Outline.
2. Concursus — Sin and the Sovereignty of God.
1. Concursus, Definition. Return to Outline.
Michael Horton:
From the Latin verb concurrere, “to run together,” the idea of concursus, or concurrence, in theology refers to the simultaneity of divine and human agency in specific actions and events. Aquinas recognized that on one hand Scripture clearly teaches that God has predestined all things that come to pass while on the other hand it attributes decisions and actions to human agents. Sometimes God acts immediately and directly, but ordinarily he works through natural means. Aquinas employed the Aristotelian category of primary and secondary causes to make this point.
(Michael Horton, The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way, [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011], p. 356.)
Louis Berkhof:
Concurrence may be defined as the co-operation of the divine power with all subordinate powers, according to the pre-established laws of their operation, causing them to act and to act precisely as they do. …It should be noted at the outset that this doctrine implies two things: (1) That the powers of nature do not work by themselves, that is, simply by their own inherent power, but that God is immediately operative in every act… This must be maintained in opposition to the deistic position. (2) That second causes are real, and not to be regarded simply as the operative power of God. It is only on condition that second causes are real, that we can properly speak of a concurrence or co-operation of the First Cause with secondary causes. This should be stressed over against the pantheistic idea that God is the only agent working in the world.
(Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology: Fourth Revised and Enlarged Edition, [Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1959], pp. 171-172.)
Herman Bavinck:
We can speak of such secondary causes even in reference to the inanimate creatures. For although it is true that God lets His sun rise over the evil and the good and sends rain on the just and the unjust (Matt. 5:45), He does make use of the sun and the clouds on such occasions.
(Herman Bavinck, Our Reasonable Faith, trans. Henry Zylstra, [Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1956], p. 181.)
Geerhardus Vos:
Here, too, two extremes will have to be avoided, deism and pantheism. According to the first, the powers and the laws of nature certainly come from God and as such are not necessary for God but now work of themselves such that God remains excluded. That eliminates God’s immanence. According to the other extreme, God alone does everything in nature, that is, there are not two causes that work together; the laws of nature and the powers of nature are just abstractions from God’s modes of working. Thus, nature and God are identified.
(Geerhardus Vos, Reformed Dogmatics: Single Volume Edition, trans. & ed. Richard B. Gaffin, Jr., [Bellingham: Lexham Press, 2020], 1.7.12, p. 198.)
Herman Bavinck:
Although God works through secondary causes, this is not to be interpreted, in the manner of Deism, to mean that they come in between God and the effects with their consequences and separate these from him. “God’s immediate provision over everything extends to the exemplar of the order.” …secondary causes are strictly subordinated to God as the primary cause and in that subordination nevertheless remain true causes. …the primary cause and the secondary cause remain distinct. The former does not destroy the latter but on the contrary confers reality on it, and the second exists solely as a result of the first. Neither are the secondary causes merely instruments, organs, inanimate automata, but they are genuine causes with a nature, vitality, spontaneity, manner of working, and law of their own.
(Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: Volume Two: God and Creation, trans. John Vriend, ed. John Bolt, [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004], §. 305, pp. 610, 613, 614.)
Francis Turretin:
III. (2) One concourse is mediate; another immediate. For a cause can be said to act either mediately or immediately both as to the subsisting substance and as to virtue. That cause acts immediately by the immediation of the subsisting substance between which and the effect no other singular subsisting substance (subsisting of itself) is interposed (which previously receives in itself the action of the agent, as water which washes and cools the hand). The other, on the contrary, acts mediately by the mediation of the subsisting substance between which and the effect another subsisting substance falls (as the chisel between the artist and the statue). A cause acts immediately by the immediation of virtue which acts by a virtue or power proper to itself and not received from any other source (as fire warms by its own heat). A cause acts mediately, however, by the mediation of virtue which operates by a virtue not its own or proper to itself, but received and borrowed from another source (as when the moon by light borrowed from the sun illuminates the earth, she is said to illuminate mediately by a mediation of virtue, i.e., the virtue of the sun mediating). Now God concurs with second causes immediately by an immediation both of virtue (because he acts by his proper power not furnished from another source) and of subsisting substance (because by his own essence he attains the thing). Nor, if he uses second causes as means, does it follow that he does not act immediately also. For he uses them not with respect to the action of the creature and consequently of the effect itself (as if he did not reach it immediately), but inasmuch as he subordinates second causes to himself (by flowing into which he also reaches the effect itself immediately).
(Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology: Volume One, trans. George M. Giger, ed. James T. Dennison, [Phillipsburg: P & R Publishing, 1992], 6.5.3, pp. 505-506.)
John Calvin:
Nay, I affirm in general, that particular events are evidences of the special providence of God. In the wilderness God caused a south wind to blow, and brought the people a plentiful supply of birds (Exod. 19:13). When he desired that Jonah should be thrown into the sea, he sent forth a whirlwind. Those who deny that God holds the reins of government will say that this was contrary to ordinary practice, whereas I infer from it that no wind ever rises or rages without his special command. In no way could it be true that “he maketh the winds his messengers, and the flames of fire his ministers;” that “he maketh the clouds his chariot, and walketh upon the wings of the wind,” (Ps. 104:3, 4), did he not at pleasure drive the clouds and winds and therein manifest the special presence of his power. In like manner, we are elsewhere taught, that whenever the sea is raised into a storm, its billows attest the special presence of God. “He commandeth and raiseth the stormy wind, which lifteth up the waves.” “He maketh the storm a calm, so that the waves thereof are still,” (Ps. 107:25, 29 ) He also elsewhere declares, that he had smitten the people with blasting and mildew (Amos 4:9). Again while man naturally possesses the power of continuing his species, God describes it as a mark of his special favour, that while some continue childless, others are blessed with offspring: for the fruit of the womb is his gift. Hence the words of Jacob to Rachel, “Am I in God’s stead, who has withheld from thee the fruit of the womb?” (Gen. 30:2). To conclude in one word. Nothing in nature is more ordinary than that we should be nourished with bread. But the Spirit declares not only that the produce of the earth is God’s special gift, but “that man does not live by bread only,” (Deut. 8:3), because it is not mere fulness that nourishes him but the secret blessing of God. And hence, on the other hand, he threatens to take away “the stay and the staff, the whole stay of bread, and the whole stay of water,” (Is. 3:1). Indeed, there could be no serious meaning in our prayer for daily bread, if God did not with paternal hand supply us with food. Accordingly, to convince the faithful that God, in feeding them, fulfils the office of the best of parents, the prophet reminds them that he “giveth food to all flesh,” (Ps. 136:25). In fine, when we hear on the one hand, that “the eyes of the Lord are upon the righteous, and his ears are open unto their cry,” and, on the other hand, that “the face of the Lord is against them that do evil, to cut off the remembrance of them from the earth,” (Ps. 34:15, 16), let us be assured that all creatures above and below are ready at his service, that he may employ them in whatever way he pleases. Hence we infer, not only that the general providence of God, continuing the order of nature, extends over the creatures, but that by his wonderful counsel they are adapted to a certain and special purpose.
(John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge, [Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2009], 1.16.7, p. 119.) Preview.
Vern S. Poythress:
God is free to work through ordinary means, or to work in extraordinary ways. Theologians have used the terminology of “primary cause” and “secondary cause.” God as the primary cause is active in bringing about all the events in the world, both ordinary events and extraordinary ones. But in the case of ordinary events he works in conjunction with secondary causes. As Psalm 104:14 says, “You make the grass to grow for the livestock.” In the growth of grass God is the primary cause. But scientists can investigate many secondary causes. They study the way in which water and nutrients travel from the soil through the roots into the grass, and how photosynthesis takes place to convert the energy of light into chemical energy for sustaining life. In other cases, God may work apart from any secondary cause, as he did in the initial creation of the world (Gen. 1:1). …God as primary cause does not compete with secondary causes within the world. When God uses “a strong east wind” (Ex. 14:21) to dry up the sea, God does it and the east wind does it, but on different levels.
(Vern S. Poythress, Redeeming Science: A God-Centered Approach, [Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2006], pp. 179-180, 194.)
Note: See further: Providence.
Thomas Aquinas:
…Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): As the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself. …In government there are two things to be considered; the design of government, which is providence itself; and the execution of the design. As to the design of government, God governs all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some things by means of others.
(The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas: Part I: QQ. CIII.—CXIX., trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, [London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1922], Pt. I, Q. 103, Art. 6, p. 14.)
Thomas Aquinas:
Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.
(The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas, Part I. QQ. LXXV.—CII., trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, [London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, LTD., 1922], Pt. I, Q. 83, Art. 1, Reply Obj. 3, p. 149.)
Note: See further: The “Will”; also Free Will (Libertarian?); and Does God Drag Unwilling Sinners to Heaven?
2. Concursus — Sin and the Sovereignty of God. Return to Outline.
John Calvin:
First, it must be observed that the will of God is the cause of all things that happen in the world: and yet God is not the author of evil. ...the proximate cause is one thing, and the remote cause another.
(John Calvin, Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God, trans. J. K. S. Reid, [London: James Clarke & Co. Limited, 1961], pp. 169, 181.)
Benedict Pictet:
Now divines reply, that in these, as well as in those before treated of, the act itself may be distinguished from the sinfulness of the act. But because I know that many cannot conceive this, it has sometimes occurred to me, that we may put it in this form: God in these actions is the author of the motions which precede them…
(Benedict Pictet, Christian Theology, trans. Frederick Reyroux, [London: R. B. Seeley and W. Burnside, 1834], p. 175.)
Robert Shaw:
Since all things were known to God from the beginning of the world, and come to pass according to the immutable counsel of his will, it necessarily follows that, in respect of the foreknowledge and decree of God, all things come to pass infallibly. But, by his providence, he orders them to fall out according to the nature of second causes. Every part of the material world has an immediate dependence on the will and power of God, in respect of every motion and operation, as well as in respect of continued existence; but he governs the material world by certain physical laws,—commonly called the laws of nature, and in Scripture the ordinances of heaven,—and agreeably to these laws, so far as relates to second causes, certain effects uniformly and necessarily follow certain causes. The providence of God is also concerned about the volitions and actions of intelligent creatures; but his providential influence is not destructive of their rational liberty, for they are under no compulsion, but act freely; and all the liberty which can belong to rational creatures is that of acting according to their inclinations. Though there is no event contingent with respect to God, “who declareth the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things which are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure;” yet many events are contingent or accidental with regard to us, and also with respect to second causes.
(Robert Shaw, An Exposition of the Confession of Faith of the Westminster Assembly of Divines: Eighth Edition, [Glasgow: Blackie and Son, 1857], Chapter V, §. 2, p. 68.)
Louis Berkhof:
1. THE IDEA OF DIVINE CONCURRENCE AND SCRIPTURAL PROOF FOR IT.
a. Definition and explanation. Concurrence may be defined as the co-operation of the divine power with all subordinate powers, according to the pre-established laws of their operation, causing them to act and to act precisely as they do. Some are inclined to limit its operation, as far as man is concerned. to human actions that are morally good and therefore commendable; others. more logically, extend it to actions of every kind. It should be noted at the outset that this doctrine implies two things: (1) That the powers of nature do not work by themselves, that is, simply by their own inherent power, but that God is immediately operative in every act of the creature. This must be maintained in opposition to the deistic position. (2) That second causes are real, and not to be regarded simply as the operative power of God. It is only on condition that second causes are real, that we can properly speak of a concurrence or co-operation of the First Cause with secondary causes. This should be stressed over against the pantheistic idea that God is the only agent working in the world.
b. Scripture proof for divine concurrence. The Bible clearly teaches that the providence of God pertains not only to the being but also to the actions or operations of the creature. The general truth that men do not work independently, but are controlled by the will of God, appears from several passages of Scripture. Joseph says in Gen. 45:5 that God rather than his brethren had sent him to Egypt. In Ex. 4:11,12 the Lord says that He will be with Moses’ mouth and teach him what to say; and in Jos. 11:6 He gives Joshua the assurance that He will deliver the enemies to Israel. Proverbs 21:1 teaches us that “the king’s heart is in the hand of Jehovah. . . . He turneth it whithersoever He will”; and Ezra 6:22, that Jehovah “had turned the heart of the king of Assyria” unto Israel. In Deut 8:18 Israel is reminded of the fact that it was Jehovah that gave it power to get wealth. More particularly, it is also evident from Scripture that there is some kind of divine co-operation in that which is evil. According to II Sam. 16:11 Jehovah bade Shimei to curse David. The Lord also calls the Assyrian “the rod of mine anger, the staff in whose hand is mine indignation,” Isa. 10:5. Moreover, He provided for a lying spirit in the mouth of the prophets of Ahab, I Kings 22:20-23.
(Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology: Fourth Revised and Enlarged Edition, [Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1959], pp. 171-172.)
Louis Berkhof:
4. THE DIVINE CONCURRENCE AND SIN. Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, and Arminians raise a serious objection to this doctrine of providence. They maintain that a previous concurrence, which is not merely general but predetermines man to specific actions, makes God the responsible author of sin. Reformed theologians are well aware of the difficulty that presents itself here, but do not feel free to circumvent it by denying God’s absolute control over the free actions of His moral creatures, since this is clearly taught in Scripture, Gen. 45:5; 50:19,20; Ex. 10:1,20; II Sam. 16:10.11; Isa. 10:5-7; Acts 2:23; 4:27,28. They feel constrained to teach: (a) that sinful acts are under divine control and occur according to God’s pre-determination and purpose, but only by divine permission, so that He does not efficiently cause men to sin, Gen. 45:5; 50:20; Ex. 14:17; Isa. 66:4; Rom. 9:22; II Thess. 2:11; (b) that God often restrains the sinful works of the sinner, Gen. 3:6; Job 1:12; 2:6; Ps. 76:10; Isa. 10:15; Acts 7:51; and (c) that God in behalf of His own purpose overrules evil for good, Gen. 50:20; Ps. 76:10; Acts. 3:13.
(Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology: Fourth Revised and Enlarged Edition, [Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1959], p. 174.)
Wilhelmus à Brakel:
The thought might occur as to whether the consequence of such cooperation would not be that there is but one cause of all motions and activities. Then God would be the only active agent and man and all creatures would be entirely passive, being set in motion as the strings of a musical instrument which are entirely passive and whose motion is caused solely by the player.
My response to this is: “Not in the least!” For even though creatures function as means in relation to each other, God using them in the execution of His work and purpose, they are nevertheless the primary cause of their motions and activities. This is not true in respect to God as if they were independent from Him, but in respect to other subordinate causes as well as the results of their activities. There is no inconsistency in the fact that two causes of a different order have the same result, especially since the result is one and the same, proceeding from both sources in a different manner.
(Wilhelmus à Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service: Volume 1: God, Man, and Christ, trans. Bartel Elshout, ed. Joel R. Beeke, [Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 1999], p. 339.) Online.
Wilhelmus à Brakel:
Objection #1: Does not such cooperation make God a cause of sin?
Answer: By no means! One needs to make a distinction between the activity itself, such as understanding, willing, seeing, hearing, speaking, working, and the context in which this activity must occur: the law of God. The activity itself is natural and as such neither good nor evil; however when viewed within the context of the law, according to which it ought to be judged as far as subject, time, and manner are concerned, this activity becomes either good or evil. When discussing God’s cooperation we understand this to refer to the natural dimensions of this activity or motion itself. This is neither true, however, in reference to the misuse of this activity, to the lack of conformity to the law, nor to the evil in this activity. One person can be the cause of activity in another person, but not of the evil which accompanies it. The government causes the executioner to scourge the thief, but is not the cause of the cruel manner in which he may do so. A player causes the strings to bring forth sound, but not the dissonance; this proceeds from the string. A rider may drive his horse and thus cause progress. He is not the cause of its limp, however; this is due to a flaw in the horse. Such is the case here. The activity itself proceeds from God, but man spoils it due to his inner corruption. Consequently, it is not God but man who is the cause of sin.
(Wilhelmus à Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service: Volume 1: God, Man, and Christ, trans. Bartel Elshout, ed. Joel R. Beeke, [Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 1999], p. 341.) Online.
Herman Bavinck:
Scripture, however, tells us both that God works all things so that the creature is only an instrument in his hand (Isa. 44:24; Ps. 29:3; 65:10; 147:15ff.; Matt. 5:45; Acts 17:25; etc.) and that providence is distinct from creation and presupposes the existence and self-activity of creatures (Gen. 1:11, 20, 22, 24, 28; etc.). In keeping with this witness, Christian theology teaches that the secondary causes are strictly subordinated to God as the primary cause and in that subordination nevertheless remain true causes. The odd theologian, to be sure, diverged from this position, such as the nominalist Biel in the Middle Ages and Zwingli in the time of the Reformation, who believed that secondary causes were mistakenly so-called and preferred to call them instruments.
The constant teaching of the Christian church, nevertheless, has been that the two causes, though they are totally dependent on the primary cause, are at the same time also true and essential causes. With his almighty power God makes possible every secondary cause and is present in it with his being at its beginning, progression, and end. It is he who posits it and makes it move into action (praecursus) and who further accompanies it in its working and leads it to its effect (concursus). He is “at work” [in us] “both to will and to do for his good pleasure” (Phil. 2:13). But this energizing activity of the primary cause in the secondary causes is so divinely great that precisely by that activity he stirs those secondary causes into an activity of their own. “The providence of God does not cancel out but posits secondary causation.” Concurrence is precisely the reason for the self-activity of the secondary causes, and these causes, sustained from beginning to end by God’s power, work with a strength that is appropriate and natural to them. So little does the activity of God nullify the activity of the creature that the latter is all the more vigorous to the degree that the former reveals itself the more richly and fully. Hence, the primary cause and the secondary cause remain distinct. The former does not destroy the latter but on the contrary confers reality on it, and the second exists solely as a result of the first. Neither are the secondary causes merely instruments, organs, inanimate automata, but they are genuine causes with a nature, vitality, spontaneity, manner of working, and law of their own. “Satan and evildoers are not so effectively the instruments of God that they do not also act in their own behalf. For we must not suppose that God works in an iniquitous man as if he were a stone or a piece of wood, but He uses him as a thinking creature, according to the quality of his nature, which He has given him. Thus, when we say that God works in evildoers, that does not prevent them from working also in their own behalf.”
In relation to God the secondary causes can be compared to instruments (Isa. 10:15; 13:5; Jer. 50:25; Acts 9:15; Rom. 9:20–23); in relation to their effects and products they are causes in the true sense. And precisely because the primary and the secondary cause do not stand and function dualistically on separate tracks, but the primary works through the secondary, the effect that proceeds from the two is one and the product is one. There is no division of labor between God and his creature, but the same effect is totally the effect of the primary cause as well as totally the effect of the proximate cause. The product is also in the same sense totally the product of the primary as well as totally the product of the secondary cause. But because the primary cause and the secondary cause are not identical and differ essentially, the effect and product are in reality totally the effect and product of the two causes, to be sure, but formally they are only the effect and product of the secondary cause. Wood burns and it is God alone who makes it burn, yet the burning process may not be formally attributed to God but must be attributed to the wood as subject. Human persons speak, act, and believe, and it is God alone who supplies to a sinner all the vitality and strength he or she needs for the commission of a sin. Nevertheless the subject and author of the sin is not God but the human being. In this manner Scripture draws the lines within which the reconciliation of God’s sovereignty and human freedom has to be sought.
(Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: Volume Two: God and Creation, trans. John Vriend, ed. John Bolt, [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004], §. 305, pp. 613-615.)
William G. T. Shedd:
In endeavoring to explain how God decrees sin, some theologians make divine concursus to be identically the same thing in relation to both holiness and sin, namely, that of internal and positive actuation or inclining of the human will. In both cases God works in the finite will “to will and to do.” This destroys the distinction between the efficient and the permissive decree. Howe (Letter on God’s Prescience, postscript) discusses this point in his answer to the criticism of Theophilus Gale, who charged him with denying the divine concursus altogether, because he refused to make “the concurrence of God to the sins of men” identical with that to the holiness of men. The substance of his answer is that there is both an “immediate” and a “determinative,” that is, causative concourse of God to the will of man in good action, but only an “immediate,” not “determinative” or causative concourse in evil action. In the first instance God both upholds and inwardly inclines or actuates the will of man; in the second instance he upholds but does not inwardly incline it: “Divine concourse or influence (for I here affect not the curiosity to distinguish these terms, as some do), which I deny not to be immediate to any actions, I only deny to be determinative as to those that are wicked. It is only God’s determinative concurrence to all actions, even those that are most malignantly wicked, which is the thing I speak of; as what I cannot reconcile with the wisdom and sincerity of his councils and exhortations against such actions.”
(William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology: Volume III, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1894], p. 147.)
Robert Lewis Dabney:
This, then, is my picture of the providential evolution of God’s purpose as to sinful acts; so to arrange and group events and objects around free agents by his manifold wisdom and power, as to place each soul, at every step, in the presence of those circumstances, which, He knows, will be a sufficient objective inducement to it to do, of its own native, free activity, just the thing called for by God’s plan. Thus the act is man’s alone, though its occurrence is efficaciously secured by God. And the sin is man’s only. God’s concern in it is holy, first, because all His personal agency in arranging to secure its occurrence was holy; and second, His ends or purposes are holy. God does not will the sin of the act, for the sake of its sinfulness; but only wills the result to which the act is a means, and that result is always worthy of His holiness.
(Robert Lewis Dabney, Syllabus and Notes of the Course of Systematic and Polemic Theology: Second Edition, [St Louis: Presbyterian Publishing Company of St. Louis, 1878], pp. 288-289.)
Note: See further: The “Will”; also Free Will (Libertarian?); and Does God Drag Unwilling Sinners to Heaven?
An Objection and Answer.
John Piper:
Arminians sometimes disparage Reformed appeals to “secondary causes” between God’s sovereign will and the immediate effecting of a sinful act. But the Reformed introduce this idea of intermediate causes, different from God’s ultimate causing, not because of a theological necessity but because so many Scripture passages demand it. For example, God commissions an “evil spirit” between Abimelech and the men of Shechem to bring about his will (Judg. 9:22–24); Satan leads Judas to do (Luke 22:3) what Acts 2:23 says God brings about; Paul says that Satan blinds the minds of unbelievers (2 Cor. 4:4), but also says that God sends a blinding spirit of stupor (Rom. 11:8–10); Satan stirs up David to take a census (1 Chron. 21:1), which proves to be sin (2 Sam. 24:10), and yet it is written that God is in some sense the cause behind Satan (2 Sam. 24:1); and Satan gets permission from God to torment Job (Job 1:12; 2:6), but when Satan takes Job’s family and makes him sick, Job says, “The Lord has taken” (Job 1:21), and, “Shall we receive good from God, and shall we not receive evil?” (2:10)—to which the writer responds: “In all this Job did not sin or charge God with wrong” (1:22; cf. 2:10).
(John Piper, Does God Desire all to be Saved? [Wheaton: Crossway, 2013], pp. 42-43.) Preview.
Note: See further: Compatibilism — God’s Sovereignty and Human Responsibility.
καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν πρὸ πάντων καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκεν ~ Soli Deo Gloria
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