself, He cannot but do evil by our evil instrumentality; although, according to His wisdom, He makes good use of this evil for His own glory and for our salvation.” (Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, trans. J. I. Packer, O. R. Johnston, [Grand Rapids: Fleming H. Revell, 2000], p. 206.) Return to Article.

[2.] Louis Berkhof: “Reprobation may be defined as that eternal decree of God whereby He has determined to pass some men by with the operations of His special grace, and to punish them for their sins, to the manifestation of His justice. . . . it embodies a twofold purpose: (a) to pass by some in the bestowal of regenerating and saving grace; and (b) to assign them to dishonor and to the wrath of God for their sins.” (Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology: Fourth Revised and Enlarged Edition, [Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1976], p. 116.) See also: ccel.org. Return to Article.


[3.] John Piper, The Justification of God: An Exegetical and Theological Study of Romans 9:1-23: Second Edition, [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1993]. Return to Article.


[4.] Thomas Aquinas: “God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good—namely, eternal life—He is said to hate or reprobate them.” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.23.3; trans. The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas: Part: I: QQ. I.-XXVI: Second and Revised Edition, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, [London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1920], p. 324.) Return to Article.

[5.] A. H. Strong: “The decree of reprobation is not a positive decree, like that of election, but a permissive decree to leave the sinner to his self-chosen rebellion and its natural consequences of punishment. Election and sovereignty are only sources of good. Election is not a decree to destroy,—it is a decree only to save. When we elect a President, we do not need to hold a second election to determine that the remaining millions shall be non-Presidents. It is needless to apply contrivance or force. Sinners, like water, if simply let alone, will run down hill to ruin. The decree of reprobation is simply a decree to do nothing—a decree to leave the sinner to himself.” (Augustus Hopkins Strong, Systematic Theology: In Three Volumes: Volume Three, [Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press, 1909], pp. 789-790.) Return to Article.


[6.] John Dick: “When, out of many objects which are presented to him, a person makes a selection, he as positively rejects some as he chooses others. He does not pass by any without taking notice of them; but, having them all at once, or in succession, under his eye, he takes and leaves, for reasons which are satisfactory to himself. Not to choose, is a negative phrase, but it does not imply the absence of a determination of the mind. It is not to words, but to things, that we ought to attend; and any man, who reflects upon the operation of his own mind in a similar case, will perceive that the will is exercised in passing by one object, as much as in choosing another.” (John Dick, Lectures on Theology: In Two Volumes: Vol. I, [Philadelphia: J. Whetham & Son, 1841], p. 368.) Return to Article.


[7.] Amandus Polanus: “Reprobation is equal to election, 1. in the efficient causes. For God is author of both, God’s good pleasure or freewill is the motive cause of both. 2. In the matter. For both is the decree of God. 3. In the ends: for both are for the glory of God… The inequality or unlikeliness of reprobation and election, appears . . . 1. In the form. For as election is a decree of pitying and delivering out of the universal ruin, and taking into salvation: so reprobation is a decree of not pitying but relinquishing in the common waste, and of not vouchsafing of salvation. 2. In the effects. For inward calling, faith, justification, glorification, good works, and eternal salvation, are the effects of election: but debarring from the grace of inward calling, and faith, and justification, glorification, good works, and the blessing of salvation, and sins, and the punishments of the same, are not the effects of reprobation.” (Amandus Polanus, Treatise of Amandus Polanus, Concerning God’s Eternal Predestination, [Cambridge: John Legat, Printer to the University of Cambridge, 1599], pp. 201, 202.) [I have modernized the original spelling.] Return to Article.


[8.] R. C. Sproul: “To understand the Reformed view of the matter we must pay close attention to the crucial distinction between positive and negative decrees of God. Positive has to do with God’s active intervention in the hearts of the elect. Negative has to do with God’s passing over the non-elect. The Reformed view teaches that God positively or actively intervenes in the lives of the elect to insure their salvation. The rest of mankind God leaves to themselves. He does not create unbelief in their hearts. That unbelief is already there. He does not coerce them to sin. They sin by their own choices. In the Calvinist view the decree of election is positive; the decree of reprobation is negative.” (R. C. Sproul, Chosen by God, [Wheaton: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 1986], pp. 142-143.) Return to Article.


[9.] Augustine: “Since, therefore, one person is moved to faith in one way while another is moved in another way, and frequently the same thing said to one person at one time moves him but said to another at another time does not move him, and it moves one and does not move another, who would dare to say that God lacked that way of calling by which Esau as well could have applied his mind and joined his will to that faith in which Jacob was made righteous? If the resistance of a person’s will can be so great that a mental revulsion hardens him against any manner of calling, it may be asked whether this very hardening comes from a divine punishment, when God has abandoned a person by not calling him in such a way that he will be moved to faith. For who would say that the manner in which he might be persuaded to have faith was lacking to the Almighty?” (Augustine of Hippo, Miscellany of Questions in Response to Simplician, 1.2.14, PL, 40:119; trans. WSA, I/12:196.) Thomas Aquinas: “Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.23.3; trans. The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas: Part: I: QQ. I.-XXVI: Second and Revised Edition, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, [London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1920], p. 324.) Return to Article.


[10.] William G. T. Shedd: “Not to show mercy to a man is, in St. Paul’s use of the word, to “harden” him. To harden is, not to soften. Hardening is not the efficient action of God, since Pharaoh is said to have hardened his own heart, Ex. viii. 15,32; ix. 34; x. 16. The agency of God in hardening is inaction, rather than action. The Holy Spirit does not strive at all with the human will (Gen. vi. 3), and so permits the already sinful man to confirm himself in sin, by pure and unhindered self-determination. The restraints of conscience, and of the providential circumstances amidst which the man lives, may continue, but are overborne by the sinful will. This is the negative aspect of the hardening. But besides this, there may be a positive withdrawal of these restraints. This is punitive action, intended as retribution for past resistance of restraining circumstances and influences.” (William G. T. Shedd, A Critical and Doctrinal Commentary Upon the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1879], pp. 291-292.) Augustine: “For God thus blinds and hardens, simply by letting alone and withdrawing His aid: and God can do this by a judgment that is hidden, although not by one that is unrighteous.” (Augustine of Hippo, Lectures or Tractates on the Gospel According to St. John, 53.6; PL, 35:1777; trans. NPNF1, 7:293.) Thomas Aquinas: “God does reprobate some. For . . . predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence… Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence… Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.23.3; trans. The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas: Part: I: QQ. I.-XXVI: Second and Revised Edition, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, [London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1920], pp. 323-324.) John Calvin: “Therefore, those whom God passes over, he condemns; and this he does for no other reason than that he wills to exclude them from the inheritance which he predestines for his own children. …I, at least, maintain this teaching of Augustine’s: where God makes sheep out of wolves, he reforms them by a more powerful grace to subdue their hardness; accordingly, God does not convert the obstinate because he does not manifest that more powerful grace, which is not lacking if he should please to offer it.” (John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 3.23.1; trans. The Library of Christian Classics: Volume XXI: Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, [Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960], pp. 947, 949.) The Westminster Confession of Faith: “The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice.” (The Westminster Confession of Faith, 3.7; In: Philip Schaff, Bibliotheca Symbolica Ecclesiæ Universalis: The Creeds of Christendom: With a History and Critical Notes: Fourth Edition—Revised and Enlarged: Volume III, [New York: Harper & Brothers, 1905], pp. 609-610.) Return to Article.

[11.] William G. T. Shedd: “Reprobation relates to regenerating grace, not to common grace. It is an error to suppose that the reprobate are entirely destitute of grace. All mankind enjoy common grace. There are no elect or reprobate in this reference. Every human being experiences some degree of the ordinary influences of the Spirit of God. St. Paul teaches that God strives with man universally. He convicts him of sin, and urges him to repent of it, and forsake it. Rom. 1:19, 20; 2:3, 4; Acts 17:24-31. …The reprobate resist and nullify common grace; and so do the elect. The obstinate selfishness and enmity of the human heart defeats the Divine mercy as shown in the ordinary influences of the Holy Spirit, in both the elect and non-elect. Acts 7: 51… The difference between the two cases is, that in the instance of the elect, God follows up the common grace which has been resisted, with the regenerating grace which overcomes the resistance; while in the instance of the reprobate, he does not. It is in respect to the bestowment of this higher degree of grace, that St. Paul affirms that God “hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth” [i.e. does not soften].” (William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology: Volume I, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1888], pp. 431-432.) William Bates: “...it is from the perverseness of the will, and the love of sin, that men do not obey the gospel. For the Holy Spirit never withdraws his gracious assistance, till resisted, grieved, and quenched by them. It will be no excuse, that divine grace is not conferred in the same eminent degree upon some as upon others that are converted, for the impenitent shall not be condemned for want of that singular powerful grace that was the privilege of the elect, but for receiving in vain that measure of common grace that they had. If he that received one talent had faithfully improved it, he had been rewarded with more; but upon the slothful and ingrateful neglect of his duty, he was justly deprived of it, and cast into a dungeon of horror, the emblem of hell.” (William Bates, The Four Last Things: Namely, Death, Judgment, Heaven and Hell, Practically Considered and Applied in Several Discourses, [Burlington: Chauncey Goodrich, 1832], p. 399.) William G. T. Shedd: “God opposes no obstacle to the efficacy of the atonement, in the instance of the non-elect, (a) He exerts no direct efficiency to prevent the non-elect from trusting in the atonement. The decree of reprobation is permissive. God leaves the non-elect to do as he likes, (b) There is no compulsion from the external circumstances in which the providence of God has placed the non-elect. On the contrary, the outward circumstances, especially in Christendom, favor instead of hindering trust in Christ’s atonement. And so, in a less degree, do the outward circumstances in Heathendom. “The goodness, forbearance, and long-suffering of God [tend to] lead to repentance,” Rom. 2:4; Acts 14:17; 17:26-30. (c) The special grace which God bestows upon the elect does not prevent the non-elect from believing; neither does it render faith any more difficult for him. The non-elect receives common grace, and common grace would incline the human will if it were not defeated by the human will. If the sinner should make no hostile opposition, common grace would be equivalent to saving grace.[fn. 1: To say that common grace if not resisted by the sinner would be equivalent to regenerating grace, is not the same as to say that common grace if assisted by the sinner would be equivalent to regenerating grace. In the first instance, God would be the sole author of regeneration; in the second he would not be.] (William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology: Volume II, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1888], pp. 482-483.) Stephen Charnock: “God is holy and righteous, because he doth not withdraw from man, till man deserts him. To say, that God withdrew that grace from Adam, which he had afforded him in creation, or any thing that was due to him, till he had abused the gifts of God, and turned them to an end contrary to that of creation, would be a reflection upon the Divine holiness. God was first deserted by man before man was deserted by God; and man doth first contemn and abuse the common grace of God, and those relics of natural light, that ‘enlighten every man that comes into the world’ (John i. 9); before God leaves him to the hurry of his own passions. Ephraim was first joined to idols, before God pronounced the fatal sentence, ‘Let him alone’ (Hos. iv. 17): and the heathens first changed the glory of the incorruptible God, before God withdrew his common grace from the corrupted creature (Rom. i. 23, 24); and they first ‘served the creature more than the Creator,’ before the Creator gave them up to the slavish chains of their vile affections (ver. 25, 26). Israel first cast off God before God cast off them; but then he ‘gave them up to their own hearts’ lusts, and they walked in their own counsels’ (Ps. lxxxi. 11, 12).” (Stephen Charnock, Discourses Upon the Existence and Attributes of God: A New Edition, [London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853], p. 507.) Return to Article.


[12.] Augustine: “Nevertheless, so far as it concerns justice and grace, it may be truly said to the guilty who is condemned, also concerning the guilty who is delivered, “Take what thine is, and go thy way;” “I will give unto this one that which is not due;” “Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? is thine eye evil because I am good?” And how if he should say, “Why not to me also?” He will hear, and with reason, “Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God?” And although assuredly in the one case you see a most benignant benefactor, and in your own case a most righteous exactor, in neither case do you behold an unjust God. For although He would be righteous even if He were to punish both, he who is delivered has good ground for thankfulness, he who is condemned has no ground for finding fault.” (Augustine of Hippo, A Treatise on the Gift of Perseverance, 8.17; PL, 45:1003; trans. NPNF1, 5:531.) Stephen Charnock: “The holiness of God is not blemished by decreeing the eternal rejection of some men. Reprobation, in its first notion, is an act of preterition, or passing by. A man is not made wicked by the act of God; but it supposeth him wicked; and so it is nothing else but God’s leaving a man in that guilt and filth wherein he beholds him. In its second notion, it is an ordination, not to a crime, but to a punishment (Jude 4): ‘an ordaining to condemnation.’ And though it be an eternal act of God, yet, in order of nature, it follows upon the foresight of the transgression of man, and supposeth the crime. God considers Adam’s revolt, and views the whole mass of his corrupted posterity, and chooses some to reduce to himself by his grace, and leaves others to lie sinking in their ruins. Since all mankind fell by the fall of Adam, and have corruption conveyed to them successively by that root, whereof they are branches; all men might justly be left wallowing in that miserable condition to which they are reduced by the apostasy of their common head; and God might have passed by the whole race of man, as well as he did the fallen angels, without any hope of redemption. He was no more bound to restore man, than to restore devils, nor bound to repair the nature of any one son of Adam; and had he dealt with men as he dealt with the devils, they had had, all of them, as little just ground to complain of God; for all men deserved to be left to themselves, for all were concluded under sin; but God calls out some to make monuments of his grace, which is an act of the sovereign mercy of that dominion, whereby ‘he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy’ (Rom. ix. 18); others he passes by, and leaves them remaining in that corruption of nature wherein they were born. If men have a power to dispose of their own goods, without any unrighteousness, why should not God dispose of his own grace, and bestow it upon whom he pleases; since it is a debt to none, but a free gift to any that enjoy it? God is not the cause of sin in this, because his operation about this is negative; it is not an action, but a denial of action, and therefore cannot be the cause of the evil actions of men. God acts nothing, but withholds his power; he doth not enlighten their minds, nor incline their wills so powerfully, as to expel their darkness, and root out those evil habits which possess them by nature. God could, if he would, savingly enlighten the minds of all men in the world, and quicken their hearts with a new life by an invincible grace; but in not doing it, there is no positive act of God, but a cessation of action. We may with as much reason say, that God is the cause of all the sinful actions that are committed by the corporation of devils, since their first rebellion, because he leaves them to themselves, and bestows not a new grace upon them,—as say, God is the cause of the sins of those that he overlooks and leaves in that state of guilt wherein he found them. God did not pass by any without the consideration of sin; so that this act of God is not repugnant to his holiness, but conformable to his justice.” (Stephen Charnock, Discourses Upon the Existence and Attributes of God: A New Edition, [London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853], p. 492.) Francis Turretin: “Although God by that desertion denies to man that without which sin cannot be avoided, the causality of sin cannot on that account be attributed to him. (1) God denies it justly and is not bound to give that grace to anyone. (2) From that negation does not follow the capability of sinning (which man has from himself), but only the non-curing of that incapability. (3) God denies the grace which they are unwilling to accept (or to retain) and which they of their own accord despise, since they desire nothing less than being governed by the Holy Spirit. (4) He does not deny that grace that they may sin, but that they may be punished on account of sin.” (Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 4.14.7; trans. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology: Volume One: First Through Tenth Topics, trans. George Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison, Jr., [Phillipsburg: P&R, 1992], p. 381.) Return to Article.


[13.] Mortimer J. Adler: “1. Material cause: that out of which something is made. 2. Efficient cause: that by which something is made. 3. Formal cause: that into which something is made. 4. Final cause: that for the sake of which something is made.” (Mortimer J. Adler, Aristotle for Everybody: Difficult Thought Made Easy, [New York: Touchstone, 1997], p. 42.) Cf. Idem, pp. 39-41. Return to Article.

[14.] Thomas Aquinas: “Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined—namely, glory—and of what is received in this life—namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present—namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future—namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way the word of the prophet is true—namely, Destruction is thy own, O Israel.(Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.23.3; trans. The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas: Part: I: QQ. I.-XXVI: Second and Revised Edition, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, [London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1920], p. 324.) William G. T. Shedd: “Election does not presuppose faith. There is no faith prior to the electing act of God, and consequently faith must be produced by this act. Faith is the gift of God (Eph. ii. 8). Hence faith is only the secondary instrumental cause of salvation. …man’s unbelief and rejection of Christ is assigned as the primary and efficient cause of perdition, and, consequently, the divine act of reprobation as the secondary and occasional cause. In the instance of reprobation, there is unbelief already existing; for reprobation supposes the existence of sin. Consequently, the reprobating act does not (like the electing act) originate any new moral quality in the man. It merely lets an existing quality, viz.: unbelief, continue. Reprobation is, therefore, not the efficient and guilty cause of perdition, but only the occasional and innocent cause of it. …The facts, then, in St. Paul’s theory of reprobation are as follows: God does nothing to save the non-elect sinner. His action is inaction. God passes the man by, in the bestowment of regenerating grace. He has a right to do so, because he does not owe this grace to any man. The divine inaction, or preterition, is the occasional cause of the sinner’s perdition: the efficient cause being the obstinate self-determination of the human will; as a man’s doing nothing to prevent a stone from falling, is the occasional cause of its fall, the efficient cause being gravitation. If this self-determination in sin were superable by the human will itself, the inaction of God in reprobation would not make the man’s perdition certain. Although God had decided to do nothing to save him, he might save himself. But this obstinate self-determination to evil is insuperable by the human will (John viii. 34; Rom. viii. 7). Consequently, mere inaction, or doing nothing, on the part of God, results in an everlasting self-determination to sin, on the part of man. The doctrine of reprobation is necessarily connected with that of self-originated sin, and bondage in sin. Viewed in this connection, there is no foundation for the charge of fatalism… God is the author of salvation, because he elects; but he is not the author of perdition, because he reprobates. In the first instance, he is efficiently active, by his Spirit and word; in the second instance, he is permissively inactive. If John Doe throw himself into the water, and is rescued by Richard Roe, the statement would be that he is saved because Richard Roe rescued him. But if John Doe throw himself into the water and is not rescued by Richard Roe, the verdict of the coroner would be suicide, and not homicide: “Drowned because he threw himself in,” and not: “Drowned, because Richard Roe did not pull him out.” Compare Hosea xiii. 9.” (William G. T. Shedd, A Critical and Doctrinal Commentary Upon the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1879], pp. 308-309.) Stephen Charnock: “Because the act of God in this is only negative. Thus God is said to ‘harden’ men: not by positive hardening, or working any thing in the creature, but by not working, not softening, leaving a man to the hardness of his own heart, whereby it is unavoidable by the depravation of man’s nature, and the fury of his passions, but that he should be further hardened, and ‘increase unto more ungodliness,’ as the expression, is (2 Tim. ii. 19). As a man is said to give another his life, when he doth not take it away when it lay at his mercy; so God is said to ‘harden’ a man, when he doth not mollify him when it was in his power, and inwardly quicken him with that grace whereby he might infallibly avoid any further provoking of him. God is said to harden men when he removes not from them the incentives to sin, curbs not those principles, which are ready to comply with those incentives, withdraws the common assistances of his grace, concurs not with counsels and admonitions to make them effectual; flasheth not in the convincing light which he darted upon them before. If hardness follows upon God’s withholding his softening grace, it is not by any positive act of God, but from the natural hardness of man. If you put fire near to wax or rosin, both will melt; but when that fire is removed, they return to their natural quality of hardness and brittleness; the positive act of the fire is to melt and soften, and the softness of the rosin is to be ascribed to that; but the hardness is from the rosin itself, wherein the fire hath no influence, but only a negative act by a removal of it: so, when God hardens a man, he only leaves him to that stony heart which he derived from Adam, and brought with him into the world. All men’s understandings being blinded, and their wills perverted in Adam, God’s withdrawing his grace is but a leaving them to their natural pravity, which is the cause of their further sinning, and not God’s removal of that special light he before afforded them, or restraint he held over them. As when God withdraws his preserving power from the creature, he is not the efficient, but deficient cause of the creature’s destruction; so, in this case, God only ceaseth to bind and dam up that sin which else would break out. …When a man that hath bridled in a high-mettled horse from running out, gives him the reins; or a huntsman takes off the string that held the dog, and lets him run after the hare,—are they the immediate cause of the motion of the one, or the other?—no, but the mettle and strength of the horse, and the natural inclination of the hound, both which are left to their own motions to pursue their own natural instincts. Man doth as naturally tend to sin as a stone to the centre, or as a weighty thing inclines to a motion to the earth: it is from the propension of man’s nature that he ‘drinks up iniquity like water:’ and God doth no more when he leaves a man to sin, by taking away the hedge which stopped him, but leave him to his natural inclination. As a man that breaks up a dam he hath placed, leaves the streams to run in their natural channel; or one that takes away a prop from a stone to let it fall, leaves it only to that nature which inclines it to a descent; both have their motion from their own nature, and man his sin from his own corruption. The withdrawing the sunbeams is not the cause of darkness, but the shadiness of the earth; nor is the departure of the sun the cause of winter, but the coldness of the air and earth, which was tempered and beaten back into the bowels of the earth by the vigour of the sun, upon whose departure they return to their natural state: the sun only leaves the earth and air as it found them at the beginning of the spring or the beginning of the day. If God do not give a man grace to melt him, yet he cannot be said to communicate to him that nature which hardens him, which man hath from himself. As God was not the cause of the first sin of Adam, which was the root of all other, so he is not the cause of the following sins, which, as branches, spring from that root; man’s free-will was the cause of the first sin, and the corruption of his nature by it the cause of all succeeding sins. God doth not immediately harden any man, but doth propose those things, from whence the natural vice of man takes an occasion to strengthen and nourish itself.” (Stephen Charnock, Discourses Upon the Existence and Attributes of God: A New Edition, [London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853], pp. 505-506, 506-507.) Cf. Idem, pp. 505-508. Francis Turretin: “The negative act includes two: both preterition, by which in the election of some to glory as well as to grace, he neglected and slighted others (which is evident from the event of election); and negative desertion, by which he left them in the corrupt mass and in their misery. However this is so to be understood: (1) that they are not excepted from the laws of common providence, but remain subject to them; nor are they immediately deprived of all God’s favor, but only of the saving and vivifying (which is the fruit of election); (2) that actual sins of all kinds follow that preterition and desertion; not indeed from the nature of preterition and desertion itself and the force of the denied grace itself, but from the nature of the corrupt free will and the force of corruption in it (as he who does not cure the disease of a sick man is not the cause per se of the disease, nor of the results flowing from it; so sins are the consequents, rather than the effects of reprobation; necessarily bringing about the futurition of the event, but yet not infusing or producing the wickedness; not by removing what is present, but by not supplying what would sustain).” (Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 4.14.6; trans. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology: Volume One: First Through Tenth Topics, trans. George Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison, Jr., [Phillipsburg: P&R, 1992], p. 381.) Return to Article.

[15.] Augustine: “Faith, then, as well in its beginning as in its completion, is God’s gift; and let no one have any doubt whatever, unless he desires to resist the plainest sacred writings, that this gift is given to some, while to some it is not given. But why it is not given to all ought not to disturb the believer, who believes that from one all have gone into a condemnation, which undoubtedly is most righteous; so that even if none were delivered therefrom, there would be no just cause for finding fault with God. Whence it is plain that it is a great grace for many to be delivered, and to acknowledge in those that are not delivered what would be due to themselves; so that he that glorieth may glory not in his own merits, which he sees to be equalled in those that are condemned, but in the Lord. But why He delivers one rather than another,—“His judgments are unsearchable, and His ways past finding out.” For it is better in this case for us to hear or to say, “O man, who art thou that repliest against God?” than to dare to speak as if we could know what He has chosen to be kept secret. Since, moreover, He could not will anything unrighteous.” (Augustine of Hippo, A Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints, 16; PL, 44:972-973; trans. NPNF1, 5:506.) Augustine: “But I do not know the reason why one or another is more or less helped or not helped by that grace; this only I know, that God does this with perfect justice, and for reasons which to Himself are known as sufficient.” (Augustine of Hippo, Letter 95.6 [to Paulinus and Therasia]; trans. NPNF1, 1:403. Cf. WSA, II/1:419.) Louis Berkhof: “(a) Preterition is a sovereign act of God, an act of His mere good pleasure, in which the demerits of man do not come into consideration, while precondemnation is a judicial act, visiting sin with punishment. …(b) The reason for preterition is not known by man. It cannot be sin, for all men are sinners. We can only say that God passed some by for good and wise reasons sufficient unto Himself. On the other hand the reason for condemnation is known; it is sin. (c) Preterition is purely passive, a simple passing by without any action on man, but condemnation is efficient and positive. Those who are passed by are condemned on account of their sin.” (Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology: Fourth Revised and Enlarged Edition, [Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1976], pp. 116-117.) See also: ccel.org. Return to Article.

[16.] R. C. Sproul: “The saved get mercy and the unsaved get justice. Nobody gets injustice.” (R. C. Sproul, Chosen by God, [Wheaton: Tyndale House, 1986], pp. 37-38.) Return to Article.

[17.] R. C. Sproul, The Holiness of God, [Carol Stream: Tyndale House Publishers, 1998], p. 115. Return to Article.

[18.] Cf. D. A. Carson (1946-  A.D.):

     Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude that reprobation is the symmetrical antithesis of election. John nowhere states that Jesus chose men to be condemned; rather, he chose some out of the ‘world’. The primary mission of the Son is to save (3.17; 12.47), and this mission springs from God’s love (3.16). This love comes to transform men who constitute the ‘world’ into men who do not. Jesus does not come to assign some neutral men to life and other neutral men to condemnation. He comes rather to a world already condemned (3.36) and proceeds to save.

(D. A. Carson, Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical Perspectives in Tension, [Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981], p. 196. Cf. Idem, pp. 195-197.)

Cf. Louis Berkhof (1873-1957 A.D.):

Reprobation may be defined as that eternal decree of God whereby He has determined to pass some men by with the operations of His special grace, and to punish them for their sins, to the manifestation of His justice. The following points deserve special emphasis: (1) It contains two elements. According to the most usual representation in Reformed theology the decree of reprobation comprises two elements, namely, preterition or the determination to pass by some men; and condemnation (sometimes called precondemnation) or the determination to punish those who are passed by for their sins. As such it embodies a twofold purpose: (a) to pass by some in the bestowal of regenerating and saving grace; and (b) to assign them to dishonor and to the wrath of God for their sins. The Belgic Confession mentions only the former, but the Canons of Dort name the latter as well. Some Reformed theologians would omit the second element from the decree of reprobation. Dabney prefers to regard the condemnation of the wicked as the foreseen and intended result of their preterition, thus depriving reprobation of its positive character; and Dick is of the opinion that the decree to condemn ought to be regarded as a separate decree, and not as a part of the decree of reprobation. It seems to us, however, that we are not warranted in excluding the second element from the decree of reprobation, nor to regard it as a different decree. The positive side of reprobation is so clearly taught in Scripture as the opposite of election that we cannot regard it as something purely negative, Rom. 9:21,22; Jude 4. However, we should notice several points of distinction between the two elements of the decree of reprobation: (a) Preterition is a sovereign act of God, an act of His mere good pleasure, in which the demerits of man do not come into consideration, while precondemnation is a judicial act, visiting sin with punishment. Even Supralapsarians are willing to admit that in condemnation sin is taken into consideration. (b) The reason for preterition is not known by man. It cannot be sin, for all men are sinners. We can only say that God passed some by for good and wise reasons sufficient unto Himself. On the other hand the reason for condemnation is known; it is sin. (c) Preterition is purely passive, a simple passing by without any action on man, but condemnation is efficient and positive. Those who are passed by are condemned on account of their sin. (2) We should guard against the idea, however, that as election and reprobation both determine with absolute certainty the end unto which man is predestined and the means by which that end is realized, they also imply that in the case of reprobation as well as in that of election God will bring to pass by His own direct efficiency whatsoever He has decreed. This means that, while it can be said that God is the author of the regeneration, calling, faith, justification, and sanctification, of the elect, and thus by direct action on them brings their election to realization, it cannot be said that He is also the responsible author of the fall, the unrighteous condition, and the sinful acts of the reprobate by direct action on them, and thus effects the realization of their reprobation. God’s decree undoubtedly rendered the entrance of sin into the world certain, but He did not predestinate some unto sin, as He did others unto holiness. And as the holy God He cannot be the author of sin. The position which Calvin takes on this point in his Institutes is clearly indicated in the following deliverances found in Calvin’s Articles on Predestination:

     “Although the will of God is the supreme and first cause of all things and God holds the devil and all the impious subject to His will, God nevertheless cannot be called the cause of sin, nor the author of evil, neither is He open to any blame.

     “Although the devil and reprobates are God’s servants and instruments to carry out His secret decisions, nevertheless in an incomprehensible manner God so works in them and through them as to contract no stain from their vice, because their malice is used in a just and righteous way for a good end, although the manner is often hidden from us.

     “They act ignorantly and calumniously who say that God is made the author of sin, if all things come to pass by His will and ordinance; because they make no distinction between the depravity of men and the hidden appointments of God.” (3) It should be noted that that with which God decided to pass some men by, is not His common but his special, His regenerating, grace, the grace that changes sinners into saints. It is a mistake to think that in this life the reprobate are entirely destitute of God’s favor. God does not limit the distribution of His natural gifts by the purpose of election. He does not even allow election and reprobation to determine the measure of these gifts. The reprobate often enjoy a greater measure of the natural blessings of life than the elect. What effectively distinguishes the latter from the former is that they are made recipients of the regenerating and saving grace of God.

(L. Berkhof, Systematic Theology: Fourth Revised and Enlarged Edition, [Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1976], pp. 116-117.) See also: ccel.org. Return to Article.

[19.] Cf. Augustine of Hippo (c. 354-430 A.D.):

     Since, therefore, one person is moved to faith in one way while another is moved in another way, and frequently the same thing said to one person at one time moves him but said to another at another time does not move him, and it moves one and does not move another, who would dare to say that God lacked that way of calling by which Esau as well could have applied his mind and joined his will to that faith in which Jacob was made righteous?

     If the resistance of a person’s will can be so great that a mental revulsion hardens him against any manner of calling, it may be asked whether this very hardening comes from a divine punishment, when God has abandoned a person by not calling him in such a way that he will be moved to faith. For who would say that the manner in which he might be persuaded to have faith was lacking to the Almighty?

(Augustine of Hippo, Miscellany of Questions in Response to Simplician, 1.2.14, PL, 40:119; trans. WSA, I/12:196.)

Cf. Augustine of Hippo (c. 354-430 A.D.):

     Faith, then, as well in its beginning as in its completion, is God’s gift; and let no one have any doubt whatever, unless he desires to resist the plainest sacred writings, that this gift is given to some, while to some it is not given. But why it is not given to all ought not to disturb the believer, who believes that from one all have gone into a condemnation, which undoubtedly is most righteous; so that even if none were delivered therefrom, there would be no just cause for finding fault with God. Whence it is plain that it is a great grace for many to be delivered, and to acknowledge in those that are not delivered what would be due to themselves; so that he that glorieth may glory not in his own merits, which he sees to be equalled in those that are condemned, but in the Lord. But why He delivers one rather than another,—“His judgments are unsearchable, and His ways past finding out.” For it is better in this case for us to hear or to say, “O man, who art thou that repliest against God?” than to dare to speak as if we could know what He has chosen to be kept secret. Since, moreover, He could not will anything unrighteous.

(Augustine of Hippo, A Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints, 16; PL, 44:972-973; trans. NPNF1, 5:506.) See also: ccel.org.

Cf. Augustine of Hippo (c. 354-430 A.D.):

Nevertheless, so far as it concerns justice and grace, it may be truly said to the guilty who is condemned, also concerning the guilty who is delivered, “Take what thine is, and go thy way;” “I will give unto this one that which is not due;” “Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? is thine eye evil because I am good?” And how if he should say, “Why not to me also?” He will hear, and with reason, “Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God?” And although assuredly in the one case you see a most benignant benefactor, and in your own case a most righteous exactor, in neither case do you behold an unjust God. For although He would be righteous even if He were to punish both, he who is delivered has good ground for thankfulness, he who is condemned has no ground for finding fault.

(Augustine of Hippo, A Treatise on the Gift of Perseverance, 8.17; PL, 45:1003; trans. NPNF1, 5:531.) See also: ccel.org.

Cf. Augustine of Hippo (c. 354-430 A.D.):

But I do not know the reason why one or another is more or less helped or not helped by that grace; this only I know, that God does this with perfect justice, and for reasons which to Himself are known as sufficient.

(Augustine of Hippo, Letter 95.6 [to Paulinus and Therasia]; trans. NPNF1, 1:403. Cf. WSA, II/1:419.) See also: ccel.org. Return to Article.

[20.] Cf. Amandus Polanus (1561-1610 A.D.):

     Reprobation is equal to election, 1. in the efficient causes. For God is author of both, God’s good pleasure or freewill is the motive cause of both.

     2. In the matter. For both is the decree of God.

     3. In the ends: for both are for the glory of God and salvation of the elect.

     4. In the common subject, which is mankind, in as much as it was to be corrupted & thrown into eternal death by their own default. As then election is the decree of delivering such as are given to Christ by mercy out of the common destruction: so Reprobation is the decree to leave such as are not given to Christ in that common destruction by justice. Therefore as election found not men worthy but made them so, so reprobation cast none into eternal death, but by just judgment leaves them that are plunged into it by their own sin and fault in it. For as God decreed not to choose any that was just already, but the sinner to be made just by grace, so likewise he did not decree to reprobate the just, but the sinner to be justly condemned for sin.

     5. In the adjuncts both were from eternal: both are firm and immutable: both not to be altered, whether you respect God’s counsel, or the persons themselves elected or reprobated. So that neither the counsel of God can possibly be made frustrate, nor the elect become reprobates, nor the reprobates elect.

     The inequality or unlikeliness of reprobation and election, appears in these.

     1. In the form. For as election is a decree of pitying and delivering out of the universal ruin, and taking into salvation: so reprobation is a decree of not pitying but relinquishing in the common waste, and of not vouchsafing of salvation.

     2. In the effects. For inward calling, faith, justification, glorification, good works, and eternal salvation, are the effects of election: but debarring from the grace of inward calling, and faith, and justification, glorification, good works, and the blessing of salvation, and sins, and the punishments of the same, are not the effects of reprobation.

     3. In the proper subjects. For election is of such as shall be saved, reprobation of them that are to be condemned.

     4. In the ensuing adjuncts. For though sin be not the cause of reprobation, yet it is of damnation: for no man is condemned but for sin: but the good works of the godly, as they are not the cause of election so neither of salvation, but only the way that God hath prepared for the godly to walk in. Eph. 2.10. We are his workmanship framed in Christ Jesus to good works, which God hath prepared that we should walk in them: Now as the way is not the cause of the mark, so are not good works the cause of salvation.

(Amandus Polanus, Treatise of Amandus Polanus, Concerning God’s Eternal Predestination, [Cambridge: John Legat, Printer to the University of Cambridge, 1599], pp. 201-203.) [I have modernized the original spelling.] Return to Article.

[21.] Cf. R. C. Sproul (1939-2017 A.D.):

In the case of the elect, God extends mercy. In the case of the reprobate, he withholds it. “I will have mercy on whomever I will have mercy” (Rom. 9:15). There is no equal ultimacy in the distribution of God’s mercy and grace. He extends his mercy and withholds it as he pleases. We all enter this world as fallen, sinful creatures. God exercises his saving grace on the elect, and the rest he leaves in their fallen, sinful state.

(R. C. Sproul, Truths We Confess: Volume One: The Triune God, [Phillipsburg: P&R, 2006], p. 104.) Return to Article.

[22.] Cf. Wilhelmus à Brakel (1635-1711 A.D.):

Reprobation Defined

     The other element of predestination is reprobation, to which reference is made in a variety of ways, such as “to be cast away.” “I have chosen thee, and not cast thee away” (Isa 41:9); to be fitted to destruction (Rom 9:22); to be appointed unto wrath (1 Thess 5:9); to be ordained unto condemnation (Jude 4); and not to be written in the book of life (Rev 13:8). These texts prove at once that there is such a thing as reprobation.

     We define reprobation to be the predestination of some specific individuals, identified by name, out of sovereign good pleasure to the manifestation of God’s justice in them by punishing them for their sins.

     (1) Just as we have shown and shall further prove that election pertains to specific individuals, so this is likewise applicable to reprobation. “...whose names were not written in the book of life” (Rev 17:8). Christ said to specific individuals, “Ye are not of My sheep” (John 10:26). They are designated by the relative pronoun “who,” “For there are certain men … who were before of old ordained to this condemnation” (Jude 4). This is the reason why some are specifically called by name, such as Esau (Rom 9:17), Pharaoh (Rom 9:17), and Judas Iscariot (Acts 1:25). The number of reprobates far exceeds the number of elect, who in contrast to them—even of those that are called—are referred to as “few” (Matt 20:16).

     (2) Reprobation proceeds solely from God’s good pleasure. Although the ungodliness of the reprobates is the cause of their damnation, this nevertheless was not the reason why God, to the glory of His justice, was moved to decree their reprobation. It purely proceeds from the good pleasure of God who has the right and the power to do as He pleases with His own. Thus, no one is permitted to say, “Why hast Thou made me thus?” (Rom 9:22). According to His good pleasure He conceals the way of salvation (Matt 11:25-26); “He hath mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth” (Rom 9:22). His purpose stands firm. This is confirmed in Rom 9:11 where it is stated, “for the children being not yet born, neither having done good or evil.” It is therefore according to God’s sovereignty and good pleasure to manifest His justice towards some and His grace to others (Rom 9:22-23), God shall maintain His holiness and justice. Believers know that God is just and righteous in all His doings. Let him who wishes to strive with God concerning this do so.

     (3) As the decree itself is a manifestation of the sovereignty of God, its purpose is the manifestation of God’s justice which reveals itself in the execution of this decree. He who decrees the end simultaneously decrees the means unto this end. Sin is the only reason that God has decreed to damn specific individuals. God permits them by their own volition to turn from Him and to enslave themselves to sin. They, having sinned, become subject to the curse threatened upon sin. God, while delivering others from sin and its curse by means of the Surety Jesus Christ, bypasses them, and therefore they neither hear God nor believe in Him. “Ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God” (John 8:47); “But ye believe not, because ye are not of My sheep” (John 10:26). As a righteous Judge God punishes them due to their sin in “the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God” (Rom 2:5). Thus, God shows His wrath over “vessels of wrath fitted to destruction” (Rom 9:22).

(Wilhelmus à Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service: Volume One, trans. Bartel Elshout, [Morgan: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 1992], pp. 220-221.) Return to Article.


[23.] Cf. Stephen Charnock (1628-1680 A.D.):

     Prop. VII. The holiness of God is not blemished by withdrawing his grace from a sinful creature, whereby he falls into more sin. That God withdraws his grace from men, and gives them up sometimes to the fury of their lusts, is as clear in Scripture as any thing (Deut. xxix. 4): ‘Yet the Lord hath not given you a heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and ears to hear,’ &c. Judas was delivered to Satan after the sop, and put into his power, for despising former admonitions. He often leaves the reins to the devil, that he may use what efficacy he can in those that have offended the Majesty of God; he withholds further influences of grace, or withdraws what before he had granted them. Thus he withheld that grace from the sons of Eli, that might have made their father’s pious admonitions effectual to them (1 Sam. ii. 25): ‘They hearkened not to the voice of their father, because the Lord would slay them.’ He gave grace to Eli to reprove them, and withheld that grace from them, which might have enabled them against their natural corruption and obstinacy to receive that reproof. But the holiness of God is not blemished by this.

     1. Because the act of God in this is only negative. Thus God is said to ‘harden’ men: not by positive hardening, or working any thing in the creature, but by not working, not softening, leaving a man to the hardness of his own heart, whereby it is unavoidable by the depravation of man’s nature, and the fury of his passions, but that he should be further hardened, and ‘increase unto more ungodliness,’ as the expression, is (2 Tim. ii. 19). As a man is said to give another his life, when he doth not take it away when it lay at his mercy; so God is said to ‘harden’ a man, when he doth not mollify him when it was in his power, and inwardly quicken him with that grace whereby he might infallibly avoid any further provoking of him. God is said to harden men when he removes not from them the incentives to sin, curbs not those principles, which are ready to comply with those incentives, withdraws the common assistances of his grace, concurs not with counsels and admonitions to make them effectual; flasheth not in the convincing light which he darted upon them before. If hardness follows upon God’s withholding his softening grace, it is not by any positive act of God, but from the natural hardness of man. If you put fire near to wax or rosin, both will melt; but when that fire is removed, they return to their natural quality of hardness and brittleness; the positive act of the fire is to melt and soften, and the softness of the rosin is to be ascribed to that; but the hardness is from the rosin itself, wherein the fire hath no influence, but only a negative act by a removal of it: so, when God hardens a man, he only leaves him to that stony heart which he derived from Adam, and brought with him into the world. All men’s understandings being blinded, and their wills perverted in Adam, God’s withdrawing his grace is but a leaving them to their natural pravity, which is the cause of their further sinning, and not God’s removal of that special light he before afforded them, or restraint he held over them. As when God withdraws his preserving power from the creature, he is not the efficient, but deficient cause of the creature’s destruction; so, in this case, God only ceaseth to bind and dam up that sin which else would break out.

     2. The whole positive cause of this hardness is from man’s corruption. God infuseth not any sin into his creatures, but forbears to infuse his grace, and restrain their lusts, which, upon the removal of his grace, work impetuously: God only gives them up to that which he knows will work strongly in their hearts. And, therefore, the apostle wipes off from God any positive act in that uncleanness the heathens were given up to (Rom. i. 24, ‘Wherefore God gave them up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own hearts.’ And, ver. 26, God gave them up to ‘vile affections;’ but they were their own affections, none of God’s inspiring.) by adding, ‘through the lusts of their own hearts.’ God’s giving them up was the logical cause, or a cause by way of argument; their own lusts were the true and natural cause; their own they were, before they were given up to them, and belonging to none, as the author, but themselves, after they were given up to them. The lust in the heart, and the temptation without, easily close and mix interests with one another: as the fire in a coal pit will with the fuel, if the streams derived into it for the quenching it, be dammed up: the natural passions will run to a temptation, as the waters of a river tumble towards the sea. When a man that hath bridled in a high-mettled horse from running out, gives him the reins; or a huntsman takes off the string that held the dog, and lets him run after the hare,—are they the immediate cause of the motion of the one, or the other?—no, but the mettle and strength of the horse, and the natural inclination of the hound, both which are left to their own motions to pursue their own natural instincts. Man doth as naturally tend to sin as a stone to the centre, or as a weighty thing inclines to a motion to the earth: it is from the propension of man’s nature that he ‘drinks up iniquity like water:’ and God doth no more when he leaves a man to sin, by taking away the hedge which stopped him, but leave him to his natural inclination. As a man that breaks up a dam he hath placed, leaves the streams to run in their natural channel; or one that takes away a prop from a stone to let it fall, leaves it only to that nature which inclines it to a descent; both have their motion from their own nature, and man his sin from his own corruption. The withdrawing the sunbeams is not the cause of darkness, but the shadiness of the earth; nor is the departure of the sun the cause of winter, but the coldness of the air and earth, which was tempered and beaten back into the bowels of the earth by the vigour of the sun, upon whose departure they return to their natural state: the sun only leaves the earth and air as it found them at the beginning of the spring or the beginning of the day. If God do not give a man grace to melt him, yet he cannot be said to communicate to him that nature which hardens him, which man hath from himself. As God was not the cause of the first sin of Adam, which was the root of all other, so he is not the cause of the following sins, which, as branches, spring from that root; man’s free-will was the cause of the first sin, and the corruption of his nature by it the cause of all succeeding sins. God doth not immediately harden any man, but doth propose those things, from whence the natural vice of man takes an occasion to strengthen and nourish itself. Hence, God is said to ‘harden Pharaoh’s heart’ (Exod. vii. 13), by concurring with the magicians in turning their rods into serpents, which stiffened his heart against Moses, conceiving him by reason of that to have no more power than other men, and was an occasion of his farther hardening: and Pharaoh is said to ‘harden himself’ (Exod. viii. 32); that is, in regard of his own natural passion.

     3. God is holy and righteous, because he doth not withdraw from man, till man deserts him. To say, that God withdrew that grace from Adam, which he had afforded him in creation, or any thing that was due to him, till he had abused the gifts of God, and turned them to an end contrary to that of creation, would be a reflection upon the Divine holiness. God was first deserted by man before man was deserted by God; and man doth first contemn and abuse the common grace of God, and those relics of natural light, that ‘enlighten every man that comes into the world’ (John i. 9); before God leaves him to the hurry of his own passions. Ephraim was first joined to idols, before God pronounced the fatal sentence, ‘Let him alone’ (Hos. iv. 17): and the heathens first changed the glory of the incorruptible God, before God withdrew his common grace from the corrupted creature (Rom. i. 23, 24); and they first ‘served the creature more than the Creator,’ before the Creator gave them up to the slavish chains of their vile affections (ver. 25, 26). Israel first cast off God before God cast off them; but then he ‘gave them up to their own hearts’ lusts, and they walked in their own counsels’ (Ps. lxxxi. 11, 12). Since sin entered into the world by the fall of Adam, and the blood of all his posterity was tainted, man cannot do any thing that is formally good; not for want of faculties, but for the want of a righteous habit in those faculties, especially in the will; yet God discovers himself to man in the works of his hands; he hath left in him footsteps of natural reason; he doth attend him with common motions of his Spirit; corrects him for his faults with gentle chastisements. He is near unto all in some kind of instructions: he puts many times providential bars in their way of sinning; but when they will rush into it as the horse into the battle, when they will rebel against the light, God doth often leave them to their own course, sentence him that is ‘filthy to be filthy still’ (Rev. xxii. 11), which is a righteous act of God, as he is rector and governor of the world. Man’s not receiving, or not improving what God gives, is the cause of God’s not giving further, or taking away his own, which before he had bestowed; this is so far from being repugnant to the holiness and righteousness of God, that it is rather a commendable act of his holiness and righteousness, as the rector of the world, not to let those gifts continue in the band of a man who abuses them contrary to his glory. Who will blame a father, that, after all the good counsels he hath given to his son to reclaim him, all the corrections he hath inflicted on him for his irregular practice, leaves him to his own courses, and withdraws those assistances, which he scoffed at, and turned the deaf ear unto? Or, who will blame the physician for deserting the patient, who rejects his counsel, will not follow his prescriptions, but dasheth his physic against the wall? No man will blame him, no man will say that he is the cause of the patient’s death, but the true cause is the fury of the distemper, and the obstinacy of the diseased person, to which the physician left him. And who can justly blame God in this case, who yet never denied supplies of grace to any that sincerely sought it at his hands; and what man is there that lies under a hardness, but first was guilty of very provoking sins? What unholiness is it to deprive men of those assistances, because of their sin, and afterwards to direct those counsels and practices of theirs, which he hath justly given them up unto, to serve the ends of his own glory in his own methods?

     4. Which will appear further by considering, that God is not obliged to continue his grace to them. It was at his liberty whether he could give any renewing grace to Adam after his fall, or to any of his posterity: he was at his own liberty to withhold it or communicate it: but, if he were under any obligation then, surely he must be under less now, since the multiplication of sin by his creatures: but, if the obligation were none just after the fall, there is no pretence now to fasten any such obligation on God. That God had no obligation at first, hath been spoken to before; be is less obliged to continue his grace after a repeated refusal, and a peremptory abuse, than he was bound to proffer it after the first apostasy. God cannot be charged with unholiness in withdrawing his grace after we have received it, unless we can make it appear that his grace was a thing due to us, as we are his creatures, and as he is governor of the world. What prince looks upon himself as obliged to reside in any particular place of his kingdom? But suppose he be bound to inhabit in one particular city, yet after the city rebels against him, is he bound to continue his court there, spend his revenue among rebels, endanger his own honour and security, enlarge their charter, or maintain their ancient privileges? Is it not most just and righteous for him to withdraw himself, and leave them to their own tumultuousness and sedition, whereby they should eat the fruit of their own doings? If there be an obligation on God as a governor, it would rather lie on the side of justice to leave man to the power of the devil whom he courted, and the prevalency of those lusts he hath so often caressed; and wrap up in a cloud all his common illuminations, and leave him destitute of all common workings of his Spirit.

(Stephen Charnock, Discourses Upon the Existence and Attributes of God: A New Edition, [London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853], pp. 505-508.) Return to Article.

[24.] Cf. William G. T. Shedd (1820-1894 A.D.):

     Reprobation relates to regenerating grace, not to common grace. It is an error to suppose that the reprobate are entirely destitute of grace. All mankind enjoy common grace. There are no elect or reprobate in this reference. Every human being experiences some degree of the ordinary influences of the Spirit of God. St. Paul teaches that God strives with man universally. He convicts him of sin, and urges him to repent of it, and forsake it. Rom. 1:19, 20; 2:3, 4; Acts 17:24-31. “The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who hold the truth in unrighteousness, so that they are without excuse. And thinkest thou, O man, that thou shalt escape the judgment of God? Or despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance, and long suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance. God hath made of one blood all nations of men, and appointed the bounds of their habitation, that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him and find him: for in him we live and move and have our being.”

     The reprobate resist and nullify common grace; and so do the elect. The obstinate selfishness and enmity of the human heart defeats the Divine mercy as shown in the ordinary influences of the Holy Spirit, in both the elect and non-elect. Acts 7: 51, “Ye stiff-necked, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost.” The difference between the two cases is, that in the instance of the elect, God follows up the common grace which has been resisted, with the regenerating grace which overcomes the resistance; while in the instance of the reprobate, he does not. It is in respect to the bestowment of this higher degree of grace, that St. Paul affirms that God “hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth” [i.e. does not soften]. “It is,” says Bates (Eternal Judgment, II.), “from the perverseness of the will and the love of sin, that men do not obey the gospel. For the Holy Spirit never withdraws his gracious assistance, till resisted, grieved, and quenched by them. It will be no excuse, that Divine grace is not conferred in the same eminent degree upon some as upon others that are converted; for the impenitent shall not be condemned for want of that singular powerful grace that was the privilege of the elect, but for receiving in vain that measure of common grace that they had. If he that received one talent had faithfully improved it, he had been rewarded with more; but upon the slothful and ungrateful neglect of his duty, he was justly deprived of it, and cast into a dungeon of horror, the emblem of hell.”

     Reprobation comprises preterition, and condemnation or damnation. It is defined in the Westminster Confession, III. 7, as a twofold purpose: (a) “To pass by” some men in the bestowment of regenerating grace; and (b) “To ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin.” The first is preterition; the last is condemnation, or damnation. Preterition must not be confounded with condemnation. This is done by Baier, Compendium, III. xii. 27. Much of the attack upon the general tenet of reprobation arises from overlooking this distinction. The following characteristics mark the difference between the two. (a) Preterition is a sovereign act; condemnation is a judicial act. God passes by, or omits an individual in the bestowment of regenerating grace, because of his sovereign good pleasure (ἐυδοκία). But he condemns this individual to punishment, not because of his sovereign good pleasure, but because this individual is a sinner. To say that God condemns a man to punishment because he pleases, is erroneous; but to say that God omits to regenerate a man because he pleases, is true. (b) The reason of condemnation is known; sin is the reason. The reason of preterition is unknown. It is not sin, because the elect are as sinful as the non-elect. (c) In preterition, God’s action is permissive; inaction rather than action. In condemnation, God’s action is efficient and positive.

     1. The decree of preterition, or omission, is a branch of the permissive decree. As God decided to permit man to use his self-determining power and originate sin, so he decided to permit some men to continue to use their self-determining power and persevere in sin. Preterition is no more exposed to objection than is the decree to permit sin at first. “It is no blemish,” says Howe (Decrees, Lect. III.), “when things are thus and so connected in themselves naturally and morally, to let things in many instances stand just as in themselves they are.” Preterition is “letting things stand” as they are. To omit or pretermit is to leave, or let alone. The idea is found in Luke 17:34. “The one shall be taken, the other shall be left.” God sometimes temporarily leaves one of his own children to his own self-will. This is a temporary reprobation. Such was the case of Hezekiah. “In the business of the ambassadors of the princes of Babylon, God left him, to try him, that he might know all that was in his heart,” 2 Chron. 32:31. Compare Ps. 81: 12, 13; and David’s temporary reprobation in the matter of Uriah. Preterition in the bestowment of regenerating (not common) grace, is plainly taught in Scripture. Isa. 6:9, 10; Matt. 11:25, 26; 13:11; 22:14; Luke 17:34; John 10:26; 12:39; Acts 1:16; 2 Thess. 2:11, 12; 2 Tim. 2:20; 1 Pet. 2:8; Rom. 9:17, 18, 21, 22; Jude 4. The passage in Isa. 6: 9, 10 is quoted more often in the New Testament, than any other Old Testament text. It occurs four times in the Gospels (in every instance, in the discourse of our Lord), once in Acts, and once in Romans. Shedd: Romans 9:18, 23, 33.

(William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology: Volume I, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1888], pp. 431-434.)

Cf. William G. T. Shedd (1820-1894 A.D.):

God opposes no obstacle to the efficacy of the atonement, in the instance of the non-elect, (a) He exerts no direct efficiency to prevent the non-elect from trusting in the atonement. The decree of reprobation is permissive. God leaves the non-elect to do as he likes, (b) There is no compulsion from the external circumstances in which the providence of God has placed the non-elect. On the contrary, the outward circumstances, especially in Christendom, favor instead of hindering trust in Christ’s atonement. And so, in a less degree, do the outward circumstances in Heathendom. “The goodness, forbearance, and long-suffering of God [tend to] lead to repentance,” Rom. 2:4; Acts 14:17; 17:26-30. (c) The special grace which God bestows upon the elect does not prevent the non-elect from believing; neither does it render faith any more difficult for him. The non-elect receives common grace, and common grace would incline the human will if it were not defeated by the human will. If the sinner should make no hostile opposition, common grace would be equivalent to saving grace.[fn. 1: To say that common grace if not resisted by the sinner would be equivalent to regenerating grace, is not the same as to say that common grace if assisted by the sinner would be equivalent to regenerating grace. In the first instance, God would be the sole author of regeneration; in the second he would not be.] Acts 7:51, “Ye stiff-necked and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost.” 2 Tim. 3:8, “As Jannes and Jambres withstood Moses, so do these also withstand the truth.” See Howe’s remarks on common grace. Oracles, II. ii.

(William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology: Volume II, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1888], pp. 482-483.)

Cf. William Bates (1625-1699 A.D.):

     From hence it follows, that it is from the perverseness of the will, and the love of sin, that men do not obey the gospel. For the Holy Spirit never withdraws his gracious assistance, till resisted, grieved, and quenched by them. It will be no excuse, that divine grace is not conferred in the same eminent degree upon some as upon others that are converted, for the impenitent shall not be condemned for want of that singular powerful grace that was the privilege of the elect, but for receiving in vain that measure of common grace that they had. If he that received one talent had faithfully improved it, he had been rewarded with more; but upon the slothful and ingrateful neglect of his duty, he was justly deprived of it, and cast into a dungeon of horror, the emblem of hell. The sentence of the law has its full force upon impenitent sinners, with intolerable aggravations for neglecting the salvation of the gospel.

(William Bates, The Four Last Things: Namely, Death, Judgment, Heaven and Hell, Practically Considered and Applied in Several Discourses, [Burlington: Chauncey Goodrich, 1832], p. 399.)

Cf. William G. T. Shedd (1820-1894 A.D.):

Not to show mercy to a man is, in St. Paul’s use of the word, to “harden” him. To harden is, not to soften. Hardening is not the efficient action of God, since Pharaoh is said to have hardened his own heart, Ex. viii. 15,32; ix. 34; x. 16. The agency of God in hardening is inaction, rather than action. The Holy Spirit does not strive at all with the human will (Gen. vi. 3), and so permits the already sinful man to confirm himself in sin, by pure and unhindered self-determination. The restraints of conscience, and of the providential circumstances amidst which the man lives, may continue, but are overborne by the sinful will. This is the negative aspect of the hardening. But besides this, there may be a positive withdrawal of these restraints. This is punitive action, intended as retribution for past resistance of restraining circumstances and influences. See the explanation of παρέδωκεν in Rom. i. 24. In the instance of Pharaoh, the hardening included both of these features. God left the king of Egypt to his self-will, and also withdrew the restraints that tended to check it. The charge of necessity, in such a reference is absurd. No more unhindered liberty can be conceived of, than this. The human will is left severely alone, to find the reason and source of its impulse wholly within itself. Sin is a more intense and wilful form of self-determination than holiness is; because, unlike the latter, it is the product of the human will in its solitary action, without any internal influence from God. “If hardness follows upon God’s withholding his softening grace, it is not by any efficient and causative act of God, but from the natural hardness of man. When God hardens a man, he only leaves him to his stony heart. God infuseth not any sin into his creatures, but forbears to infuse his grace, and to restrain their lusts, which, upon the withdrawal of restraints, work impetuously. When a man that hath bridled in a high-mettled horse from running, hath given him the reins; or a huntsman takes off the string that held the dog, and lets him run after the hare, are they the efficient cause of the motion of the one, or the other? No, but the mettle and strength of the horse, and the natural inclination of the hound: both of which are left to their own motions, to pursue their own natural instincts.” Charnocke, Holiness of God. “Five times it is said that God hardened Pharaoh’s heart; three times that Pharaoh hardened his own heart. Pharaoh, then, was hardened differently by God, from what he was by himself. He hardened his own heart by wilfully resisting Moses, and despising God, and the judgments of God. God hardened his heart, by not converting his already hard heart into a heart of flesh.” Pareus, in loco. “The perdition of sinners,” says Calvin (Instit. III. xxiii. 8), “depends upon the divine predestination in such a manner that the cause and matter of it are found in themselves.”

(William G. T. Shedd, A Critical and Doctrinal Commentary Upon the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1879], pp. 291-293.)

Cf. William G. T. Shedd (1820-1894 A.D.):

     The 32d verse is a highly important one, because it brings to notice the difference between election and reprobation. According to the preceding statements of St. Paul, men are elected, and saving faith in Christ is the consequence. Election does not presuppose faith. There is no faith prior to the electing act of God, and consequently faith must be produced by this act. Faith is the gift of God (Eph. ii. 8). Hence faith is only the secondary instrumental cause of salvation. But, in the 32d verse, man’s unbelief and rejection of Christ is assigned as the primary and efficient cause of perdition, and, consequently, the divine act of reprobation as the secondary and occasional cause. In the instance of reprobation, there is unbelief already existing; for reprobation supposes the existence of sin. Consequently, the reprobating act does not (like the electing act) originate any new moral quality in the man. It merely lets an existing quality, viz.: unbelief, continue. Reprobation is, therefore, not the efficient and guilty cause of perdition, but only the occasional and innocent cause of it. St. Paul repeats the same truth in xi. 20: “Well: because of unbelief they were broken off.”

     The facts, then, in St. Paul’s theory of reprobation are as follows: God does nothing to save the non-elect sinner. His action is inaction. God passes the man by, in the bestowment of regenerating grace. He has a right to do so, because he does not owe this grace to any man. The divine inaction, or preterition, is the occasional cause of the sinner’s perdition: the efficient cause being the obstinate self-determination of the human will; as a man’s doing nothing to prevent a stone from falling, is the occasional cause of its fall, the efficient cause being gravitation. If this self-determination in sin were superable by the human will itself, the inaction of God in reprobation would not make the man’s perdition certain. Although God had decided to do nothing to save him, he might save himself. But this obstinate self-determination to evil is insuperable by the human will (John viii. 34; Rom. viii. 7). Consequently, mere inaction, or doing nothing, on the part of God, results in an everlasting self-determination to sin, on the part of man. The doctrine of reprobation is necessarily connected with that of self-originated sin, and bondage in sin. Viewed in this connection, there is no foundation for the charge of fatalism, frequently made by anti-predestinarian exegetes, of which the following extract from Meyer (in loco) is an example. “The contents of Rom. ix. 6-29, in themselves considered, certainly exclude the notion of a divine decree that is conditioned by the self-determination of the human will, or of an absolute agency of God that depends upon that of the individual man; but, at the same time, they equally exclude the fatalistic determinism, the tremendum mysterium of Calvin, which, as Augustine’s theory had previously done, robs man of his self-determination and freedom in respect to salvation, and makes him the passive object of the arbitrary and absolute will of God.”

     God is the author of salvation, because he elects; but he is not the author of perdition, because he reprobates. In the first instance, he is efficiently active, by his Spirit and word; in the second instance, he is permissively inactive. If John Doe throw himself into the water, and is rescued by Richard Roe, the statement would be that he is saved because Richard Roe rescued him. But if John Doe throw himself into the water and is not rescued by Richard Roe, the verdict of the coroner would be suicide, and not homicide: “Drowned because he threw himself in,” and not: “Drowned, because Richard Roe did not pull him out.” Compare Hosea xiii. 9.

(William G. T. Shedd, A Critical and Doctrinal Commentary Upon the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1879], pp. 308-309.) Return to Article.

[25.] Cf. Charles Hodge (1797-1878 A.D.):

     The Scriptures do not teach philosophy, but a philosophy underlies them. Philosophy is only the scientific explanation and arrangement of the facts of consciousness and the laws of our constitution which those facts reveal. The Scriptures, coming from the author of our constitution, are consistent with those facts and assume those laws. The Scriptures, therefore, recognize the soul as one. They have no name exclusively devoted to the several faculties. The same word is used of the intellect and of the seat of the affections.

     The thoughts of the heart, the blindness of the heart, are familiar representations. The heart therefore here is the soul. Its obduracy is a state, not of one faculty, but of all. The same word is sometimes translated to blind and sometimes to harden. As there are two words πώρος (poros,) a stone, and πώρωσις (porosis,) blindness or hardness. Mark iii: 5; Rom. xi: 25.

     II. The hardness therefore of which the Scriptures speak is,

     1. Not mere callousness or insensibility of feeling.

     2. But also the blindness of the mind.

     3. Fixedness of the will in opposition to God and his truth.

     It is of course a matter of degrees. a. Disobedience and secret opposition to the truth. b. Zealous opposition and hatred of it, manifesting itself at length in blasphemy and persecution.

     III. This hardness is a sinful state.

     1. From its very nature.

     2. In its higher form it is the state or character of the lost and of Satan.

     3. It is self-induced; a. As it is the natural result or effect of our depravity. b. As it is the consequence, i. e., the natural consequence of the indulgence of sin. As the natural consequence of the cultivation of virtue, is virtue; of kindness, is kindness; of tenderness, is tenderness; so the natural consequence of the indulgence of sin is sin,—a sinful hardness of heart.

     IV. It is none the less a divine judgment and a premonition of reprobation. Any degree of it is reason to fear such reprobation. The higher forms of it are direct evidence of it.

     1. It is attributed to God who is said to harden the hearts of men, as we attribute the results of an agent’s acts to the agent himself. We say a father ruins a child. By this we mean that the ruin is the natural effect of the father’s conduct. It need not be intended. In case of God, let it be observed,

     1. That God exerts no efficiency in hardening the hearts of sinners, as he does in working grace in men.

     2. But it is a punitive withdrawing of the Spirit; the inevitable result of which is obduracy. God determined to let Pharaoh alone, and the result was what it was.

     V. This hardness is,

     1. Beyond the reach of argument, or motive, or discipline, or culture.

     2. It is beyond our own power to cure or to remove. It is, therefore, a. To be greatly dreaded. b. It is to be withstood and operated against. c. It is to be prayed against. d. It is to be avoided by avoiding grieving and quenching the Holy Spirit.

(Charles Hodge, Princeton Sermons: Outlines of Discourses, Doctrinal and Practical, [London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1879], LXVI. Hardness of Heart [No. 10th, 1861.], pp. 100-101.)

Cf. James Petigru Boyce (1827-1888 A.D.):

     The Scriptural statements as to Reprobation are that God, in eternity, when he elected some, did likewise not elect others; that as resulting from this non-election, but not as efficiently caused by it, he passes by these in the bestowment of the special favours shown to the Elect, and, as in like manner yet further resulting, condemns men because of sin to everlasting destruction, and while they are in the state of sin and condemnation, he effects or permits the hardening of their heart, so that his truth is not appreciated, but actually rejected.

(James Petigru Boyce, Abstract of Systematic Theology, [Baltimore: H. M. Wharton & Company, 1887], p. 356.)

Cf. R. L. Dabney (1820-1898 A.D.):

     I would rather say, that it consists simply of a sovereign, yet righteous purpose to leave out the non-elect, which preterition was foreseen and intended to result in their final righteous condemnation. The decree of reprobation is then, in its essence, a simple preterition. It is indeed intelligent and intentional in God. He leaves them out of His efficacious plan and purpose of mercy, not out of a general inattention or overlooking of them, but knowingly and sovereignly. Yet objectively this act is only negative, because God does nothing to those thus passed by, to make their case any worse, or to give any additional momentum to their downward course. He leaves them as they are. Yea, incidentally. He does them many kindnesses, extends to multitudes of them the calls of His word, and even the remonstrances of His Spirit, preventing them from becoming as wicked as they would otherwise have been. But the practical or efficacious part of His decree is, simply that He will not “make them willing in the day of His power.”

(R. L. Dabney, Syllabus and Notes of the Course of Systematic and Polemic Theology: Second Edition, [St Louis: Presbyterian Publishing Company of St. Louis, 1878], p. 239.)

Cf. Augustus Hopkins Strong (1836-1921 A.D.):

     (g) The decree of election implies a decree of reprobation.—Answer: The decree of reprobation is not a positive decree, like that of election, but a permissive decree to leave the sinner to his self-chosen rebellion and its natural consequences of punishment.

     Election and sovereignty are only sources of good. Election is not a decree to destroy,—it is a decree only to save. When we elect a President, we do not need to hold a second election to determine that the remaining millions shall be non-Presidents. It is needless to apply contrivance or force. Sinners, like water, if simply let alone, will run down hill to ruin. The decree of reprobation is simply a decree to do nothing—a decree to leave the sinner to himself. The natural result of this judicial forsaking, on the part of God, is the hardening and destruction of the sinner. But it must not be forgotten that this hardening and destruction are not due to any positive efficiency of God,—they are a self-hardening and a self-destruction,—and God’s judicial forsaking is only the just penalty of the sinner’s guilty rejection of offered mercy.

(Augustus Hopkins Strong, Systematic Theology: In Three Volumes: Volume Three, [Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press, 1909], pp. 789-790.)

Cf. John Dick (1764-1833 A.D.):

When, out of many objects which are presented to him, a person makes a selection, he as positively rejects some as he chooses others. He does not pass by any without taking notice of them; but, having them all at once, or in succession, under his eye, he takes and leaves, for reasons which are satisfactory to himself. Not to choose, is a negative phrase, but it does not imply the absence of a determination of the mind. It is not to words, but to things, that we ought to attend; and any man, who reflects upon the operation of his own mind in a similar case, will perceive that the will is exercised in passing by one object, as much as in choosing another.

(John Dick, Lectures on Theology: In Two Volumes: Vol. I, [Philadelphia: J. Whetham & Son, 1841], p. 368.)

Note: Dick is correct with respect to an act of the will—ad intra—the choice to pass over one individual is as much an act of volition (positive/active) as the choice to elect another (Romans 9:11-13). Nevertheless, this is not the case as regards the outworking of that choice—ad extra.

     God “actively” (or positively) softens the hearts of His elect by extending His special (invincible) grace (Ezekiel 36:26-27; Philippians 2:13). Conversely, He does not harden the hearts of the reprobate (or non-elect) in the same manner. Rather, He does so “passively” (or negatively) by withdrawing His common grace (Psalm 81:12; Romans 1:24-28), which He owes to no one (Matthew 20:15; Romans 9:15-18), and giving the sinful inclinations of the fallen human heart free rein to do as they desire (Genesis 8:21; Ecclesiastes 9:3). All, outside and apart from Christ, are guilty of sin (Romans 3:23; 5:12) and entitled to nothing other than judgment (Romans 6:23; 2:5-6).

     To use an Aristotelian taxonomy, God is the efficient cause of the softening of the elect and the final cause of the hardening of the reprobate (or non-elect). In the former (election), God sovereignly originates a new moral quality in the heart—faith—which was not previously there. In the latter (reprobation), nothing new is implanted; instead, God allows an existing quality—unbelief—to persist unchecked.

     The reason that God softens some (Jeremiah 24:7; Acts 16:14) and hardens others (Joshua 11:20; Deuteronomy 2:30; Isaiah 63:17) is ultimately for the sake of His Glory (Exodus 14:4, 17-18; Ephesians 1:4-6, 11-14; Romans 9:22-23). However, what this specifically entails and why God chooses to extend His saving grace to some and to pass over others is something known to Him alone (Romans 11:33; Isaiah 55:8-9). In the end, the elect receive mercy, the reprobate (or non-elect) receive justice, no one receives injustice (Romans 9:14; Genesis 18:25; Job 34:12). Return to Article.


καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν πρὸ πάντων καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκεν ~ Soli Deo Gloria


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