Evangelical Answers : The Will(s) of God

John Piper:

…1 Timothy 2:4, where Paul says that God wills all persons to be saved. What are we to say of the fact that God wills something that in fact does not happen? These are two possibilities. One is that there is a power in the universe greater than God’s that is frustrating him by overruling what he wills. …The other possibility is that God wills not to save all, even though he is willing to save all, because there is something else that he wills more, which would be lost if he exerted his sovereign power to save all. …Both Calvinists and Arminians affirm two wills in God when they ponder deeply over 1 Timothy 2:4. Both can say that God wills for all to be saved. But then when queried why all are not saved both Calvinist and Arminian answer that God is committed to something even more valuable than saving all. …What does God will more than saving all? The answer given by Arminians is that human self-determination and the possible resulting love relationship with God are more valuable than saving all people by sovereign, efficacious grace. The answer given by Calvinists is that the greater value is the manifestation of the full range of God’s glory in wrath and mercy (Rom. 9:22–23) and the humbling of man so that he enjoys giving all credit to God for his salvation (1 Cor. 1:29).

(John Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” In: Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge & Grace, eds. Thomas R. Schreiner, Bruce A. Ware, [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2000], pp. 123-124.)

Note: Regarding the full display of God’s attributes, see: William G. T. Shedd, Calvinism: Pure And Mixed: A Defence of the Westminster Standards, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1893], pp. 80-85.

Cf. I. Howard Marshall: (Arminian Theologian)

To avoid all misconceptions it should be made clear at the outset that the fact that God wishes or wills that all people should be saved does not necessarily imply that all will respond to the gospel and be saved. We must certainly distinguish between what God would like to see happen and what he actually does will to happen, and both of these things can be spoken of as God’s will. The question at issue is not whether all will be saved but whether God has made provision in Christ for the salvation of all, provided that they believe, and without limiting the potential scope of the death of Christ merely to those whom God knows will believe.

(I. Howard Marshall, “Universal Grace and the Atonement in the Pastoral Epistles;” In:Clark H. Pinnock, ed., The Grace of God, the Will of Man: A Case for Arminianism, [Grand Rapids: Academie Books, 1989], p. 56.) Preview.

Cf. Michael F. Bird:

In response, we can point out that God’s will and/or desire is not identical with God’s purpose. We can speak legitimately of the two wills of God understood as (1) his will as desire to provide a salvation sufficient for all, deriving from his merciful character, and (2) his will as purpose to execute salvation for the elect, deriving from his glory.

(Michael F. Bird, Evangelical Theology: A Biblical and Systematic Introduction: Second Edition, [Grand Rapids: Zondervan Academic, 2020], 5.5.1.1, p. 644.)

Cf. Timothy Keller:

…Paul says that God is showing “the riches of his glory” by having mercy on some and passing over others. This is the heart of the mystery. Somehow, if God had mercy on all or condemned all, we would not see his glory. I don’t think Paul is giving us much more than a hint here, but it is a very suggestive hint. For the biggest question is: If God could save everyone, why doesn’t he? And here Paul seems to say that God’s chosen course (to save some and leave others) will in the end be more fit to show forth God’s glory than any other scheme we can imagine. This may seem strange to us, but that is the point—we are not God, and cannot know everything or decide what is best (v 20—Paul will return to this idea in 11:33-36).

(Timothy Keller, Romans 8-16 For You, [The Good Book Company, 2015; reprinted 2019], p. 68.)

Cf. Timothy Keller:

We are so far below God that we have neither the wisdom nor the right to question our Creator. This is God’s own approach to Job when Job questions why God has put him through such suffering. As readers, we know the answer—Satan wants to prove Job only loves God for what he receives from him, not for who he is himself, and so God has allowed Satan to test Job (1:8-12). God could choose to let Job in on this spiritual dimension—instead, he challenges Job’s right even to ask (Job 38-41). Who is Job, a man, to question or to answer back to his Creator? We must beware of standing in judgment over God, rather than remembering he is judge over us; and must most of all beware re-creating God in a way that is more pleasant or palatable, rather than acknowledging that he is our Creator. He is the divine Potter; we are human clay (Romans 9:21).

(Timothy Keller, Romans 8-16 For You, [The Good Book Company, 2015; reprinted 2019], p. 67.)

Ezekiel 18:23:

Do I take any pleasure [חָפֵץ, ḥāp̄ēṣ] in the death of the wicked,” declares the Lord God, “rather than that he would turn from his ways and live?

(New American Standard Bible.)

Cf. Ezekiel 18:32:

For I take no pleasure [חָפֵץ, ḥāp̄ēṣ] in the death of anyone who dies,” declares the Lord God. “Therefore, repent and live!”

(New American Standard Bible.)

Cf. Ezekiel 33:11:

Say to them, ‘As I live!’ declares the Lord God, ‘I take no pleasure [חָפֵץ, ḥāp̄ēṣ] at all in the death of the wicked, but rather that the wicked turn from his way and live. Turn back, turn back from your evil ways! Why then should you die, house of Israel?’

(New American Standard Bible.)

Cf. 1 Samuel 2:25:

If one person sins against another, God will mediate for him; but if a person sins against the Lord, who can intercede for him?” But they would not listen to the voice of their father, for the Lord desired [חָפֵץ, ḥāp̄ēṣ] to put them to death.

(New American Standard Bible.)

Cf. John Piper:

Why would the sons of Eli not heed their father’s good counsel? The answer of the text is “for it was the will of the Lord to put them to death.” This makes sense only if the Lord had the right and the power to restrain their disobedience—a right and power that he willed not to use. Thus, we must say that in one sense God willed that the sons of Eli go on doing what he commanded them not to do: dishonoring their father and committing sexual immorality.

Moreover, the word translated as “will” in the clause “it was the will of the Lord to put them to death” is the same Hebrew word (haphez) used in Ezekiel 18:23, 32 and 33:11, where God asserts that he does not have pleasure in the death of the wicked. The word signifies desire or pleasure. God (in one sense) desired to put the sons of Eli to death, but (in another sense) he does not desire the death of the wicked. This is a strong warning to us not to take one assertion, such as Ezekiel 18:23, and assume we know the precise meaning without letting other passages, such as 1 Samuel 2:25, have a say. The upshot of putting the two together is that in one sense God may desire the death of the wicked and in another sense he may not.

(John Piper, Does God Desire all to be Saved? [Wheaton: Crossway, 2013], pp. 28-29.)

Cf. Luke 7:30:

But the Pharisees and the lawyers rejected God’s purpose [βουλὴν] for themselves, not having been baptized by John.

(New American Standard Bible.)

Cf. Ephesians: 1:11:

In Him we also have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to the purpose [βουλὴν] of Him who works all things in accordance with the plan of His will,

(New American Standard Bible.)

1 Timothy 2:4:

who wants all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth [εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας].

(New American Standard Bible.)

Cf. 2 Timothy 2:25:

with gentleness correcting those who are in opposition, if perhaps God may grant [δώῃ] them repentance leading to the knowledge of the truth [εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας],

(New American Standard Bible.)

Cf. John Piper:

Perhaps you hear in the words “God may perhaps grant them repentance leading to a knowledge of the truth” an echo of 1 Timothy 2:4, where Paul says, “[God] desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.” This connection between these two texts is very important. Notice the desire of God for people to “be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth [εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας]” (in 1 Tim. 2:4), and the gift of God that people “repent unto a knowledge of the truth [εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας]” (in 2 Tim. 2:25).

Why is this parallel so important? Because many people use 1 Timothy 2:4 (“God . . . desires all people to be saved”) as an argument that God could not possibly choose that some people repent and be saved while not choosing to save others. But that is precisely what 2 Timothy 2:25 says. “God may perhaps grant them repentance.” He gives repentance to some. The fact that these two texts are parallel in wording shows us how Paul might answer those who argue from 1 Timothy 2:4 that God cannot choose to give repentance only to some.

He might say something like this: God’s desire (θέλει) for all to be saved (1 Tim. 2:4) is real, but it does not rise to the level of decisive action for all people. God can desire things at one level and choose not to act on those desires at another level. He desires all to be saved at one level, and he grants some to repent and be saved at another level.

(John Piper, Providence, [Wheaton: Crossway, 2020], pp. 547-548.)

Cf. John Piper:

…2 Timothy 2:24-26, which says: “The Lord’s servant must not be quarrelsome but kind to everyone, able to teach, patiently enduring evil, correcting his opponents with gentleness. God may perhaps grant them repentance leading to a knowledge of the truth, and they may come to their senses and escape from the snare of the devil, after being captured by him to do his will.” …The text is even more significant because its wording is used in 1 Timothy 2:4. Compare the desire of God for people to “be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Tim. 2:4) with the gift of God that people repent, “leading to a knowledge of the truth” (2 Tim. 2:25). These two texts alone probably teach that there are “two wills” in God: the will that all be saved and the will to give repentance to some.

(John Piper, Does God Desire all to be Saved? [Wheaton: Crossway, 2013], p. 18.)

John Piper:

It is the way Jeremiah spoke of God’s heart in Lamentations 3:32-33:

Though he cause grief, he will have compassion

according to the abundance of his steadfast love;

for he does not afflict from his heart

or grieve the children of men.

Here we see a level of willing “from [God’s] heart” that does not wish to cause grief and a level of willing that actually does cause grief. Similarly, there is a way for God’s heart to desire the salvation of all, while at the same time granting repentance only to some.

(John Piper, Providence, [Wheaton: Crossway, 2020], p. 549.)

Cf. Robert L. Dabney:

The direction in which the answers are conceived to lie may be best indicated by an analogical instance. A human ruler may have full power and authority over the punishment of a culprit, may declare consistently his sincere compassion for him, and may yet freely elect to destroy him. A concrete case will make the point more distinct. Chief-Justice Marshall, in his Life of Washington (Vol. IV., Chap. vi.), says with reference to the death-warrant of the rash and unfortunate Major André: “Perhaps on no occasion of his life did the commander-in-chief obey with more reluctance the stern mandates of duty and of policy.” In this historical instance we have these facts: Washington had plenary power to kill or to save alive. His compassion for the criminal was real and profound. Yet he signed his death-warrant with spontaneous decision. The solution is not the least difficult either for philosophy or common sense. Every deliberate rational volition is regulated by the agent’s dominant subjective disposition, and prompted by his own subjective motive. But that motive is a complex, not a simple modification of spirit. The simplest motive of man’s rational volition is a complex of two elements: a desire or propension of some subjective optative power, and a judgment of the intelligence as to the true and preferable. The motive of a single decision may be far more complex than this, involving many intellectual considerations of prudence, or righteous policy, and several distinct and even competing propensions of the optative powers. The resultant volition arises out of a deliberation, in which the prevalent judgment and appetency counterpoise the inferior ones. To return to our instance Washington’s volition to sign the death-warrant of André did not arise from the fact that his compassion was slight or feigned; but from the fact that it was rationally counterpoised by a complex of superior judgments and propensions of wisdom, duty, patriotism, and moral indignation. Let us suppose that one of André’s intercessors (and he had them, even among the Americans) standing by, and hearing the commanding general say, as he took up the pen to sign the fatal paper, “I do this with the deepest reluctance and pity,” should have retorted, “Since you are supreme in this matter, and have full bodily ability to throw down that pen, we shall know by your signing this warrant that your pity is hypocritical.” The petulance of this charge would have been equal to its folly. The pity was real; but was restrained by superior elements of motive. Washington had official and bodily power to discharge the criminal; but he had not the sanction of his own wisdom and justice. Thus his pity was genuine, and yet his volition not to indulge it free and sovereign.

(Robert L. Dabney, “God’s Indiscriminate Proposals of Mercy as Related to His Power, Wisdom, and Sincerity”; In: Robert L. Dabney, Discussions: Vol I. Theological and Evangelical, [Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication, 1890], pp. 284-286.)

Robert L. Dabney:

4. God’s Volitions Arise out of a Complex Motive.

The manner in which a volition which dates from eternity, subsists in the Infinite mind, is doubtless, in many respects, inscrutable to us. But since God has told us that we are made in His image, we may safely follow the Scriptural representations, which describe God’s volitions as having their rational relation to subjective motive; somewhat as in man, when he wills aright. For, a motiveless volition cannot but appear to us as devoid both of character and of wisdom. We add, that while God “has no parts nor passions,” He has told us that He has active principles, which, while free from all agitation, ebb and flow, and mutation, are related in their superior measure to man’s rational affections. These active principles in God, or passionless affections, are all absolutely holy and good. Last: God’s will is also regulated by infinite wisdom. Now, in man, every rational volition is prompted by a motive, which is in every case, complex to this degree, at least that it involves some active appetency of the will and some prevalent judgment of the intelligence. And every wise volition is the result of virtual or formal deliberation, in which one element of motive is weighed in relation to another, and the elements which appear superior in the judgment of the intelligence, preponderate and regulate the volition. Hence, the wise man’s volition is often far from being the expression of every conception and affection present in his consciousness at the time; but it is often reached by holding one of these elements of possible motive in check, at the dictate of a more controlling one. For instance a philanthropic man meets a distressed and destitute person. The good man is distinctly conscious in himself of a movement of sympathy tending towards a volition to give the sufferer money. But he remembers that he has expressly promised all the money now in his possession, to be paid this very day to a just creditor. The good man bethinks himself, that he “ought to be just before he is generous,” and conscience and wisdom counterpoise the impulse of sympathy; so that it does not form the deliberate volition to give alms. But the sympathy exists, and it is not inconsistent to give other expression to it. We must not ascribe to that God whose omniscience is, from eternity, one infinite, all-embracing intuition, and whose volition is as eternal as His being, any expenditure of time in any process of deliberation, nor any temporary hesitancy or uncertainty, nor any agitating struggle of feeling against feeling. But there must be a residuum of meaning in the Scripture representations of His affections, after we have guarded ourselves duly against the anthropopathic forms of their expression. Hence, we ought to believe, that in some ineffable way, God’s volitions, seeing they are supremely wise, and profound, and right, do have that relation to all His subjective motives, digested by wisdom and holiness into the consistent combination, the finite counterpart of which constitutes the rightness and wisdom of human volitions. I claim, while exercising the diffidence proper to so sacred a matter, that this conclusion bears us out at least so far: That, as in a wise man, so much more in a wise God, His volition, or express purpose, is the result of a digest, not of one, but of all the principles and considerations bearing on the case. Hence it follows, that there may be in God an active principle felt by Him, and yet not expressed in His executive volition in a given case, because counterpoised by other elements of motive, which His holy omniscence judges ought to be prevalent. Now, I urge the practical question: Why may not God consistently give some other expression to this active principle, really and sincerely felt towards the object, though His sovereign wisdom judges it not proper to express it in volition? To return to the instance from which we set out: I assert that it is entirely natural and reasonable for the benevolent man to say to the destitute person: “I am sorry for you, though I give you no alms.” The ready objection will be: “that my parallel does not hold, because the kind man is not omnipotent, while God is. God could not consistently speak thus, while withholding alms, because he could create the additional money at will.” This is more ready than solid. It assumes that God’s omniscence cannot see any ground, save the lack of physical ability or power, why it may not be best to refrain from creating the additional money. Let the student search and see; he will find that this preposterous and presumptuous assumption is the implied premise of the objection. In fact, my parallel is a fair one in the main point. This benevolent man is not prevented from giving the alms, by any physical compulsion. If he diverts a part of the money in hand from the creditor, to the destitute man, the creditor will visit no penalty on him. He simply feels bound by his conscience. That is, the superior principles of reason and morality are regulative of his action, counterpoising the amiable but less imperative principle of sympathy, in this case. Yet the verbal expression of sympathy in this case may be natural, sincere, and proper. God is not restrained by lack of physical omnipotence from creating on the spot the additional money for the alms; but He may be actually restrained by some consideration known to His omniscience, which shows that it is not on the whole best to resort to the expedient of creating the money for the alms, and that rational consideration may be just as decisive in an all-wise mind, and properly as decisive, as a conscious impotency to create money in a man’s.

This view is so important here, and will be found so valuable in another place, that I beg leave to give it farther illustration. It is related that the great Washington, when he signed the death-warrant of the amiable but misguided Andre, declared his profound grief and sympathy. Let us suppose a captious invader present, and criticising Washington’s declaration thus: “You are by law of the rebel congress, commander-in-chief. You have absolute power here. If you felt any of the generous sorrow you pretend, you would have thrown that pen into the fire, instead of using it to write the fatal words. The fact you do the latter proves that you have not a shade of sympathy, and those declarations are sheer hypocrisy.” It is easy to see how impudent and absurd this charge would be. Physically, Washington had full license, and muscular power, to throw the pen into the fire. But he was rationally restrained from doing so, by motives of righteousness and patriotism, which were properly as decisive as any physical cause. Now, will the objector still urge, that with God it would have been different, in this case; because His omnipotence might have enabled Him to overrule, in all souls, British and Americans, all inconvenient results that could flow from the impunity of a spy caught in flagrante delicto; and that so, God could not give any expression to the infinite benevolence of His nature, and yet sign the death-warrant, without hypocrisy? The audacity of this sophism is little less than the other. How obvious is the reply: That as in the one case, though Washington was in possession of the muscular ability, and also of an absolute license, to burn the death-warrant, if he chose; and yet his wisdom and virtue showed him decisive motives which rationally restrained him from it; so God may have full sovereignty and omnipotence to change the heart of the sinner whose ruin He compassionates, and yet be rationally restrained from doing it, by some decisive motives seen in His omniscience. What is it, but logical arrogance run mad, for a puny creature to assume to say, that the infinite intelligence of God may not see, amidst the innumerable affairs and relations of a universal government stretching from creation to eternity, such decisive considerations?

The great advantage of this view is, that it enables us to receive, in their obvious sense, those precious declarations of Scripture, which declare the pity of God towards even lost sinners. The glory of these representations is, that they show us God’s benevolence as an infinite attribute, like all His other perfections. Even where it is rationally restrained, it exists. The fact that there is a lost order of angels, and that there are persons in our guilty race, who are objects of God’s decree of preterition, does not arise from any stint or failure of this infinite benevolence. It is as infinite, viewed as it qualifies God’s nature only, as though He had given expression to it in the salvation of all the devils and lost men. We can now receive, without any abatement, such blessed declarations as Ps. lxxxi: 13; Ezek. xviii: 32; Luke xix: 41, 42. We have no occasion for such questionable, and even perilous exegesis, as even Calvin and Turrettin feel themselves constrained to apply to the last. Afraid lest God’s principle of compassion (not purpose of rescue), towards sinners non-elect, should find any expression, and thus mar the symmetry of their logic, they say that it was not Messiah the God-man and Mediator, who wept over reprobate Jerusalem; but only the humanity of Jesus, our pattern. I ask: Is it competent to a mere humanity to say: “How often would I have gathered your children?” And to pronounce a final doom, “Your house is left unto you desolate?” The Calvinist should have paused, when he found himself wresting these Scriptures from the same point of view adopted by the ultra-Arminian. But this is not the first time we have seen “extremes meet.” Thus argues the Arminian: “Since God is sovereign and omnipotent, if He has a propension, He indulges it, of course, in volition and action. Therefore, as He declares He had a propension of pity towards contumacious Israel, I conclude that He also had a volition to redeem them, and that He did whatever omnipotence could do, against the obstinate contingency of their wills. Here then, I find the bulwark of my doctrine, that even omnipotence cannot certainly determine a free will.” And thus argues the ultra-Calvinist: “Since God is sovereign and omnipotent, if He has any propension, He indulges it, of course, in volition and action. But if He had willed to convert reprobate Israel, He would infallibly have succeeded. Therefore He never had any propension of pity at all towards them.” And so this reasoner sets himself to explain away, by unscrupulous exegesis, the most precious revelations of God’s nature! Should not this fact, that two opposite conclusions are thus drawn from the same premises, have suggested error in the premises? And the error of both extremists is just here. It is not true that if God has an active principle looking towards a given object, He will always express it in volition and action. This, as I have shown, is no more true of God, than of a righteous and wise man. And as the good man, who was touched with a case of destitution, and yet determined that it was his duty not to use the money he had in giving alms, might consistently express what he truly felt of pity, by a kind word; so God consistently reveals the principle of compassion as to those whom, for wise reasons, He is determined not to save. We know that God’s omnipotence surely accomplishes every purpose of His grace. Hence, we know that He did not purposely design Christ’s sacrifice to effect the redemption of any others than the elect. But we hold it perfectly consistent with this truth, that the expiation of Christ for sin—expiation of infinite value and universal fitness—should be held forth to the whole world, elect and non-elect, as a manifestation of the benevolence of God’s nature. God here exhibits a provision, which is so related to the sin of the race, that by it, all those obstacles to every sinner’s return to his love, which his guilt and the law presents, are ready to be taken out of the way. But in every sinner, another class of obstacles exists; those, namely, arising out of the sinner’s own depraved will. As to the elect, God takes these obstacles also out of the way, by His omnipotent calling, in pursuance of the covenant of redemption made with, and fulfilled for them by, their Mediator. As to the non-elect, God has judged it best not to take this class of obstacles out of the way; the men therefore go on to indulge their own will in neglecting or rejecting Christ.

But it will be objected: If God foreknew that non-elect men would do this; and also knew that their neglect of gospel-mercy would infallibly aggravate their doom in the end, (all of which I admit), then that gospel was no expression of benevolence to them at all. I reply, first; the offer was a blessing in itself; these sinners felt it so in their serious moments; and surely its nature as a kindness is not reversed by the circumstance that they pervert it; though that be foreseen. Second; God accompanies the offer with hearty entreaties to them not thus to abuse it. Third; His benevolence is cleared in the view of all other beings, though the perverse objects do rob themselves of the permanent benefit. And this introduces the other cavil: That such a dispensation towards non-elect sinners is utterly futile, and so, unworthy of God’s wisdom. I reply: It is not futile; because it secures actual results both to non-elect men, to God and to the saved. To the first, it secures many temporal restraints and blessings in this life, the secular ones of which, at least, the sinner esteems as very solid benefits; and also a sincere offer of eternal life, which he, and not God, disappoints. To God, this dispensation secures great revenue of glory, both for His kindness towards contumacious enemies, and His clear justice in the final punishment. To other holy creatures it brings not only this new revelation of God’s glory, but a new apprehension of the obstinacy and malignity of sin as a spiritual evil.

Some seem to recoil from the natural view which presents God, like other wise Agents, as planning to gain several ends, one primary and others subordinate, by the same set of actions. They fear that if they admit this, they will be entrapped into an ascription of uncertainty, vacillation and change to God’s purpose. This consequence does not at all follow, as to Him. It might follow as to a finite man pursuing alternative purposes. For instance, a general might order his subordinate to make a seeming attack in force on a given point of his enemy’s position. The general might say to himself: “I will make this attack either a feint, (while I make my real attack elsewhere), or, if the enemy seem weak there, my real, main attack.” This, of course, implies some uncertainty in his foreknowledge; and if the feint is turned into his main attack, the last purpose must date in his mind from some moment after the feint began. Such doubt and mutation must not be imputed to God. Hence I do not employ the phrase “alternative objects” of His planning; as it might be misunderstood. We “cannot find out the Almighty unto perfection.” But it is certain, that He, when acting on finite creatures, and for the instruction of finite minds, may and does pursue, in one train of His dealings, a plurality of ends, of which one is subordinated to another. Thus God consistently makes the same dispensation first a manifestation of the glory of His goodness, and then, when the sinner has perverted it, of the glory of His justice. He is not disappointed, nor does He change His secret purpose. The mutation is in the relation of the creature to His providence. His glory is, that seeing the end from the beginning, He brings good even out of the perverse sinner’s evil.

There is, perhaps, no Scripture which gives so thorough and comprehensive an explanation of the design and results of Christ’s sacrifice, as Jno. iii: 16-19. It may receive important illustration from Matt. xxii 4. In this last parable, the king sends this message to invited guests who, he foresees, would reject and never partake the feast. “My oxen and my fatlings are killed: come, for all things are now ready.” They alone were unready. I have already stated one ground for rejecting that interpretation of Jno. iii 16, which makes “the world” which God so loved, the elect world, I would now, in conclusion, simply indicate, in the form of a free paraphrase, the line of thought developed by our Redeemer, trusting that the ideas already expounded will suffice, with the coherency and consistency of the exposition, to prove its correctness.

Verse 16: Christ’s mission to make expiation for sin is a manifestation of unspeakable benevolence to the whole world, to man as man and a sinner, yet designed specifically to result in the actual salvation of believers. Does not this imply that this very mission, rejected by others, will become the occasion (not cause) of perishing even more surely to them? It does. Yet, (verse 17,) it is denied that this vindicatory result was the primary design of Christ’s mission and the initial assertion is again repeated, that this primary design was to manifest God, in Christ’s sacrifice, as compassionate to all. How then is the seeming paradox to be reconciled? Not by retracting either statement. The solution, (verse 18,) is in the fact, that men, in the exercise of their free agency, give opposite receptions to this mission. To those who accept it as it is offered, it brings life. To those who choose to reject it, it is the occasion (not cause) of condemnation. For, (verse 19,) the true cause of this perverted result is the evil choice of the unbelievers, who reject the provision offered in the divine benevolence, from a wicked motive; unwillingness to confess and forsake their sins. The sum of the matter is then: That Christ’s mission is, to the whole race, a manifestation of God’s mercy. To believers it is means of salvation, by reason of that effectual calling which Christ had expounded in the previous verses. To unbelievers it becomes a subsequent and secondary occasion of aggravated doom. This melancholy perversion, while embraced in God’s permissive decree, is caused by their own contumacy. The efficient in the happy result is effectual calling: the efficient in the unhappy result is man’s own evil will. Yet God’s benevolence is cleared, in both results. Both were, of course, foreseen by Him, and included in His purpose.

(R. L. Dabney, Syllabus and Notes of the Course of Systematic and Polemic Theology: Second Edition, [St Louis: Presbyterian Publishing Company of St. Louis, 1878], pp. 529-535.)

R. C. Sproul:

The Bible is deeply concerned about the will of God—His sovereign authority over His creation and everything in it. When we speak about God’s will we do so in at least three different ways. The broader concept is known as God’s decretive, sovereign, or hidden will. By this, theologians refer to the will of God by which He sovereignly ordains everything that comes to pass. Because God is sovereign and His will can never be frustrated, we can be sure that nothing happens over which He is not in control. He at least must “permit” whatever happens to happen. Yet even when God passively permits things to happen, He chooses to permit them in that He always has the power and right to intervene and prevent the actions and events of this world. Insofar as He lets things happen, He has “willed” them in this certain sense.

Though God’s sovereign will is often hidden from us until after it comes to pass, there is one aspect of His will that is plain to us—His preceptive will. Here God reveals His will through His holy law. For example, it is the will of God that we do not steal; that we love our enemies; that we repent; that we be holy. This aspect of God’s will is revealed in His Word as well as in our conscience, by which God has written His moral law upon our heart.

His laws, whether they be found in the Scripture or in the heart, are binding. We have no authority to violate this will. We have the power or the ability to thwart the preceptive will of God, though never the right to do so. Nor can we excuse ourselves for sinning by saying, “Que sera, sera.” It may be God’s sovereign or hidden will that we be “permitted” to sin, as He brings His sovereign will to pass even through and by means of the sinful acts of people. God ordained that Jesus be betrayed by the instrument of Judas’s treachery. Yet this makes Judas’s sin no less evil or treacherous. When God “permits” us to break His preceptive will, it is not to be understood as permission in the moral sense of His granting us a moral right. His permission gives us the power, but not the right to sin.

The third way the Bible, speaks of the will of God is with respect to God’s will of disposition. This will describes God’s attitude. It defines what is pleasing to Him. For example, God takes no delight in the death of the wicked, yet He most surely wills or decrees the death of the wicked. God’s ultimate delight is in His own holiness and righteousness. When He judges the world, He delights in the vindication of His own righteousness and justice, yet He is not gleeful in a vindictive sense toward those who receive His judgment. God is pleased when we find our pleasure in obedience. He is sorely displeased when we are disobedient.

(R. C. Sproul, Essential Truths of the Christian Faith, [Minneapolis: Grason, 1992], pp. 67-68.)

Cf. R. C. Sproul:

The three meanings of the will of God: (a) Sovereign decretive will is the will by which God brings to pass whatsoever He decrees. This is hidden to us until it happens. (b) Preceptive will is God’s revealed law or commandments, which we have the power but not the right to break. (c) Will of disposition describes God’s attitude or disposition. It reveals what is pleasing to Him.

(R. C. Sproul, Essential Truths of the Christian Faith, [Minneapolis: Grason, 1992], p. 69.)

William G. T. Shedd:

The difference between the Divine desire and the Divine purpose or decree, is the same as between the revealed and the secret will of God, mentioned in Deut. 29:29. God’s desire in reference to sin and salvation is expressed in all that he has revealed: (a) In the moral law. (b) In the plan of redemption. Everything in the law and the gospel implies that God does not take pleasure in sin, or in the death of the sinner. But there is nothing in the revealed will of God, as made known in the law and gospel, that indicates what he has decided to do towards actually converting particular persons from their sins. This decision is altogether different from his desire, and it is a secret with himself.

The phrase, “God’s will,” is ambiguous. It may mean what he is pleased with, loves, and desires. An example of this is, Heb. 13:20, 21. “Now the God of peace, make you perfect to do his will (θέλημα), working in you that which is well-pleasing (ἐνάρεστον) in his sight.” Here, God’s “will” is something which he desires and delights in. An example of the secret will is found in Rom. 9:19. “Who hath resisted his will?” Here, God’s “will” is his purpose or decree to “harden,” or not soften, and is designated by βούλημα. What he “wills,” i.e. decrees, in this instance, is the sinner’s remaining in sin, which certainly is not well-pleasing in his sight. In the holy actions of elect men, the secret and the revealed will agree. God, in this case, decrees what he loves. In the sinful actions of non-elect men, the two wills do not agree. God, in this case, decrees what he hates. This distinction is sometimes designated by the terms, legislative, and decretive will; sometimes by will of complacency (complacentiae), and of good pleasure (beneplaciti): in which latter case, “good-pleasure” must not be confounded with “pleasure.” The schoolmen employ the terms voluntas signi (signified), and voluntas beneplaciti. The Greeks speak of the will ἐυαρεστίας, and ἐυδοκίας.

(William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology: Volume I, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1888], pp. 456-457.)

Charles Hodge:

C. The Decretive and Preceptive Will of God.

The decretive will of God concerns his purposes, and relates to the futurition of events. The preceptive will relates to the rule of duty for his rational creatures. He decrees whatever he purposes to effect or to permit. He prescribes, according to his own will, what his creatures should do, or abstain from doing. The decretive and preceptive will of God can never be in conflict. God never decrees to do, or to cause others to do, what He forbids. He may, as we see He does, decree to permit what He forbids. He permits men to sin, although sin is forbidden. This is more scholastically expressed by the theologians by saying, A positive decretive will cannot consist with a negative preceptive will; i.e., God cannot decree to make men sin. But a negative decretive will may consist with an affirmative preceptive will; e.g., God may command men to repent and believe, and yet, for wise reasons, abstain from giving them repentance.

The distinction between voluntas beneplaciti et signi, as those terms are commonly used, is the same as that between the decretive and preceptive will of God. The one referring to his decrees, founded on his good pleasure; the other to his commands, founded on what He approves or disapproves.

By the secret will of God, is meant his purposes, as still hidden in his own mind; by his revealed will, his precepts and his purposes, as far as they are made known to his creatures.

D. Antecedent and Consequent Will.

These terms, as used by Augustinians, have reference to the relation of the decrees to each other. In the order of nature the end precedes the means, and the purpose of the former is antecedent to the purpose of the latter. Thus it is said, that God by an antecedent will, determined on the manifestation of his glory; and by a consequent will, determined on the creation of the world as a means to that end.

By Lutherans and Remonstrants these terms are used in a very different sense. According to their views, God by an antecedent will determined to save all men; but, foreseeing that all would not repent and believe, by a subsequent will He determined to save those who he foresaw would believe. That is, He first purposed one thing and then another.

E. Absolute and Conditional Will.

These terms, when employed by Augustinians, have reference not so much to the purposes of God, as to the events which are decreed. The event, but not the purpose of God, is conditional. A man reaps, if he sows. He is saved, if he believes. His reaping and salvation are conditional events. But the purpose of God is absolute. If He purposes that a man shall reap, He purposes that he shall sow; if He purposes that he shall be saved, He purposes that he shall believe. Anti-Augustinians, on the other hand, regard the purposes of God as conditional. He purposes the salvation of a man, if he believes. But whether he believes or not, is left undetermined; so that the purpose of God is suspended on a condition not under his control, or, at least, undecided. A father may purpose to give an estate to his son, if he be obedient; but whether the son will fulfil the condition is undetermined, and therefore the purpose of the father is undecided. It is, however, manifestly inconsistent with the perfection of God, that He should first will one thing and then another; nor can his purposes be dependent on the uncertainty of human conduct or events. These are questions, however, which belong to the consideration of the doctrine of decrees. They are mentioned here because these distinctions occur in all discussions concerning the Divine Will, with which the student of theology should be familiar.

In this place it is sufficient to remark, that the Greek word θέλω, and the corresponding English verb, to will, sometimes express feeling, and sometimes a purpose. Thus in Matt. xxvii. 48, the words εἰ θέλει αὐτόν are correctly rendered, “if he delight in him.” Comp. Ps. xxii. 8. It is in this sense the word is used, when it is said that God wills all men to be saved. He cannot be said to purpose or determine upon any event which is not to come to pass. A judge may will the happiness of a man whom he sentences to death. He may will him not to suffer when he wills him to suffer. The infelicity in such forms of expression is that the word “will” is used in different senses. In one part of the sentence it means desire, and in the other purpose. It is perfectly consistent, therefore, that God, as a benevolent Being, should desire the happiness of all men, while he purposes to save only his own people.

(Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology: Vol. I, [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1883], pp. 403-405.)

Cf. Charles Hodge:

…God delights in the happiness of his creatures, and that when he permits them to perish, or inflicts evil upon them, it is from some inexorable necessity; that is, because it would be unwise and wrong to do otherwise. His relation is that of a benevolent sovereign in punishing crime, or of a tender judge in passing sentence on offenders, or, what is the familiar representation of Scripture, that of a father who deals with his children with tenderness, yet with wisdom and according to the dictates of right.

(Charles Hodge, Princeton Sermons, [London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1879], XII. “Who will have all men to be saved and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.” 1 Tim. 2: 4 [March 1st, 1868], p. 19.)

Robert L. Dabney:

I have argued that God’s will is absolutely executed over all free agents; and yet Scripture is full of declarations that sinful men and devils disobey His will! There must be, therefore, a distinction between His secret and revealed, His decretive and preceptive will. All God’s will must be, in reality, a single, eternal, immutable act. The distinction, therefore, is one necessitated by our limitation of understanding, and relates only to the manifestation of the parts of this will to the creature. By God’s decretive will, we mean that will by which He foreordains whatever comes to pass. By His preceptive, that by which He enjoins on creatures what is right and proper for them to do. The decretive we also call His secret will: because it is for the most part (except as disclosed in some predictions and the effectuation) retained in His own breast. His preceptive we call His revealed will, because it is published to man for his guidance. Although this distinction is beset with plausible quibbles, yet every man is impelled to make it; for otherwise, either alternative is odious and absurd. Say that God has no secret decretive will, and He wishes just what He commands and nothing more, and we represent Him as a Being whose desires are perpetually crossed and baffled: yea, trampled on; the most harassed, embarrassed, and impotent Being in the universe. Deny the other part of our distinction, and you represent God as acquiescing in all the iniquities done on earth and in hell. Again, Scripture clearly establishes the distinction. Witness all the texts already quoted to show that God’s sovereignty overrules all the acts of men to His purposes. Add. Rom. xi: 33, to end: Prov. xvi: 4. See also Deut. xxix; 29. Special cases are also presented, (the most emphatic possible,) in which God’s decretive will differed from His preceptive will, as to the same individuals. See Exodus iv: 21-23; Ezekiel iii: 7, with xviii: 31. These authentic cases offer an impregnable bulwark against Arminian objections; and prove that it is not Calvinism, but Inspiration, which teaches the distinction.

The objections are, that this distinction represents God as

either insincere in His precepts to His creatures, or else, as having His own volitions at war among themselves and that, by making His secret will decretive of sinful acts as well as holy, we represent Him as unholy. The seeming inconsistency is removed by these considerations. “God’s preceptive will.” In this phrase, the word will is used in a different sense. For, in fact, while God wills the utterance of the precepts, the acts enjoined are not objects of God’s volition, save in the cases where they are actually embraced in His decretive will. All the purposes which God carries out by permitting and overruling the evil acts of His creatures, are infinitely holy and proper for Him to carry out. It may be right for Him to permit what it would be wrong for us to do, and therefore wrong for Him to command us to do. Not only is it righteous and proper for an infinite Sovereign to withhold from His creatures, in their folly, a part of His infinite and wise designs; but it is absolutely unavoidable; for their minds being finite, it is impossible to make them comprehend God’s infinite plan. Seeing, then, that He could not give them His whole immense design as the rule of their conduct, what rule was it most worthy of His goodness and holiness to reveal? Evidently, the moral law, requiring of them what is righteous and good for them. There is no insincerity in God’s giving this law, although He may, in a part of the cases, secretly determine not to give unmerited grace to constrain men to keep it. Remember, also, that if even in these cases men would keep it, God would not fail to reward them according to His promise. But God, foreknowing that they would freely choose not to keep it, for wise reasons determines to leave them to their perverse choice, and overrule it to His holy designs. I freely admit that the divine nature is inscrutable; and that mystery must always attach to the divine purposes. But there is a just sense in which a wise and righteous man might say, that he sincerely wished a given subject of his would not transgress, and yet that, foreseeing his perversity, he fully purposed to permit it, and carry out his purposes thereby. Shall not the same thing be possible for God in a higher sense?

There is a sense in which some parts of God’s will may be said to be antecedent to, and some parts consequent to His foresight of man’s acts—i. e., as our finite minds are compelled to conceive them. Thus: although God’s will acts by one, eternal, comprehensive, simultaneous act, we cannot conceive of His determination to permit man’s fall, except as a consequence of His prior purpose to create man; (because if none were created, there would be none to fall;) and of His decree to give a Redeemer, as consequent on His foresight of the fall. But the Arminian Scholastics have perverted this simple distinction thus, making the antecedent act of God’s will precede the view had by God of the creature’s action; and the consequent, following upon, and produced by that foresight; e. g., the purpose to create man was antecedent, to punish his sin consequent. I object, that this notion really violates the unity and eternity of God’s volition. 2d. It derogates from the independence of God’s will, making it determined by, instead of determining, the creature’s conduct. 3d. It overlooks the fact that all the parts of the chain, the means as well as the end, the second causes as well as consequences, are equally and as early determined by, and embraced in, God’s comprehensive plan. As to a sequence and dependency between the parts of God’s decree, the truth, so far as man’s mind is capable of of comprehending, seems to be this: That the decree is in fact one, in God’s mind, and has no succession; but we being incapable of apprehending it save by parts, are compelled to conceive God, as having regard in one part of His eternal plan to a state of facts destined by Him to proceed out of another part of it, This remark will have no little importance when we come to view supralapsarianism.

(R. L. Dabney, Syllabus and Notes of the Course of Systematic and Polemic Theology: Second Edition, [St Louis: Presbyterian Publishing Company of St. Louis, 1878], pp. 161-163.)

Henry B. Smith:

§3. Other Distinctions as to the Mode of Manifestation of the Divine Will.

1. The decretive and preceptive will of God. The decretive is that which has reference to the divine decrees, what God purposes shall take place. The preceptive is that which God commands his creatures to do. These are often confounded by Arminians. God commands all his creatures to be holy. He permits sin. The permission is a part of the divine decree, but God does not enjoin or desire what He thus permits. Example of the decretive will, Isa. xlvi. 11; of the preceptive, the Decalogue.

2. The permissive and efficient will of God. This is the distinction made all through the history of Calvinistic theology down to the time of the Hopkinsian school in New England. God permits the morally evil and effects the good. In respect to sin, He for wise reasons simply determines not to prevent it, all things considered. The efficient will of God has respect to what God directly produces through his own agency. The importance of this distinction is, that we cannot logically or rationally or morally conceive that God would directly produce by his positive efficiency what He forbids. Accordingly we must employ some milder term than efficiency with respect to the relation of God to moral evil, and the term selected is permission. This may not be the best, but it is well to retain it until we get a better.

3. The secret and revealed will of God. This relates to what God keeps in his own counsel, and to what He has communicated: Deut. xxix. 29; Rom xi. 33. The same distinction is signified in somewhat barbarous Latin by the two phrases, “voluntas signi” and “voluntas placiti.” This distinction used to be much insisted on in the discussion of the divine decrees: 1 Tim. ii. 4; 2 Pet. iii. 9. It was said to be the revealed will of God that all should be saved, the secret will or actual determination in the matter, that some should be. A better point of view for this is found in the distinction between what God desires, in itself considered, and what He determines to bring to pass on the whole. In itself considered, He desires the happiness of every creature, but on the whole, He may not determine to bring this to pass.

4. Other distinctions have been made . . . (a.) The antecedent and consequent will of God. The antecedent, God desires the salvation of all. The consequent, He determines to save some. Here will is used in the two senses of general benevolence and purpose. (b.) Absolute and conditional. What God wills without conditions and what is dependent on moral character. He wills sanctification through the truth, but He wills the renewal of the soul without antecedent repentance and faith, because the renewal is in the repentance and faith. (c.) The efficacious and inefficacious. That producing by efficiency, and that which does not act directly.

(Henry B. Smith, System of Christian Theology: Fourth Edition, Revised, ed. William S. Karr, [New York: A. C. Armstrong and Son, 1892], pp. 31-32.)

William Lindsay Alexander:

Scripture signalizes will as belonging to God. The expressions used are βουλὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ, θέλημα τ. Θ., βουλὴ τοῦ θελήματος, εὐδοκία τ. θελ., חֵפֶץ, etc. It is not always, however, in exactly the same sense that the will of God is referred to in Scripture. Sometimes it means His secretory will or purpose, as in Eph. i. 11: “the purpose of Him who worketh all things after the counsel of His own will;” sometimes it means God’s desire or wish or pleasure, as in Matt. xviii. 14: “It is not the will of your Father in heaven that one of these little ones should perish;” and sometimes it means what God approves and enjoins on His intelligent creatures, as in Eph. vi. 6: “doing the will of God from the heart;” 1 Pet. iv. 2: “That he should no longer live. to the lusts of men, but to the will of God.” The divine purposes are from eternity and are immutable, and His will in this sense must be accomplished: “Who hath saved us,” says the apostle, “and called us with an holy calling, not according to our works, but according to His own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began” (2 Tim. i. 9); “The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever, the thoughts of His heart to all generations” (Ps. xxxiii. 11), etc. What God has pleasure in and desires, He has not always decreed shall come to pass, or He has decreed it shall come to pass under certain conditions which may or may not be fulfilled; and therefore what He desires, may not always be attained thus though God delights not in the death of him that dieth, but will have all men to be saved, yet as He has not decreed that none shall perish, and has made salvation conditional on man’s pursuing a certain course, all are not saved, multitudes perish. So also the preceptive will of God may not be done by men, who as free agents may or may not follow that path which God has commended and prescribed to them.

(W. Lindsay Alexander, A System of Biblical Theology: In Two Volumes: Vol. I, [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1888], pp. 73-74.)

Herman Bavinck:

There is a big difference between the will of God that prescribes what we must do (Matt. 7:21; 12:50; John 4:34; 7:17; Rom. 12:2), and the will of God that tells us what he does and will do (Ps. 115:3; Dan. 4:17, 25, 32, 35; Rom. 9:18-19; Eph. 1:5, 9, 11; Rev. 4:11). The petition that God’s will may be done (Matt. 6:10) is very different in tenor from the childlike and resigned prayer: “Your will be done” (Matt. 26:42; Acts 21:14). Over and over in history we see the will of God assert itself in two ways. God commands Abraham to sacrifice his son, yet he does not let it happen (Gen. 22). He wants Pharaoh to let his people Israel go, yet hardens his heart so that he does not do it (Exod. 4:21). He has the prophet tell Hezekiah that he will die; still he adds fifteen years to his life (Isa. 38:1, 5). He prohibits us from condemning the innocent, yet Jesus is delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God (Acts 2:23; 3:18; 4:28). God does not will sin; he is far from iniquity. He forbids it and punishes it severely, yet it exists and is subject to his rule (Exod. 4:21; Josh. 11:20; 1 Sam. 2:25; 2 Sam. 16:10; Acts 2:23; 4:28; Rom. 1:24, 26; 2 Thess. 2:11; etc.). He wills the salvation of all (Ezek. 18:23, 32; 33:11; 1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Pet. 3:9), yet has mercy on whom he wills and hardens whom he wills (Rom. 9:18).

(Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: Volume 2: God and Creation, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004], §. 209, p. 241.)

Cf. Herman Bavinck:

At an early stage a distinction was made in theology between these two sides of the divine will. Tertullian already speaks of a hidden and higher will on the one hand, and a lower or lesser will on the other. Augustine points out that God often fulfills his good will through the malicious will of humans. Later this twofold will was described, on the one hand, as “the will of God’s good pleasure,” “God’s secret will,” and “the decretive will”; and on the other as “the expressed” or “signified” will, “the revealed” or “preceptive” will. The term “signified” or “revealed” will (voluntas signi) derives from the fact that this will makes known to us “what is pleasing to God and our duty”; it is known to us from five “signs”: precept, prohibition, counsel, permission, and operation. Developed in great detail by scholasticism, this view of the divine will was adopted by Catholic theologians in general, and especially treated with predilection in Reformed theology. Still other distinctions cropped up with respect to the will of God, especially the distinction between the “antecedent” and the “consequent” will of God, which already occurs in Tertullian and John of Damascus; and between “the absolute and the conditioned, the efficacious and inefficacious will of God,” found already in Augustine. These distinctions, too, can be readily understood in the sense, namely, that God antecedently and conditionally wills many things (such as the salvation of all humans) that “consequently” and “absolutely” he does not will and therefore does not permit to happen. Zanchius, accordingly, says that all these distinctions come down to the same thing; and this is also the opinion of Hyperius, Walaeus, Voetius, and others.

(Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: Volume 2: God and Creation, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004], §. 209, p. 242.)

Herman Bavinck:

God’s antecedent will is not really a will in God: “It is a wishing rather than a sheer willing.” God’s expressed will is called God’s will in a metaphorical sense; “just as when someone issues a command, it is a sign that he wills it to be done.” The actual will in God is the will of his good pleasure, identical with his being, and efficacious.

(Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: Volume 2: God and Creation, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004], §. 209, pp. 243-244.)

Note: Regarding the antecedent will Bavinck references Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, I.19.6; regarding the expressed will he references Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, I.19.11; and regarding the will of good pleasure he references Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, I.19.6-7; Summa Contra Gentiles, I.72ff. cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, I.45-48.

Cf. Thomas Aquinas:

…according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii. 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will it self, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed.

To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.

(Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, I.19.6; trans. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica: In Three Volumes: Volume One, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, [New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1947], Reply Objection 1, p. 108.)

Cf. Thomas Aquinas:

Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (Q. 13, A. 3). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven (Matth. vi. 10). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will.

(Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, I.19.11; trans. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica: In Three Volumes: Volume One, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, [New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1947], Answer, p. 112.)

Robert Letham (1947- A.D.):

5.6.3 The Will of God as Desire

Sometimes the will of God is expressed as a desire that this or that take place, even though the desired outcome does not occur. Two examples will suffice. Ezekiel 18:30-32 says:

Therefore I will judge you, O house of Israel, every one according to his ways, declares the Lord GOD. Repent and turn from all your transgressions, lest iniquity be your ruin. Cast away from you all the transgressions that you have committed, and make yourselves a new heart and a new spirit! Why will you die, O house of Israel? For I have no pleasure in the death of anyone, declares the Lord GOD; so turn, and live.

Despite Yahweh’s deep desire that the house of Israel should repent and live, they remained obstinate in their unbelief, and Jerusalem was soon overthrown.

Again, 2 Peter 3:9 declares, “The Lord is not slow concerning his promise, as some count slowness, but he is patient toward you, not willing that anyone perish but that all reach repentance” (my trans.). This expresses the overall desire of God that all people be saved. Evidently not all will be saved. According to Paul’s argument in Ephesians 1:11, this outcome has been planned by God. Yet he derives no pleasure in anyone perishing. Indeed, the statement here in 2 Peter is held out as an example of what we are to do on our part (2 Pet. 3:11-12).

(Robert Letham, Systematic Theology, [Wheaton: Crossway, 2019], §. 5.6.3, p. 171.)

Cf. Robert Letham (1947- A.D.):

In this we need to remember that these paradigms are constructed by theologians to obtain some kind of understanding of the variegated manifestations of the will of God. God has one will, since he is one indivisible being.

(Robert Letham, Systematic Theology, [Wheaton: Crossway, 2019], §. 5.6.4, p. 172.)

Matthew Poole:

But a question arises, how it can be said that God would have all men saved, when that the most of men perish? For the resolving this difficulty, we must observe, that in the style of Scripture the will of God sometimes signifies his eternal counsel and decree; that things should be done either by his immediate efficiency, or by the intervention of means: or, secondly, his commands and invitations to men to do such things as are pleasing to him. The will of God in the first sense always infallibly obtains its effect, Psal. cxv. 3; thus he declares: My counsel shall stand, I will do all my pleasure, Isa. xlvi. 10; for otherwise there must be a change of God’s will and counsel, or a defect of power, both which assertions are impious blasphemy. But those things which he commands and are pleasing to him, are often not performed without any reflection upon him, either as mutable or impotent. Thus he declares, that he wills things that are pleasing to him; as, I will not the death of a sinner, but that he should turn and live, Eze. xxxiii. 11; and sometimes that he will not those things that are displeasing to him, as contrary to holiness, though he did not decree the hindering of them: thus he complains in Isa. lxv. 12; Ye did evil before mine eyes, and did choose that wherein I delighted not. This distinction of the Divine will being clearly set down in Scripture, answers the objection; for when it is said in the text, that God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth; and in the same sense by St. Peter, that God will have none perish, but come to repentance, 2 Pet. iii. 9; we must understand it, not with respect to his decretive will, but his complacential will, that is, the repentance and life of a sinner is very pleasing to his holiness and mercy.

(Matthew Poole, Annotations Upon the Holy Bible: In Three Volumes: Vol. III, [London: James Nisbet and Co., 1853], p. 777.)

Robert S. Candlish:

There is a well known theological distinction between God’s will of decree (voluntas decreti) and his will of desire or of good pleasure (voluntas beneplaciti)—between what his mind, on a consideration of all interests, actually determines, and what his heart, from its very nature, if I may venture to use the expression, cannot but decidedly prefer and wish. The types, or expressions, of these two wills respectively, are to be found in two classes of texts which are commonly quoted as proofs and instances of the reality of the distinction between them. Of the first class of texts, one of the most obvious is that in which the Apostle Paul puts into the mouth of the gainsayer the sophistical argument that he is about to answer: “Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? for who hath resisted his will?” (Rom. ix. 19). Such a question could be asked only with reference to God’s will of determination, or of decree, fixing what is to take place. To the same aspect of the will of God the penitent king of Babylon more reverentially and submissively points when he exclaims: “He doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou?” (Dan. iv. 35.) Of the other class of texts, indicating the other aspect of the will of God,—his will, if one may so speak, of nature, or of natural preference and desire,—examples in abundance might be quoted; but one may suffice. Take that in which the Lord pours forth his earnest longing, almost in a burst of pathetic and passionate regret: “Oh that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways! I should soon have subdued their enemies and turned my hand against their adversaries”—“He should have fed them also with the finest of the wheat; and with honey out of the rock should I have satisfied thee” (Ps. lxxxi. 13, 14, 16).

This latter will of desire or good pleasure, as distinguished from the former will of determination or decree, denotes the pure complacency with which God approves of a certain result as just and holy and good in itself. On that account he delights in it, and therefore wills to enjoin it on the creature, as his most bounden duty. And for the same reason, in enjoining it, he cannot but add the assurance of his most willing acceptance of it, whensoever, wheresoever, and howsoever realized.

(Robert S. Candlish, The Atonement: Its Reality, Completeness, and Extent, [London: T. Nelson & Sons, 1861], pp. 197-198.)

Note: It is somewhat aberrant—and perhaps unwise—to use the phrase ‘will of good pleasure’ (voluntas beneplaciti) for the ‘will of desire’, since, historically the collocation voluntas beneplaciti has been used to denote the ‘will of decree’ or ‘will of determination’. E.g. “Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, I.19.11).

John Calvin:

For it is easy to dispose of their first objection, that if nothing happens apart from God’s will, there are in him two contrary wills, because by his secret plan he decrees what he has openly forbidden by his law. …But even though his will is one and simple in him, it appears manifold to us because, on account of our mental incapacity, we do not grasp how in divers ways it wills and does not will something to take place. When Paul said that the calling of the Gentiles was “a mystery hidden” [Eph. 3:9], he added shortly thereafter that in it was shown forth “God’s manifold wisdom” [Eph. 3:10]. Because God’s wisdom appears manifold (or “multiform” as the old translator renders it), ought we therefore, on account of the sluggishness of our understanding, to dream that there is any variation in God himself, as if he either may change his plan or disagree with himself? Rather, when we do not grasp how God wills to take place what he forbids to be done, let us recall our mental incapacity, and at the same time consider that the light in which God dwells is not without reason called unapproachable [I Tim. 6: 16], because it is overspread with darkness. Therefore all godly and modest folk readily agree with this saying of Augustine: “Sometimes with a good will a man wills something which God does not will. . . . For example, a good son wills that his father live, whom God wills to die. Again, it can happen that the same man wills with a bad will what God wills with a good will. For example, a bad son wills that his father die; God also wills this. That is, the former wills what God does not will; but the latter wills what God also wills. And yet the filial piety of the former, even though he wills something other than God wills, is more consonant with God’s good will than the impiety of the latter, who wills the same thing as God does. There is a great difference between what is fitting for man to will and what is fitting for God, and to what end the will of each is directed, so that it be either approved or disapproved. For through the bad wills of evil men God fulfills what he righteously wills.” A little before he had said that by their defection the apostate angels and all the wicked, from their point of view, had done what God did not will, but from the point of view of God’s omnipotence they could in no way have done this, because while they act against God’s will, his will is done upon them.

(John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 1.18.3; trans. LCC, 20:233, 234-235.)

Cf. Augustine of Hippo (c. 354-430 A.D.):

Sometimes, however, a man in the goodness of his will desires something that God does not desire, even though God’s will is also good, nay, much more fully and more surely good (for His will never can be evil): for example, if a good son is anxious that his father should live, when it is God’s good will that he should die. Again, it is possible for a man with evil will to desire what God wills in His goodness: for example, if a bad son wishes his father to die, when this is also the will of God. It is plain that the former wishes what God does not wish, and that the latter wishes what God does wish; and yet the filial love of the former is more in harmony with the good will of God, though its desire is different from God’s, than the want of filial affection of the latter, though its desire is the same as God’s. So necessary is it, in determining whether a man’s desire is one to be approved or disapproved, to consider what it is proper for man, and what it is proper for God, to desire, and what is in each case the real motive of the will. For God accomplishes some of His purposes, which of course are all good, through the evil desires of wicked men: for example, it was through the wicked designs of the Jews, working out the good purpose of the Father, that Christ was slain and this event was so truly good, that when the Apostle Peter expressed his unwillingness that it should take place, he was designated Satan by Him who had come to be slain.[Matt. xvi. 21-23] How good seemed the intentions of the pious believers who were unwilling that Paul should go up to Jerusalem lest the evils which Agabus had foretold should there befall him![Acts xxi. 10-12] And yet it was God’s purpose that he should suffer these evils for preaching the faith of Christ, and thereby become a witness for Christ. And this purpose of His, which was good, God did not fulfill through the good counsels of the Christians, but through the evil counsels of the Jews; so that those who opposed His purpose were more truly His servants than those who were the willing instruments of its accomplishment.

(Augustine of Hippo, The Enchiridion, 101; PL, 40:279; trans. NPNF1, 3:269-270.)

Jonathan Edwards:

The Arminians ridicule the distinction between the secret and revealed will of God, or, more properly expressed, the distinction between the decree and law of God; because we say he may decree one thing, and command another. And so, they argue, we hold a contrariety in God, as if one will of His contradicted another. However, if they will call this a contradiction of wills, we know that there is such a thing; so that it is the greatest absurdity to dispute about it. We and they know it was God’s secret will, that Abraham should not sacrifice his son Isaac; but yet his command was, that he should do it. We know that God willed, that Pharaoh’s heart should be hardened; and yet that the hardness of his heart was sin. We know that God willed the Egyptians should hate God’s people: Psal. cv. 25. “He turned their heart to hate his people, and deal subtlety with his servants.” We know that it was God’s will, that Absalom should lie with David’s wives; 2 Sam. xii. 11. “Thus saith the Lord, I will raise up this evil against thee, out of thine own house; and I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbour; and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of this sun. For thou didst it secretly; but I will do this thing before all Israel, and before the sun.” We know that God willed that Jeroboam and the ten tribes should rebel. The same may be said of the plunder of the Babylonians; and other instances might be given. The Scripture plainly tells us, that God wills to harden some men, Rom. ix. 18. That he willed that Christ should be killed by men, &c.

(Jonathan Edwards, “Miscellaneous Observations: Concerning the Divine Decrees in General, and Election in Particular,” §. 2; In: The Works of President Edwards: In Four Volumes: Vol. II, [New York: Leavitt, Trow, & Co., 1844], p. 513.)

Cf. Jonathan Edwards:

For all must own, that God sometimes wills not to hinder the breach of his own commands, because he does not in fact hinder it. He wills to permit sin, it is evident, because he does permit it. None will say that God himself does what he does not will to do. But you will say, God wills to permit sin, as he wills the creature should be left to his freedom; and if he should hinder it, he would offer violence to the nature of his own creature. I answer, this comes nevertheless to the very thing that I say. You say, God does not will sin absolutely; but rather than alter the law of nature and the nature of free agents, he wills it. He wills what is contrary to excellency in some particulars, for the sake of a more general excellency and order. So that this scheme of the Arminians does not help the matter.

(Jonathan Edwards, “Miscellaneous Observations: Concerning the Divine Decrees in General, and Election in Particular,” §. 9; In: The Works of President Edwards: In Four Volumes: Vol. II, [New York: Leavitt, Trow, & Co., 1844], p. 516.)

Cf. Jonathan Edwards:

There is no inconsistency or contrariety between the decretive and preceptive will of God. It is very consistent to suppose that God may hate the thing itself, and yet will that it should come to pass. Yea, I do not fear to assert that the thing itself may be contrary to God’s will, and yet that it may be agreeable to his will that it should come to pass, because his will, in the one case, has not the same object with his will in the other case. To suppose God to have contrary wills towards the same object, is a contradiction; but it is not so, to suppose him to have contrary wills about different objects. The thing itself, and that the thing should come to pass, are different, as is evident; because it is possible that the one may be good and the other may be evil. The thing itself may be evil, and yet it may be a good thing that it should come to pass. It may be a good thing that an evil thing should come to pass; and oftentimes it most certainly and undeniably is so, and proves so.

(Jonathan Edwards, “Miscellaneous Observations: Concerning the Divine Decrees in General, and Election in Particular,” §. 60; In: The Works of President Edwards: In Four Volumes: Vol. II, [New York: Leavitt, Trow, & Co., 1844], p. 546.)

Thomas Aquinas:

God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply.

(Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, I.23.4; trans. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica: In Three Volumes: Volume One, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, [New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1947], Reply Objection 3, p. 128.)

Cf. Thomas Aquinas:

…according to Damascene, so that it is understood to be about his antecedent will, and not the consequent. For in God’s will, although there are no prior things and subsequent things, his will is nevertheless described as antecedent and consequent. Likewise, according to the order of things willed, according to which the will can be considered in two ways: namely, in general or absolutely, and according to certain circumstances, and in particular. Here the absolute and general consideration is considered prior to the particular and relative consideration. Then the absolute will is, as it were, antecedent, and the will of anything in particular is, as it were, consequent. For example, a merchant who absolutely wills to save all his goods, and this by his antecedent will; but if he considers the safety factor, he does not will all his goods to be saved, through comparison to others, namely, when the sinking of his ship follows the saving of all his goods. And this will is consequent. Similarly, in God’s case, the salvation of all men considered in itself has a reckoning so that it might be desirable; which is what the Apostle means here: therefore, he is speaking of his antecedent will. But if the good of justice is considered, and that sins be punished, thus he does not want; And this is his consequent will.

(Thomas Aquinas, In Epistolam I. ad Timotheum, Caput Secundum, Lectio I; In: Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Opera Omnia: Tomus XIII, [New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1949], p. 593.)

Taylor Patrick O’Neill:

Finally, it cannot be stated that this reality of predestination and reprobation means that God in no way loves all men and wishes for their greatest good, that is, the attainment of glory and beatitude. On the contrary, St. Thomas states, “God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply.” In speaking of possible interpretations of 1 Tm 2:4 (as well as 2 Pt 3:9), St. Thomas puts forth as one possibility the view of St. John Damascene that God wills some men to be saved according to his antecedent will and some according to his consequent. will, which implies not a mutability in the divine will but rather in the objects of that will. “Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed.”

This distinction should be understood as referencing a different scope of the divine will and not as something antecedent or consequent in God. To every man, considered in and of himself, God wishes all possible goods precisely because God loves every man more than could be imagined. That necessarily results in his wishing to give to every man all possible goods. But each man (and everything within the created order) does not exist in a vacuum; he exists in relation to all other things within the created order. Consequently, God does not will things to each individual man as if he were all that existed. Instead, he wills things to men as they are, as parts of the whole of creation, acting upon and in relation to one another. Due to this wider scope, the true order of things, God wills only some goods to each man. As such, we say that God wills that all men be saved antecedently but not consequently, for, as we have seen above, God wills that some perish for the greater good of the whole.

(Taylor Patrick O’Neill, Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin: A Thomistic Analysis, [Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2019], pp. 65-66.) Preview.

John Frame:

Reformed theologians have typically rejected the antecedent-consequent distinction because of its association with libertarian freedom. But they have adopted a rather similar distinction, between God’s decretive and preceptive wills. God’s decretive will is simply what in chapter 11 we called God’s decree. It is his eternal purpose, by which he foreordains everything that comes to pass. God’s preceptive will is his valuations, particularly as revealed to us in his Word (his precepts). The decretive will focuses on God’s lordship attribute of control, the preceptive will on the lordship attribute of authority. God’s decretive will cannot be successfully opposed; it will certainly take place. It is possible, however, and often the case, for creatures to disobey God’s preceptive will.

The decretive will is sometimes called the will of God’s good pleasure (beneplacitum). This is somewhat misleading, because Scripture speaks of God’s “pleasure” in both decretive and preceptive senses—decretive, for example, in Psalm 51:18 and Isaiah 46:10 KJV, preceptive in Psalms 5:4 NIV and 103:21 KJV. Some have also called the decretive will God’s hidden or secret will, but that, too, is misleading, since God reveals some of his decrees through his Word.

For that reason I hesitate also to call the preceptive will the revealed will (signum, “signified” will), though that language has often been used for this concept. Preceptive is also somewhat misleading, for it does not always have to do with literal precepts (God’s laws, commandments). Sometimes God’s preceptive will refers not to precepts but to states of affairs that God sees as desirable, but that he chooses not to bring about (as Ezek. 18:23; 2 Peter 3:9). Still, I will use preceptive because of customary usage, and because I don’t know of superior terminology available.

How is this distinction similar to the antecedent-consequent distinction? God’s preceptive will, like the antecedent will, consists of his valuation of every possible and actual state of affairs. His decretive will, like the consequent will, determines what will actually happen. The difference is that the concept decretive is intended to exclude libertarianism. God’s decision as to what will actually happen is not based on his foreknowledge of the libertarian free choices of men. It is rather based on his own decision to write his historical drama in a certain way.

It is therefore disingenuous for Arminians to criticize Calvinists for teaching “two wills” in God. Arminianism, indeed all theologies, recognizes some complexity in God’s will (though confessing its ultimate unity), and theologians of all persuasions have sometimes talked about multiple wills in God.

(John M. Frame, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Christian Belief, [Phillipsburg: P & R Publishing, 2013], Chapter 16: God’s Attributes: Power, Will, pp. 347-348.)

Cf. John Frame:

If God desires for people to repent of sin, then certainly he desires them to be saved, for salvation is the fruit of such repentance. Some Calvinists, however, have denied this conclusion, reasoning that God cannot possibly desire something that never takes place. But I have dealt with that objection already. Scripture often represents God as desiring things that never take place. As we have seen, he wants all people to repent of sin—but we know that many people never repent. And there are many, many other examples. God desires that all people will turn from false gods and idols, hold his name in reverence, remember the Sabbath, honor their parents, and so on. But those desires are not always fulfilled.

The reason is that God’s “desires” in this sense are expressions of his preceptive will, not his decretive will. His decretive desires always come to pass; his preceptive desires are not always fulfilled. So there is nothing contrary to Calvinistic theology in the assertion that God wants everyone to be saved.

(John M. Frame, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Christian Belief, [Phillipsburg: P & R Publishing, 2013], Chapter 16: God’s Attributes: Power, Will, p. 349.)

Archibald Alexander Hodge:

53. What is intended by the distinction between the decretive and the preceptive will of God?

The decretive will of God is God efficaciously purposing the certain futurition of events. The preceptive will of God is God, as moral governor, commanding his moral creatures to do that which he sees it right and wise that they in their circumstances should do. These are not inconsistent. What he wills as our duty may very consistently be different from what he wills as his purpose. What it is right for him to permit may be wrong for him to approve, or for us to do.

54. What is meant by the distinction between the secret and revealed will of God?

The secret will of God is his decretive will, called secret, because although it is sometimes revealed to man in the prophecies and promises of the Bible, yet it is for the most part hidden in God.

The revealed will of God is his preceptive will, which is always clearly set forth as the rule of our duty.—Deut. xxix. 29.

(Archibald Alexander Hodge, Outlines of Theology: Rewritten and Enlarged, [New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1879], p. 151.)

Louis Berkhof:

…(1) The decretive and the preceptive will of God. The former is that will of God by which He purposes or decrees whatever shall come to pass, whether He wills to accomplish it effectively (causatively), or to permit it to occur through the unrestrained agency of His rational creatures. The latter is the rule of life which God has laid down for His moral creatures, indicating the duties which He enjoins upon them. The former is always accomplished, while the latter is often disobeyed. (2) The will of eudokia and the will of eurestia. This division was made, not so much in connection with the purpose to do, as with respect to the pleasure in doing, or the desire to see something done. It corresponds with the preceding, however. in the fact that the will of eudokia, like that of the decree, comprises what shall certainly be accomplished, while the will of eurestia, like that of the precept, embraces simply what God is pleased to have His creatures do. The word eudokia should not mislead us to think that the will of eudokia has reference only to good, and not to evil, cf. Matt. 11:26. It is hardly correct to say that the element of complacency or delight is always present in it. (3) The will of the beneplacitum and the will of the signum. The former again denotes the will of God as embodied in His hidden counsel, until He makes it known by some revelation, or by the event itself. Any will that is so revealed becomes a signum. This distinction is meant to correspond to that between the decretive and the preceptive will of God, but can hardly be said to do this. The good pleasure of God also finds expression in His preceptive will; and the decretive will sometimes also comes to our knowledge by a signum. (4) The secret and the revealed will of God. This is the most common distinction. The former is the will of God’s decree, which is largely hidden in God, while the latter is the will of the precept, which is revealed in the law and in the gospel. The distinction is based on Deut. 29:29. The secret will of God is mentioned in Ps. 115:3; Dan. 4:17,25,32,35; Rom. 9:18,19; 11:33,34; Eph. 1:5,9,11; and His revealed will, in Matt. 7:21; 12:50; John 4:34; 7:17; Rom. 12:2. The latter is accessible to all and is not far from us, Deut. 30:14; Rom. 10:8. The secret will of God pertains to all things which He wills either to effect or to permit, and which are therefore absolutely fixed. The revealed will prescribes the duties of man, and represents the way in which he can enjoy the blessings of God.

(Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology: Fourth Revised and Enlarged Edition, [Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1976], pp. 77-78.) See also: ccel.org.

Petrus Van Mastricht:

XXV. But, fourth, the most accurate distinction of all is between God’s decretive and legislative will, or his will of plan and will of precept. Of these, by the former he determines events, that is, what is to be or not to be de facto, whether it is good or evil. By the latter, he determines what is to be or not to be de jure only. Included under God’s decretive will are: (1) predestination, election, reprobation, and preterition; (2) the covenant of grace, concerning the salvation of the elect, between the Father and the Son; (3) the absolute promises of regeneration, sanctification, faith, and perseverance; (4) the complements of these promises, by discriminating grace, and so forth. To God’s legislative will or will of precept belong precepts and prohibitions, promises and threats. Concerning this distribution, this must be carefully noted: just as the decretive will only determines the occurrence or futurity of a thing, but does not, however, determine its moral goodness and badness (for it determines promiscuously the occurrences of good and evil things), so the legislative will only determines the goodness and badness of the thing willed, while in the meantime it states nothing about the futurity or non-futurity of the same.

From this we evidently perceive (1) by what reckoning the will of God is always and universally effective: the former, that is, the decretive will, is so according to the event, and the latter legislative will is so according to our duty, while at the same time he wills in earnest by his legislative will many things that never occur, just as also many things occur by his decretive will that he does not will. And so we perceive from this as well (2) that there is nothing in these wills on God’s part that is repugnant, since they do not will the same thing or in the same way.

XXVI. Therefore, when this distinction is neglected you will in no way escape the following difficulties: (1) there would be contrary wills in God, by which God wills and does not will the same thing. (2) Certain wills of God would be ineffective because they do not achieve his intent. Consequently, (3) the will of God would not be omnipotent, and (4) he would not be blessed in every way, because what he wills in earnest he does not achieve. On the contrary, when you rightly distinguish the efficacy of the one from the other, as we have said, not only will you entirely avoid conflict and ineffectiveness in the divine wills, but you will also most fittingly free him from the idea of pretending, about which our adversaries continuously growl at us, saying that God (in our opinion, that is) indicates that he wills many things that he does not in fact will, and thus he pretends. Without any trouble we will answer back that God always wills in fact what he indicates that he wills. But what he wills by his legislative will, although he wills its goodness, yet he does not immediately will its futurity, nor does he indicate it.

(Petrus Van Mastricht, Theoretical-Practical Theology, 2.15.25-26; trans. Petrus Van Mastricht, Theoretical-Practical Theology, Vol. 2: Faith in the Triune God, trans. Todd M. Rester, ed. Joel R. Beeke, [Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2019], pt. 1, bk. 2, ch. 15, §§. 25-26.) Preview.

Francis Turretin:

I. Although the will in God is only one and most simple, by which he comprehends all things by a single and most simple act so that he sees and understands all things at one glance, yet because it is occupied differently about various objects, it thus happens that in our manner of conception, it may be apprehended as manifold (not in itself and intrinsically on the part of the act of willing, but extrinsically and objectively on the part of the things willed).

II. Hence have arisen various distinctions of the will of God. The first and principal distinction is that of the decretive and preceptive will. The former means that which God wills to do or permit himself; the latter what he wills that we should do. The former relates to the futurition and the event of things and is the rule of God’s external acts; the latter is concerned with precepts and promises and is the rule of our action. The former cannot be resisted and is always fulfilled: “Who hath resisted his will?” (Rom. 9:19). The latter is often violated by men: “How often would I have gathered you together, and ye would not” (Mt. 23:37).

III. As there are various passages of Scripture in which the will of God is taken either for the decree (Rom. 9:19; Eph. 1:11) or for the precept (Ps. 143:10; Rom. 12:2), so there are also some in which both wills of God are signified at the same time (i.e., Jn. 6:38, where Christ says, “I came down to do the will of him that sent me” [i.e., to fulfil the things decreed by God and to obey the command of the Father]). And when we say in the Lord’s Prayer, “Thy will be done,” we ask that our lives may correspond to his precepts and his decrees be fulfilled.

IV. Although the precept falls also under the decree as to proposition, still it does not fall as to execution. Thus they may be properly distinguished from each other, so as the will of decree may be that which determines the event of things, but the will of precept that which prescribes to man his duty. Therefore God can (without a contradiction) will as to precept what he does not will as to decree inasmuch as he wills to prescribe something to man, but does not will to effect it (as he willed Pharaoh to release the people, but yet nilled their actual release).

V. Hence it happens that although these wills may be conceived by us as diverse (owing to the diversity of the objects), yet they are not contrary. For as was just said, they are not occupied about the same thing. Undoubtedly if God by the power of his decree would impel men to do what he has by his law prohibited, or if when attempting to obey the law he would by an opposite impediment recall them from obedience, he would will repugnancies and be himself opposed to his own will. But the decree of God does not contend with his command when he prescribes to man his bounden duty (for the performance of which, however, he does not will to give the strength because he wills indeed the thing as to the proposition of duty, but yet not as to the execution of the event).

VI. The preceptive will has a twofold object: sometimes affirmative (with respect to which it can also be called affirmative when the effecting of the thing is prescribed); sometimes negative (with respect to which it can itself also be called negative consisting in the prohibition of a thing). So the decretive will may have affirmative objects with respect to which it is called effectual and affirmative as well with respect to the end as to the principle; but others negative with respect to which the will ceasing can be called also negative (if not as to the principle at least as to the end) and then may be called permissive by which he determines not to hinder the creature from sinning. For although that volition may be positive as to the principle (inasmuch as he wills not to hinder), yet it is properly called negative as to the end (which is a non-hindering).

VII. The effective will cannot stand together with the negative preceptive. For God can never by himself will to effect what his law forbids as evil. Rather it best agrees with the affirmative preceptive will; for the same one who prescribes faith decrees to give it to the elect. The affirmative preceptive will can stand together with the negative decretive will, so that God may prescribe to the creature what nevertheless he does not will to effect in the creature. So he enjoins upon all the keeping of the law which, however, he does not effect in them. He enjoins faith in Christ upon the called which nevertheless he has decreed to withhold from many.

(Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology: Volume One, trans. George Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison, Jr., [Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 1992], 3.15.1-7, pp. 220-221.)

Wayne Grudem:

…Another helpful distinction applied to different aspects of God’s will is the distinction between God’s secret will and his revealed will. Even in our own experience we know that we are able to will some things secretly and then only later make this will known to others. Sometimes we tell others before the thing that we have willed comes about, and at other times we do not reveal our secret will until the event we willed has happened.

Surely a distinction between aspects of God’s will is evident in many passages of Scripture. According to Moses, “The secret things belong to the LORD our God; but the things that are revealed belong to us and to our children for ever, that we may do all the words of this law” (Deut. 29:29). Those things that God has revealed are given for the purpose of obeying God’s will: “that we may do all the words of this law.” There were many other aspects of his plan, however, that he had not revealed to them: many details about future events, specific details of hardship or of blessing in their lives, and so forth. With regard to these matters, they were simply to trust him.

Because God’s revealed will usually contains his commands or “precepts” for our moral conduct, God’s revealed will is sometimes also called God’s will of precept or will of command. This revealed will of God is God’s declared will concerning what we should do or what God commands us to do.

On the other hand, God’s secret will usually includes his hidden decrees by which he governs the universe and determines everything that will happen. He does not ordinarily reveal these decrees to us (except in prophecies of the future), so these decrees really are God’s “secret” will. We find out what God has decreed when events actually happen. Because this secret will of God has to do with his decreeing of events in the world, this aspect of God’s will is sometimes also called God’s will of decree.

There are several instances where Scripture mentions God’s revealed will. In the Lord’s prayer the petition, “Your will be done, On earth as it is in heaven” (Matt. 6:10) is a prayer that people would obey God’s revealed will, his commands, on earth just as they do in heaven (that is, fully and completely). This could not be a prayer that God’s secret will (that is, his decrees for events that he has planned) would in fact be fulfilled, for what God has decreed in his secret will shall certainly come to pass. To ask God to bring about what he has already decreed to happen would simply be to pray, “May what is going to happen happen.” That would be a hollow prayer indeed, for it would not be asking for anything at all. Furthermore, since we do not know God’s secret will regarding the future, the person praying a prayer for God’s secret will to be done would never know for what he or she was praying. It would be a prayer without understandable content and without effect. Rather, the prayer “Your will be done” must be understood as an appeal for the revealed will of God to be followed on earth.

If the phrase is understood in this way, it provides a pattern for us to pray on the basis of God’s commands in Scripture. In this sense, Jesus provides us with a guide for an exceedingly broad range of prayer requests. We are encouraged by Christ here to pray that people would obey God’s laws, that they would follow his principles for life, that they would obey his commands to repent of sin and trust in Christ as Savior. To pray these things is to pray that God’s will would be done on earth as it is in heaven.

A little later, Jesus says, “Not every one who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ shall enter the kingdom of heaven, but he who does the will of my Father who is in heaven” (Matt. 7:21). Once again, the reference cannot be to God’s secret will or will of decree (for all mankind follows this, even if unknowingly), but to God’s revealed will, namely, the moral law of God that Christ’s followers are to obey (cf. Matt. 12:50; probably also 18:14). When Paul commands the Ephesians to “understand what the will of the Lord is” (Eph. 5:17; cf. Rom. 2:18), he again is speaking of God’s revealed will. So also is John when he says, “If we ask anything according to his will he hears us” (1 John 5:14).

It is probably best to put 1 Timothy 2:4 and 2 Peter 3:9 in this category as well. Paul says that God “desires [or ‘wills, wishes,’ Gk. theleō] all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Tim. 2:4). Peter says that the Lord “is not slow about his promise as some count slowness, but is forbearing toward you, not wishing that any should perish, but that all should reach repentance” (2 Peter 3:9). In neither of these verses can God’s will be understood to be his secret will, his decree concerning what will certainly occur. This is because the New Testament is clear that there will be a final judgment and not all will be saved. It is best therefore to understand these references as speaking of God’s revealed will, his commands for mankind to obey and his declaration to us of what is pleasing in his sight.

On the other hand, many passages speak of God’s secret will. When James tells us to say, “If the Lord wills, we shall live and we shall do this or that” (James 4:15), he cannot be talking about God’s revealed will or will of precept, for with regard to many of our actions we know that it is according to God’s command that we do one or another activity that we have planned. Rather, to trust in the secret will of God overcomes pride and expresses humble dependence on God’s sovereign control over the events of our lives.

Another instance is found in Genesis 20. Joseph says to his brothers, “As for you, you meant evil against me; but God meant it for good, to bring it about that many people should be kept alive, as they are today,” Here God’s revealed will to Joseph’s brothers was that they should love him and not steal from him or sell him into slavery or make plans to murder him. But God’s secret will was that in the disobedience of Joseph’s brothers a greater good would be done when Joseph, having been sold into slavery into Egypt, gained authority over the land and was able to save his family.

When Paul says to the Corinthians, “I will come to you soon, if the Lord wills” (1 Cor. 4:19), he is not speaking of God’s revealed will, for Paul has already determined, in obedience to God and in fulfillment of his apostolic office, to come to visit the Corinthians. He is speaking rather of God’s secret will, his hidden plan for the future, which is unknown to Paul and which will be known only as it comes to pass (cf. Acts 21:14; Rom. 1:10; 15:32; Eph. 1:11; 1 Peter 3:17; 4:19).

Both the revealing of the good news of the gospel to some and its hiding from others are said to be according to God’s will. Jesus says, “I thank you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that you have hidden these things from the wise and understanding and revealed them to babes, yea, Father, for such was your gracious will” (Matt. 11:25-26). This again must refer to God’s secret will, for his revealed will is that all come to salvation. Indeed, only two verses later, Jesus commands everyone, “Come to me, all who labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest” (Matt. 11:28). And both Paul and Peter tell us that God wills all people to be saved (see 1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Peter 3:9). Thus, the fact that some are not saved and some have the gospel hidden from them must be understood as happening according to God’s secret will, unknown to us and inappropriate for us to seek to pry into. In the same way we must understand the mention of God’s will in Romans 9:18 (“He has mercy upon whomever he wills, and he hardens the heart of whomever he wills”) and Acts 4:28 (“to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place”) as references to God’s secret will.

(Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine, [Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1994], pp. 213-215.)

D. A. Carson:

A fourth area of ambiguity lies in the nature of the divine will. An example or two will bring the heart of the problem into focus. On several occasions God is said ‘to repent’ of something, e.g. of the creation of man (Gen. 6.6), of his decision to wipe out his rebellious calf-worshipping people (Exod. 32.7-14). Similarly, the decree that Hezekiah should die is revoked (2 Kgs. 20.1-6). Cf. also 1 Samuel 15.11; 2 Samuel 24.16; Jonah 3.10; Ecclesiastes 2.13f. On the other hand, God repeatedly insists that he, unlike man, does not repent (Num. 23.19f.; 1 Sam. 15.29; Jer. 4.28; cf. Ps. 89.34f.). Again, in the account in Genesis 22, Abraham is told to sacrifice his son; yet as the narrative develops, it appears that God never really intended him to do so. Yet again, God is presented as waiting and longing to be gracious (Isa. 30.18f.; 65.2; Hos. 11.7-9), as one who extracts no pleasure from the death of the wicked (Ezek. 33.11), as the one who punishes with extreme reluctance (Lam. 3.33-6); yet at other times, as we have seen, he is said to control the thoughts of men, keep his people, and bring nations to the point where he may punish them severely.

Such phenomena as these have evoked theological distinctions concerning the ‘will’ of God. Some distinguish between God’s revealed will and his hidden or secret will (cf. Deut. 29.29); others, between God’s prescriptive will and his determinative will; others, between his permissive will and his decretive will; still others, between his antecedent will and his consequent will. All of these paired ‘wills’ suffer from serious shortcomings. For example, although the greatest part of the divine will must surely remain ‘hidden’ (i.e. unknown to men), and although any increase in the knowledge of that will is due to revelation of that hidden but already operative will, nevertheless this model is inadequate as a total explanation of the relation between the divine will and reality, because in too many instances the hidden will appears to make a mockery of the revealed will. Since the hidden will is always effective, it appears to be the actual will of God; while the revealed will is little more than precept. In that case, man does not know anything of God’s actual will, except by what actually happens; and conversely, everything that happens is exactly what God really wills to happen. This problem is related to the tension between the deus absconditus and the deus revelatus.

Similarly, distinctions between permissive will and decretive will appear desperately artificial when applied to an omniscient and omnipotent being; for if this God ‘permits’ sin, it cannot be unknowingly and unwillingly, and therefore his ‘permission’ must be granted knowingly and willingly. Wherein then does this permission differ from decree?

Indeed, any combination of these ‘wills’ leads inexorably to curious situations. For example, Yahweh foresees that the people will go astray, and that his wrath will be kindled (Deut. 31.15-22). This surely suggests something more than consequent wrath—perhaps something more akin to willed wrath. In the same way, Micaiah can warn the king of impending doom and be assured that the king will fail to heed the warning: God has decreed it so. This puts Micaiah in the invidious position of Cassandra.

At the same time, we cannot do without some distinctions concerning the ‘will(s)’ of God. Both in the Old Testament and in the fourth Gospel, not to say elsewhere, God is sometimes presented as the one who seeks men out, loves a lost world, declares his yearning for their repentance, and the like. This ‘will’ of God is his disposition; it is not necessarily his decree. But precisely how both operate in one sovereign God is extremely difficult to understand.

(D. A. Carson, Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical Perspectives in Tension, [Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981], pp. 212-214.)

Wilhelmus à Brakel:

In making a distinction in the will of God, we are not suggesting that God has two wills. In God the act of the will is singular. The difference rather relates to the objects towards whom His will is exercised. Much less do we suggest that God has two wills which are incompatible, as if God with His revealed will would desire something and His secret will would be opposed. When we consider the will of God as being either secret or revealed, this distinction pertains to decidedly different matters, some of which are revealed whereas others are not. The secret and revealed will of God neither relate to one and the same matter, nor should they be viewed from the same perspective. Let me illustrate. God commanded Abraham to sacrifice and kill His son Isaac; nevertheless, it was not God’s will that Isaac would die. This became evident from the outcome. There is a distinction here between the command and the result. God’s command was His revealed or preceptive will, which was the basis for Abraham’s behavior. He had to do everything which would contribute to the death of his son, which he also did. The result—that the death of Isaac would not take place by Abraham’s activity—was another matter and belonged to the secret will of God’s decree which Abraham perceived afterward when the voice of God prevented him. There should therefore be no concern as to what will should govern our behavior, as the Lord’s secret will is solely His domain and against it we cannot sin. God will accomplish His good pleasure. Nevertheless, it is expressed in God’s revealed will that we are to exercise confidence

(Wilhelmus à Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service: Volume 1: God, Man and Christ, trans. Bartel Elshout, ed. Joel R. Beeke, [Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 1992], p. 114.)

Petrus Van Mastricht:

The distribution of the divine will: The will of the sign and will of good pleasure

XXII. Now, nothing remains except that we should add a few things about the distribution of the divine will. By all means, the will of God is one and only one, yet it is distinguished by us into various modes, first on account of the different kinds of things that it wills, next on account of the different modes in which we see that it wills what it wills. Thus they distinguish the will of God, first, into the will of the sign and the will of good pleasure. The latter denotes the decree of God itself, either his effective decree of good or his permissive decree of evil: “He does whatever he pleases” (Ps. 115:3) and “Yes, Father, so it has pleased you” (Matt. 11:25-26; Luke 12:32). But the former generally denotes some sort of indication by which God wills something to be signified to us, either that it would be simply believed and acknowledged, to which pertains his prediction, fulfillment, and remembrance of things or deeds, or, that our actions would be obliged to it as a norm, to which pertains, first, his command, promise, exhortation, invitation, and persuasion; next, his prohibition, threatening, dissuasion, warning, and so forth. Specifically, however, in thus contrasting the former with the latter, we customarily look to the commandment, that is, the sign commanding or prohibiting a specific effect of the divine will, for which reason they also call the will of the sign the will of the commandment.

Secret and revealed will

XXIII. Furthermore, second, they divide God’s will into his secret and revealed will, according to Deuteronomy 29:29. Understand by the word secret those things that God decreed either to do or to permit and that he has so far not revealed, either by their outcome or by a prophecy. Consequently, they do not supply to us a way to know our norm; indeed, modesty requires that in investigating these things we would not be too curious. But the things that have been revealed to us oblige us immediately to assent and faith, and the things in them that are commanded for our doing or prohibited for our avoidance require obedience on the spot, and thus, putting aside all curiosity, we must carefully study their observance.

Absolute and conditioned will

XXIV. They employ, third, the distinction between God’s absolute and conditioned will, not of course with respect to the act of God who wills, for in that way all his will is absolute, but with respect to the things willed by God in this act. For God wills that some things occur absolutely but other things under a condition. Thus he wills regeneration, faith, and repentance in the elect absolutely, but in such a way that salvation comes to them under the condition of faith and repentance. But, seeing that this distinction is often stolen and used in a worse sense by the Pelagians and Pelagianizers (as we will teach on it a little further on), it is generally disregarded by the orthodox.

Decretive and legislative will

The double consequence

The use of this distribution

(Petrus Van Mastricht, Theoretical-Practical Theology, 2.15.22-26; trans. Petrus Van Mastricht, Theoretical-Practical Theology, Vol. 2: Faith in the Triune God, trans. Todd M. Rester, ed. Joel R. Beeke, [Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2019], pt. 1, bk. 2, ch. 15, §§. 22-26.) Preview.

Martin Luther:

The Diatribe is deceived by its own ignorance in that it makes no distinction between God preached and God hidden, that is, between the Word of God and God Himself. God does many things which He does not show us in His Word, and He wills many things which He does not in His Word show us that He wills. Thus, He does not will the death of a sinner—that is, in His Word; but He wills it by His inscrutable will. At present, however, we must keep in view His Word and leave alone His inscrutable will; for it is by His Word, and not by His inscrutable will, that we must be guided. In any case, who can direct himself according to a will that is inscrutable and incomprehensible? It is enough simply to know that there is in God an inscrutable will; what, why, and within what limits It wills, it is wholly unlawful to inquire, or wish to know, or be concerned about, or touch upon; we may only fear and adore!

So it is right to say: ‘If God does not desire our death, it must be laid to the charge of our own will if we perish’; this, I repeat, is right if you spoke of God preached. For He desires that all men should be saved, in that He comes to all by the word of salvation, and the fault is in the will which does not receive Him; as He says in Matt. 23: ‘How often would I have gathered thy children together, and thou wouldst not!’ (v. 37). But why the Majesty does not remove or change this fault of will in every man (for it is not in the power of man to do it), or why He lays this fault to the charge of the will, when man cannot avoid it, it is not lawful to ask; and though you should ask much, you would never find out; as Paul says in Rom. 11: ‘Who art thou that repliest against God?’ (Rom. 9.20).

(Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, trans. J. I. Packer, O. R. Johnston, [Grand Rapids: Fleming H. Revell, 2000], pp. 170-171.)

Appendix: Primary and Secondary Causes.

John Piper:

Arminians sometimes disparage Reformed appeals to “secondary causes” between God’s sovereign will and the immediate effecting of a sinful act. But the Reformed introduce this idea of intermediate causes, different from God’s ultimate causing, not because of a theological necessity but because so many Scripture passages demand it. For example, God commissions an “evil spirit” between Abimelech and the men of Shechem to bring about his will (Judg. 9:22–24); Satan leads Judas to do (Luke 22:3) what Acts 2:23 says God brings about; Paul says that Satan blinds the minds of unbelievers (2 Cor. 4:4), but also says that God sends a blinding spirit of stupor (Rom. 11:8–10); Satan stirs up David to take a census (1 Chron. 21:1), which proves to be sin (2 Sam. 24:10), and yet it is written that God is in some sense the cause behind Satan (2 Sam. 24:1); and Satan gets permission from God to torment Job (Job 1:12; 2:6), but when Satan takes Job’s family and makes him sick, Job says, “The Lord has taken” (Job 1:21), and, “Shall we receive good from God, and shall we not receive evil?” (2:10)—to which the writer responds: “In all this Job did not sin or charge God with wrong” (1:22; cf. 2:10).

(John Piper, Does God Desire all to be Saved? [Wheaton: Crossway, 2013], pp. 42-43.)

Note: See further: Concurrence (Concursus) — Primary and Secondary Causes.

Appendix: Compatibilism.

Wayne Grudem:

One approach to these passages about God’s concurrence is to say that if our choices are real, they cannot be caused by God (see below for further discussion of this viewpoint). But the number of passages that affirm this providential control of God is so considerable, and the difficulties involved in giving them some other interpretation are so formidable, that it does not seem to me that this can be the right approach to them. It seems better to affirm that God causes all things that happen, but that he does so in such a way that he somehow upholds our ability to make willing, responsible choices choices that have real and eternal results and for which we are held accountable. Exactly how God combines his providential control with our willing and significant choices, Scripture does not explain to us. But rather than deny one aspect or the other (simply because we cannot explain how both can be true), we should accept both in an attempt to be faithful to the teaching of all of Scripture.

The analogy of an author writing a play may help us to grasp how both aspects can be true. In the Shakespearean play Macbeth the character Macbeth murders King Duncan. Now (if we assume for a moment that this is a fictional account), the question may be asked, “Who killed King Duncan?” On one level, the correct answer is “Macbeth.” Within the context of the play he carried out the murder and is rightly to blame for it. But on another level, a correct answer to the question, “Who killed King Duncan?” would be “William Shakespeare”: he wrote the play, he created all the characters in it, and he wrote the part where Macbeth killed King Duncan.

It would not be correct to say that because Macbeth killed King Duncan, William Shakespeare did not kill him. Nor would it be correct to say that because William Shakespeare killed King Duncan, Macbeth did not kill him. Both are true. On the level of the characters in the play Macbeth fully (100 percent) caused King Duncan’s death, but on the level of the creator of the play, William Shakespeare fully (100 percent) caused King Duncan’s death. In similar fashion, we can understand that God fully causes things in one way (as Creator), and we fully cause things in another way (as creatures).

Of course, someone may object that the analogy does not really solve the problem because characters in a play are not real persons; they are only characters with no freedom of their own, no ability to make genuine choices, and so forth. But in response we may point out that God is infinitely greater and wiser than we are. While we as finite creatures can only create fictional characters in a play, not real persons, God, our infinite Creator, has made an actual world and in it has created us as real persons who make willing choices. To say that God could not make a world in which he causes us to make willing choices (as some would argue today; see discussion below), is simply to limit the power of God. It seems also to deny a large number of passages of Scripture. [fn. 4: I. Howard Marshall, “Predestination in the New Testament” in Grace Unlimited by Clark H. Pinnock, pp. 132–33, 139, objects to the analogy of an author and a play because the actors “are bound by the characters assigned to them and the lines that they have learned” so that even if the dramatist “makes [the characters] say ‘I love my creator’ in his drama, this is not mutual love in the real sense.” But Marshall limits his analysis to what is possible with human beings acting on a human level. He does not give consideration to the possibility (in fact, the reality!) that God is able to do far more than human beings are able to do, and that he can wonderfully create genuine human beings rather than mere characters in a play. A better approach to the analogy of an author and a play would be if Marshall would apply to this question a very helpful statement that he made in another part of the essay: “The basic difficulty is that of attempting to explain the nature of the relationship between an infinite God and finite creatures. Our temptation is to think of divine causation in much the same way as human causation, and this produces difficulties as soon as we try to relate divine causation and human freedom. It is beyond our ability to explain how God can cause us to do certain things (or to cause the universe to come into being and to behave as it does)” (pp. 137–38). I can agree fully with everything in Marshall’s statement at that point, and find that to be a very helpful way of approaching this problem.]

(Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine, [Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1994], pp. 321-322.)

A. W. Pink:

It is only as we see the real nature of freedom and mark that the will is subject to the motives brought to bear upon it, that we are able to discern there is no conflict between two statements of Holy Writ which concern our blessed Lord. In Matt. 4:1 we read, “Then was Jesus led up of the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted of the Devil”; but in Mark 1:12,13 we are told, “And immediately the Spirit driveth him into the wilderness. And he was there in the wilderness forty days, tempted of Satan”. It is utterly impossible to harmonize these two statements by the Arminian conception of the will. But really there is no difficulty. That Christ was “driven”, implies it was by a forcible motive or powerful impulse, such as was not to be resisted or refused; that he was “led” denotes his freedom in going. Putting the two together we learn, that he was driven, with a voluntary condescension thereto. So, there is the liberty of man’s will and the victorious efficacy of God’s grace united together: a sinner may be “drawn” and yet “come” to Christ—the “drawing” presenting to him the irresistible motive, the “coming” signifying the response of his will—as Christ was “driven” and “led” by the Spirit into the wilderness.

(Arthur W. Pink, The Sovereignty of God, [Lafayette: Sovereign Grace Publishers, 2008], Chapter 7: God’s Sovereignty and the Human Will, §. 1., The Nature Of The Human Will, p. 164.) Preview.

Note: See further: Compatibilism — God’s Sovereignty and Human Responsibility.

καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν πρὸ πάντων καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκεν ~ Soli Deo Gloria

Evangelical Answers

Monday, May 24, 2021

The Will(s) of God

No comments:

Post a Comment