The Will(s) of God

John Piper:

…1 Timothy 2:4, where Paul says that God wills all persons to be saved. What are we to say of the fact that God wills something that in fact does not happen? These are two possibilities. One is that there is a power in the universe greater than God’s that is frustrating him by overruling what he wills. …The other possibility is that God wills not to save all, even though he is willing to save all, because there is something else that he wills more, which would be lost if he exerted his sovereign power to save all. …Both Calvinists and Arminians affirm two wills in God when they ponder deeply over 1 Timothy 2:4. Both can say that God wills for all to be saved. But then when queried why all are not saved both Calvinist and Arminian answer that God is committed to something even more valuable than saving all. …What does God will more than saving all? The answer given by Arminians is that human self-determination and the possible resulting love relationship with God are more valuable than saving all people by sovereign, efficacious grace. The answer given by Calvinists is that the greater value is the manifestation of the full range of God’s glory in wrath and mercy (Rom. 9:22–23) and the humbling of man so that he enjoys giving all credit to God for his salvation (1 Cor. 1:29).

(John Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” In: Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge & Grace, eds. Thomas R. Schreiner, Bruce A. Ware, [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2000], pp. 123-124.)

Cf. I. Howard Marshall: (Arminian Theologian)

     To avoid all misconceptions it should be made clear at the outset that the fact that God wishes or wills that all people should be saved does not necessarily imply that all will respond to the gospel and be saved. We must certainly distinguish between what God would like to see happen and what he actually does will to happen, and both of these things can be spoken of as God’s will. The question at issue is not whether all will be saved but whether God has made provision in Christ for the salvation of all, provided that they believe, and without limiting the potential scope of the death of Christ merely to those whom God knows will believe.

(I. Howard Marshall, “Universal Grace and the Atonement in the Pastoral Epistles;” In:Clark H. Pinnock, ed., The Grace of God, the Will of Man: A Case for Arminianism, [Grand Rapids: Academie Books, 1989], p. 56.) Preview. 

Ezekiel 18:23:

Do I take any pleasure [חָפֵץ, ḥāp̄ēṣ] in the death of the wicked,” declares the Lord God, “rather than that he would turn from his ways and live?

(New American Standard Bible.)

Cf. Ezekiel 18:32:

For I take no pleasure [חָפֵץ, ḥāp̄ēṣ] in the death of anyone who dies,” declares the Lord God. “Therefore, repent and live!”

(New American Standard Bible.)

Cf. Ezekiel 33:11:

Say to them, ‘As I live!’ declares the Lord God, ‘I take no pleasure [חָפֵץ, ḥāp̄ēṣ] at all in the death of the wicked, but rather that the wicked turn from his way and live. Turn back, turn back from your evil ways! Why then should you die, house of Israel?’

(New American Standard Bible.)

Cf. 1 Samuel 2:25:

If one person sins against another, God will mediate for him; but if a person sins against the Lord, who can intercede for him?” But they would not listen to the voice of their father, for the Lord desired [חָפֵץ, ḥāp̄ēṣ] to put them to death.

(New American Standard Bible.)

Cf. John Piper:

Why would the sons of Eli not heed their father’s good counsel? The answer of the text is “for it was the will of the Lord to put them to death.” This makes sense only if the Lord had the right and the power to restrain their disobedience—a right and power that he willed not to use. Thus, we must say that in one sense God willed that the sons of Eli go on doing what he commanded them not to do: dishonoring their father and committing sexual immorality.

     Moreover, the word translated as “will” in the clause “it was the will of the Lord to put them to death” is the same Hebrew word (haphez) used in Ezekiel 18:23, 32 and 33:11, where God asserts that he does not have pleasure in the death of the wicked. The word signifies desire or pleasure. God (in one sense) desired to put the sons of Eli to death, but (in another sense) he does not desire the death of the wicked. This is a strong warning to us not to take one assertion, such as Ezekiel 18:23, and assume we know the precise meaning without letting other passages, such as 1 Samuel 2:25, have a say. The upshot of putting the two together is that in one sense God may desire the death of the wicked and in another sense he may not.

(John Piper, Does God Desire all to be Saved? [Wheaton: Crossway, 2013], pp. 28-29.)

Cf. Luke 7:30:

But the Pharisees and the lawyers rejected God’s purpose [βουλὴν] for themselves, not having been baptized by John.

(New American Standard Bible.)

Cf. Ephesians: 1:11:

In Him we also have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to the purpose [βουλὴν] of Him who works all things in accordance with the plan of His will,

(New American Standard Bible.)

1 Timothy 2:4:

who wants all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth [εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας].

(New American Standard Bible.)

Cf. 2 Timothy 2:25:

with gentleness correcting those who are in opposition, if perhaps God may grant [δώῃ] them repentance leading to the knowledge of the truth [εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας],

(New American Standard Bible.)

Cf. John Piper:

Perhaps you hear in the words “God may perhaps grant them repentance leading to a knowledge of the truth” an echo of 1 Timothy 2:4, where Paul says, “[God] desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.” This connection between these two texts is very important. Notice the desire of God for people to “be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth [εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας]” (in 1 Tim. 2:4), and the gift of God that people “repent unto a knowledge of the truth [εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας]” (in 2 Tim. 2:25).

     Why is this parallel so important? Because many people use 1 Timothy 2:4 (“God . . . desires all people to be saved”) as an argument that God could not possibly choose that some people repent and be saved while not choosing to save others. But that is precisely what 2 Timothy 2:25 says. “God may perhaps grant them repentance.” He gives repentance to some. The fact that these two texts are parallel in wording shows us how Paul might answer those who argue from 1 Timothy 2:4 that God cannot choose to give repentance only to some.

     He might say something like this: God’s desire (θέλει) for all to be saved (1 Tim. 2:4) is real, but it does not rise to the level of decisive action for all people. God can desire things at one level and choose not to act on those desires at another level. He desires all to be saved at one level, and he grants some to repent and be saved at another level.

(John Piper, Providence, [Wheaton: Crossway, 2020], pp. 547-548.)

Cf. John Piper:

…2 Timothy 2:24-26, which says: “The Lord’s servant must not be quarrelsome but kind to everyone, able to teach, patiently enduring evil, correcting his opponents with gentleness. God may perhaps grant them repentance leading to a knowledge of the truth, and they may come to their senses and escape from the snare of the devil, after being captured by him to do his will.” …The text is even more significant because its wording is used in 1 Timothy 2:4. Compare the desire of God for people to “be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Tim. 2:4) with the gift of God that people repent, “leading to a knowledge of the truth” (2 Tim. 2:25). These two texts alone probably teach that there are “two wills” in God: the will that all be saved and the will to give repentance to some.

(John Piper, Does God Desire all to be Saved? [Wheaton: Crossway, 2013], p. 18.)

R. C. Sproul:

     The Bible is deeply concerned about the will of God—His sovereign authority over His creation and everything in it. When we speak about God’s will we do so in at least three different ways. The broader concept is known as God’s decretive, sovereign, or hidden will. By this, theologians refer to the will of God by which He sovereignly ordains everything that comes to pass. Because God is sovereign and His will can never be frustrated, we can be sure that nothing happens over which He is not in control. He at least must “permit” whatever happens to happen. Yet even when God passively permits things to happen, He chooses to permit them in that He always has the power and right to intervene and prevent the actions and events of this world. Insofar as He lets things happen, He has “willed” them in this certain sense.

     Though God’s sovereign will is often hidden from us until after it comes to pass, there is one aspect of His will that is plain to us—His preceptive will. Here God reveals His will through His holy law. For example, it is the will of God that we do not steal; that we love our enemies; that we repent; that we be holy. This aspect of God’s will is revealed in His Word as well as in our conscience, by which God has written His moral law upon our heart.

     His laws, whether they be found in the Scripture or in the heart, are binding. We have no authority to violate this will. We have the power or the ability to thwart the preceptive will of God, though never the right to do so. Nor can we excuse ourselves for sinning by saying, “Que sera, sera.” It may be God’s sovereign or hidden will that we be “permitted” to sin, as He brings His sovereign will to pass even through and by means of the sinful acts of people. God ordained that Jesus be betrayed by the instrument of Judas’s treachery. Yet this makes Judas’s sin no less evil or treacherous. When God “permits” us to break His preceptive will, it is not to be understood as permission in the moral sense of His grant¬ ing us a moral right. His permission gives us the power, but not the right to sin.

     The third way the Bible, speaks of the will of God is with respect to God’s will of disposition. This will describes God s attitude. It defines what is pleasing to Him. For example, God takes no delight in the death of the wicked, yet He most surely wills or decrees the death of the wicked. God s ultimate delight is in His own holiness and righteousness. When He judges the world, He delights in the vindication of His own righteousness and justice, yet He is not gleeful in a vindictive sense toward those who receive His judgment. God is pleased when we find our pleasure in obedience. He is sorely displeased when we are disobedient.

(R. C. Sproul, Essential Truths of the Christian Faith, [Minneapolis: Grason, 1992], pp. 67-68.)

R. C. Sproul:

The three meanings of the will of God: (a) Sovereign decretive will is the will by which God brings to pass whatsoever He decrees. This is hidden to us until it happens. (b) Preceptive will is God’s revealed law or commandments, which we have the power but not the right to break. (c) Will of disposition describes God’s attitude or disposition. It reveals what is pleasing to Him.

(R. C. Sproul, Essential Truths of the Christian Faith, [Minneapolis: Grason, 1992], p. 69.)

Petrus Van Mastricht:

XXV. But, fourth, the most accurate distinction of all is between God’s decretive and legislative will, or his will of plan and will of precept. Of these, by the former he determines events, that is, what is to be or not to be de facto, whether it is good or evil. By the latter, he determines what is to be or not to be de jure only. Included under God’s decretive will are: (1) predestination, election, reprobation, and preterition; (2) the covenant of grace, concerning the salvation of the elect, between the Father and the Son; (3) the absolute promises of regeneration, sanctification, faith, and perseverance; (4) the complements of these promises, by discriminating grace, and so forth. To God’s legislative will or will of precept belong precepts and prohibitions, promises and threats. Concerning this distribution, this must be carefully noted: just as the decretive will only determines the occurrence or futurity of a thing, but does not, however, determine its moral goodness and badness (for it determines promiscuously the occurrences of good and evil things), so the legislative will only determines the goodness and badness of the thing willed, while in the meantime it states nothing about the futurity or non-futurity of the same.

(Petrus Van Mastricht, Theoretical-Practical Theology: Volume 2: Faith in the Triune God, trans. Todd M. Rester, ed. Joel R. Beeke, [Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2019], Book 2, Chapter 15, §. 25.) Preview.

Johnathan Edwards:

     The Arminians ridicule the distinction between the secret and revealed will of God, or, more properly expressed, the distinction between the decree and law of God; because we say he may decree one thing, and command another. And so, they argue, we hold a contrariety in God, as if one will of His contradicted another. However, if they will call this a contradiction of wills, we know that there is such a thing; so that it is the greatest absurdity to dispute about it. We and they know it was God’s secret will, that Abraham should not sacrifice his son Isaac; but yet his command was, that he should do it. We know that God willed, that Pharaoh’s heart should be hardened; and yet that the hardness of his heart was sin. We know that God willed the Egyptians should hate God’s people: Psal. cv. 25. “He turned their heart to hate his people, and deal subtlety with his servants.” We know that it was God’s will, that Absalom should lie with David’s wives; 2 Sam. xii. 11. “Thus saith the Lord, I will raise up this evil against thee, out of thine own house; and I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbour; and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of this sun. For thou didst it secretly; but I will do this thing before all Israel, and before the sun.” We know that God willed that Jeroboam and the ten tribes should rebel. The same may be said of the plunder of the Babylonians; and other instances might be given. The Scripture plainly tells us, that God wills to harden some men, Rom. ix. 18. That he willed that Christ should be killed by men, &c.

(Johnathan Edwards, “Miscellaneous Observations: Concerning the Divine Decrees in General, and Election in Particular,” §. 2; In: The Works of President Edwards: In Four Volumes: Vol. II, [New York: Leavitt, Trow, & Co., 1844], p. 513.)

Johnathan Edwards:

For all must own, that God sometimes wills not to hinder the breach of his own commands, because he does not in fact hinder it. He wills to permit sin, it is evident, because he does permit it. None will say that God himself does what he does not will to do. But you will say, God wills to permit sin, as he wills the creature should be left to his freedom; and if he should hinder it, he would offer violence to the nature of his own creature. I answer, this comes nevertheless to the very thing that I say. You say, God does not will sin absolutely; but rather than alter the law of nature and the nature of free agents, he wills it. He wills what is contrary to excellency in some particulars, for the sake of a more general excellency and order. So that this scheme of the Arminians does not help the matter.

(Johnathan Edwards, “Miscellaneous Observations: Concerning the Divine Decrees in General, and Election in Particular,” §. 9; In: The Works of President Edwards: In Four Volumes: Vol. II, [New York: Leavitt, Trow, & Co., 1844], p. 516.)

Francis Turretin: 

     I. Although the will in God is only one and most simple, by which he comprehends all things by a single and most simple act so that he sees and understands all things at one glance, yet because it is occupied differently about various objects, it thus happens that in our manner of conception, it may be apprehended as manifold (not in itself and intrinsically on the part of the act of willing, but extrinsically and objectively on the part of the things willed).

     II. Hence have arisen various distinctions of the will of God. The first and principal distinction is that of the decretive and preceptive will. The former means that which God wills to do or permit himself; the latter what he wills that we should do. The former relates to the futurition and the event of things and is the rule of God’s external acts; the latter is concerned with precepts and promises and is the rule of our action. The former cannot be resisted and is always fulfilled: “Who hath resisted his will?” (Rom. 9:19). The latter is often violated by men: “How often would I have gathered you together, and ye would not (Mt. 23:37).

     III. As there are various passages of Scripture in which the will of God is taken either for the decree (Rom. 9:19; Eph. 1:11) or for the precept (Ps. 143:10; Rom. 12:2), so there are also some in which both wills of God are signified at the same time (i.e., Jn. 6:38, where Christ says, “I came down to do the will of him that sent me” [i.e., to fulfil the things decreed by God and to obey the command of the Father]). And when we say in the Lord’s Prayer, “Thy will be done,” we ask that our lives may correspond to his precepts and his decrees be fulfilled.

     IV. Although the precept falls also under the decree as to proposition, still it does not fall as to execution. Thus they may be properly distinguished from each other, so as the will of decree may be that which determines the event of things, but the will of precept that which prescribes to man his duty. Therefore God can (without a contradiction) will as to precept what he does not will as to decree inasmuch as he wills to prescribe something to man, but does not will to effect it (as he willed Pharaoh to release the people, but yet nilled their actual release).

     V. Hence it happens that although these wills may be conceived by us as diverse (owing to the diversity of the objects), yet they are not contrary. For as was just said, they are not occupied about the same thing. Undoubtedly if God by the power of his decree would impel men to do what he has by his law prohibited, or if when attempting to obey the law he would by an opposite impediment recall them from obedience, he would will repugnancies and be himself opposed to his own will. But the decree of God does not contend with his command when he prescribes to man his bounden duty (for the performance of which, however, he does not will to give the strength because he wills indeed the thing as to the proposition of duty, but yet not as to the execution of the event).

     VI. The preceptive will has a twofold object: sometimes affirmative (with respect to which it can also be called affirmative when the effecting of the thing is prescribed); sometimes negative (with respect to which it can itself also be called negative consisting in the prohibition of a thing). So the decretive will may have affirmative objects with respect to which it is called effectual and affirmative as well with respect to the end as to the principle; but others negative with respect to which the will ceasing can be called also negative (if not as to the principle at least as to the end) and then may be called permissive by which he determines not to hinder the creature from sinning. For although that volition may be positive as to the principle (inasmuch as he wills not to hinder), yet it is properly called negative as to the end (which is a non-hindering).

     VII. The effective will cannot stand together with the negative preceptive. For God can never by himself will to effect what his law forbids as evil. Rather it best agrees with the affirmative preceptive will; for the same one who prescribes faith decrees to give it to the elect. The affirmative preceptive will can stand together with the negative decretive will, so that God may prescribe to the creature what nevertheless he does not will to effect in the creature. So he enjoins upon all the keeping of the law which, however, he does not effect in them. He enjoins faith in Christ upon the called which nevertheless he has decreed to withhold from many.

(Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology: Volume One, trans. George Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison, Jr., [Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 1992], 3.15.1-7, pp. 220-221.)

Wayne Grudem:

…Another helpful distinction applied to different aspects of God’s will is the distinction between God’s secret will and his revealed will. Even in our own experience we know that we are able to will some things secretly and then only later make this will known to others. Sometimes we tell others before the thing that we have willed comes about, and at other times we do not reveal our secret will until the event we willed has happened.

     Surely a distinction between aspects of God’s will is evident in many passages of Scripture. According to Moses, “The secret things belong to the LORD our God; but the things that are revealed belong to us and to our children for ever, that we may do all the words of this law” (Deut. 29:29). Those things that God has revealed are given for the purpose of obeying God’s will: “that we may do all the words of this law.” There were many other aspects of his plan, however, that he had not revealed to them: many details about future events, specific details of hardship or of blessing in their lives, and so forth. With regard to these matters, they were simply to trust him.

     Because God’s revealed will usually contains his commands or “precepts” for our moral conduct, God’s revealed will is sometimes also called God’s will of precept or will of command. This revealed will of God is God’s declared will concerning what we should do or what God commands us to do.

     On the other hand, God’s secret will usually includes his hidden decrees by which he governs the universe and determines everything that will happen. He does not ordinarily reveal these decrees to us (except in prophecies of the future), so these decrees really are God’s “secret” will. We find out what God has decreed when events actually happen. Because this secret will of God has to do with his decreeing of events in the world, this aspect of God’s will is sometimes also called God’s will of decree.

     There are several instances where Scripture mentions God’s revealed will. In the Lord’s prayer the petition, “Your will be done, On earth as it is in heaven” (Matt. 6:10) is a prayer that people would obey God’s revealed will, his commands, on earth just as they do in heaven (that is, fully and completely). This could not be a prayer that God’s secret will (that is, his decrees for events that he has planned) would in fact be fulfilled, for what God has decreed in his secret will shall certainly come to pass. To ask God to bring about what he has already decreed to happen would simply be to pray, “May what is going to happen happen.” That would be a hollow prayer indeed, for it would not be asking for anything at all. Furthermore, since we do not know God’s secret will regarding the future, the person praying a prayer for God’s secret will to be done would never know for what he or she was praying. It would be a prayer without understandable content and without effect. Rather, the prayer “Your will be done” must be understood as an appeal for the revealed will of God to be followed on earth.

     If the phrase is understood in this way, it provides a pattern for us to pray on the basis of God’s commands in Scripture. In this sense, Jesus provides us with a guide for an exceedingly broad range of prayer requests. We are encouraged by Christ here to pray that people would obey God’s laws, that they would follow his principles for life, that they would obey his commands to repent of sin and trust in Christ as Savior. To pray these things is to pray that God’s will would be done on earth as it is in heaven.

     A little later, Jesus says, “Not every one who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ shall enter the kingdom of heaven, but he who does the will of my Father who is in heaven” (Matt. 7:21). Once again, the reference cannot be to God’s secret will or will of decree (for all mankind follows this, even if unknowingly), but to God’s revealed will, namely, the moral law of God that Christ’s followers are to obey (cf. Matt. 12:50; probably also 18:14). When Paul commands the Ephesians to “understand what the will of the Lord is” (Eph. 5:17; cf. Rom. 2:18), he again is speaking of God’s revealed will. So also is John when he says, “If we ask anything according to his will he hears us” (1 John 5:14).

     It is probably best to put 1 Timothy 2:4 and 2 Peter 3:9 in this category as well. Paul says that God “desires [or ‘wills, wishes,’ Gk. theleō] all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Tim. 2:4). Peter says that the Lord “is not slow about his promise as some count slowness, but is forbearing toward you, not wishing that any should perish, but that all should reach repentance” (2 Peter 3:9). In neither of these verses can God’s will be understood to be his secret will, his decree concerning what will certainly occur. This is because the New Testament is clear that there will be a final judgment and not all will be saved. It is best therefore to understand these references as speaking of God’s revealed will, his commands for mankind to obey and his declaration to us of what is pleasing in his sight.

     On the other hand, many passages speak of God’s secret will. When James tells us to say, “If the Lord wills, we shall live and we shall do this or that” (James 4:15), he cannot be talking about God’s revealed will or will of precept, for with regard to many of our actions we know that it is according to God’s command that we do one or another activity that we have planned. Rather, to trust in the secret will of God overcomes pride and expresses humble dependence on God’s sovereign control over the events of our lives.

     Another instance is found in Genesis 20. Joseph says to his brothers, “As for you, you meant evil against me; but God meant it for good, to bring it about that many people should be kept alive, as they are today,” Here God’s revealed will to Joseph’s brothers was that they should love him and not steal from him or sell him into slavery or make plans to murder him. But God’s secret will was that in the disobedience of Joseph’s brothers a greater good would be done when Joseph, having been sold into slavery into Egypt, gained authority over the land and was able to save his family.

     When Paul says to the Corinthians, “I will come to you soon, if the Lord wills” (1 Cor. 4:19), he is not speaking of God’s revealed will, for Paul has already determined, in obedience to God and in fulfillment of his apostolic office, to come to visit the Corinthians. He is speaking rather of God’s secret will, his hidden plan for the future, which is unknown to Paul and which will be known only as it comes to pass (cf. Acts 21:14; Rom. 1:10; 15:32; Eph. 1:11; 1 Peter 3:17; 4:19).

     Both the revealing of the good news of the gospel to some and its hiding from others are said to be according to God’s will. Jesus says, “I thank you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that you have hidden these things from the wise and understanding and revealed them to babes, yea, Father, for such was your gracious will” (Matt. 11:25-26). This again must refer to God’s secret will, for his revealed will is that all come to salvation. Indeed, only two verses later, Jesus commands everyone, “Come to me, all who labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest” (Matt. 11:28). And both Paul and Peter tell us that God wills all people to be saved (see 1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Peter 3:9). Thus, the fact that some are not saved and some have the gospel hidden from them must be understood as happening according to God’s secret will, unknown to us and inappropriate for us to seek to pry into. In the same way we must understand the mention of God’s will in Romans 9:18 (“He has mercy upon whomever he wills, and he hardens the heart of whomever he wills”) and Acts 4:28 (“to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place”) as references to God’s secret will.

(Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine, [Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1994], pp. 213-215.)

Herman Bavinck:

There is a big difference between the will of God that prescribes what we must do (Matt. 7:21; 12:50; John 4:34; 7:17; Rom. 12:2), and the will of God that tells us what he does and will do (Ps. 115:3; Dan. 4:17, 25, 32, 35; Rom. 9:18-19; Eph. 1:5, 9, 11; Rev. 4:11). The petition that God’s will may be done (Matt. 6:10) is very different in tenor from the childlike and resigned prayer: “Your will be done” (Matt. 26:42; Acts 21:14). Over and over in history we see the will of God assert itself in two ways. God commands Abraham to sacrifice his son, yet he does not let it happen (Gen. 22). He wants Pharaoh to let his people Israel go, yet hardens his heart so that he does not do it (Exod. 4:21). He has the prophet tell Hezekiah that he will die; still he adds fifteen years to his life (Isa. 38:1, 5). He prohibits us from condemning the innocent, yet Jesus is delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God (Acts 2:23; 3:18; 4:28). God does not will sin; he is far from iniquity. He forbids it and punishes it severely, yet it exists and is subject to his rule (Exod. 4:21; Josh. 11:20; 1 Sam. 2:25; 2 Sam. 16:10; Acts 2:23; 4:28; Rom. 1:24, 26; 2 Thess. 2:11; etc.). He wills the salvation of all (Ezek. 18:23, 32; 33:11; 1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Pet. 3:9), yet has mercy on whom he wills and hardens whom he wills (Rom. 9:18).

(Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: Volume 2: God and Creation, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004], §. 209, p. 241.)

D. A. Carson:

     A fourth area of ambiguity lies in the nature of the divine will. An example or two will bring the heart of the problem into focus. On several occasions God is said ‘to repent’ of something, e.g. of the creation of man (Gen. 6.6), of his decision to wipe out his rebellious calf-worshipping people (Exod. 32.7-14). Similarly, the decree that Hezekiah should die is revoked (2 Kgs. 20.1-6). Cf. also 1 Samuel 15.11; 2 Samuel 24.16; Jonah 3.10; Ecclesiastes 2.13f. On the other hand, God repeatedly insists that he, unlike man, does not repent (Num. 23.19f.; 1 Sam. 15.29; Jer. 4.28; cf. Ps. 89.34f.). Again, in the account in Genesis 22, Abraham is told to sacrifice his son; yet as the narrative develops, it appears that God never really intended him to do so. Yet again, God is presented as waiting and longing to be gracious (Isa. 30.18f.; 65.2; Hos. 11.7-9), as one who extracts no pleasure from the death of the wicked (Ezek. 33.11), as the one who punishes with extreme reluctance (Lam. 3.33-6); yet at other times, as we have seen, he is said to control the thoughts of men, keep his people, and bring nations to the point where he may punish them severely.

     Such phenomena as these have evoked theological distinctions concerning the ‘will’ of God. Some distinguish between God’s revealed will and his hidden or secret will (cf. Deut. 29.29); others, between God’s prescriptive will and his determinative will; others, between his permissive will and his decretive will; still others, between his antecedent will and his consequent will. All of these paired ‘wills’ suffer from serious shortcomings. For example, although the greatest part of the divine will must surely remain ‘hidden’ (i.e. unknown to men), and although any increase in the knowledge of that will is due to revelation of that hidden but already operative will, nevertheless this model is inadequate as a total explanation of the relation between the divine will and reality, because in too many instances the hidden will appears to make a mockery of the revealed will. Since the hidden will is always effective, it appears to be the actual will of God; while the revealed will is little more than precept. In that case, man does not know anything of God’s actual will, except by what actually happens; and conversely, everything that happens is exactly what God really wills to happen. This problem is related to the tension between the deus absconditus and the deus revelatus.

     Similarly, distinctions between permissive will and decretive will appear desperately artificial when applied to an omniscient and omnipotent being; for if this God ‘permits’ sin, it cannot be unknowingly and unwillingly, and therefore his ‘permission’ must be granted knowingly and willingly. Wherein then does this permission differ from decree?

     Indeed, any combination of these ‘wills’ leads inexorably to curious situations. For example, Yahweh foresees that the people will go astray, and that his wrath will be kindled (Deut. 31.15-22). This surely suggests something more than consequent wrath—perhaps something more akin to willed wrath. In the same way, Micaiah can warn the king of impending doom and be assured that the king will fail to heed the warning: God has decreed it so. This puts Micaiah in the invidious position of Cassandra.

     At the same time, we cannot do without some distinctions concerning the ‘will(s)’ of God. Both in the Old Testament and in the fourth Gospel, not to say elsewhere, God is sometimes presented as the one who seeks men out, loves a lost world, declares his yearning for their repentance, and the like. This ‘will’ of God is his disposition; it is not necessarily his decree. But precisely how both operate in one sovereign God is extremely difficult to understand.

(D. A. Carson, Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical Perspectives in Tension, [Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981], pp. 212-214.)

Wilhelmus à Brakel:

     In making a distinction in the will of God, we are not suggesting that God has two wills. In God the act of the will is singular. The difference rather relates to the objects towards whom His will is exercised. Much less do we suggest that God has two wills which are incompatible, as if God with His revealed will would desire something and His secret will would be opposed. When we consider the will of God as being either secret or revealed, this distinction pertains to decidedly different matters, some of which are revealed whereas others are not. The secret and revealed will of God neither relate to one and the same matter, nor should they be viewed from the same perspective. Let me illustrate. God commanded Abraham to sacrifice and kill His son Isaac; nevertheless, it was not God’s will that Isaac would die. This became evident from the outcome. There is a distinction here between the command and the result. God’s command was His revealed or preceptive will, which was the basis for Abraham’s behavior. He had to do everything which would contribute to the death of his son, which he also did. The result—that the death of Isaac would not take place by Abraham’s activity—was another matter and belonged to the secret will of God’s decree which Abraham perceived afterward when the voice of God prevented him. There should therefore be no concern as to what will should govern our behavior, as the Lord’s secret will is solely His domain and against it we cannot sin. God will accomplish His good pleasure. Nevertheless, it is expressed in God’s revealed will that we are to exercise confidence

(Wilhelmus à Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service: Volume 1: God, Man and Christ, trans. Bartel Elshout, ed. Joel R. Beeke, [Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 1992], p. 114.)

Michael F. Bird:

     In response, we can point out that God’s will and/or desire is not identical with God’s purpose. We can speak legitimately of the two wills of God understood as (1) his will as desire to provide a salvation sufficient for all, deriving from his merciful character, and (2) his will as purpose to execute salvation for the elect, deriving from his glory.

(Michael F. Bird, Evangelical Theology: A Biblical and Systematic Introduction: Second Edition, [Grand Rapids: Zondervan Academic, 2020], 5.5.1.1, p. 644.)

Thomas Aquinas:

     God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply.

(St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica: In Three Volumes: Volume One, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, [New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1947], P. I, Q. 23, Art. 4, Reply Objection 3, p. 128.)

Thomas Aquinas:

     To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.

(St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica: In Three Volumes: Volume One, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, [New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1947], P. I, Q. 19, Art. 6, p. 108.)

Taylor Patrick O’Neill:

     Finally, it cannot be stated that this reality of predestination and reprobation means that God in no way loves all men and wishes for their greatest good, that is, the attainment of glory and beatitude. On the contrary, St. Thomas states, “God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply.” In speaking of possible interpretations of 1 Tm 2:4 (as well as 2 Pt 3:9), St. Thomas puts forth as one possibility the view of St. John Damascene that God wills some men to be saved according to his antecedent will and some according to his consequent. will, which implies not a mutability in the divine will but rather in the objects of that will. “Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed.”

     This distinction should be understood as referencing a different scope of the divine will and not as something antecedent or consequent in God. To every man, considered in and of himself, God wishes all possible goods precisely because God loves every man more than could be imagined. That necessarily results in his wishing to give to every man all possible goods. But each man (and everything within the created order) does not exist in a vacuum; he exists in relation to all other things within the created order. Consequently, God does not will things to each individual man as if he were all that existed. Instead, he wills things to men as they are, as parts of the whole of creation, acting upon and in relation to one another. Due to this wider scope, the true order of things, God wills only some goods to each man. As such, we say that God wills that all men be saved antecedently but not consequently, for, as we have seen above, God wills that some perish for the greater good of the whole.

(Taylor Patrick O’Neill, Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin: A Thomistic Analysis, [Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2019], pp. 65-66.) Preview.

Petrus Van Mastricht:

     The distribution of the divine will: The will of the sign and will of good pleasure

XXII. Now, nothing remains except that we should add a few things about the distribution of the divine will. By all means, the will of God is one and only one, yet it is distinguished by us into various modes, first on account of the different kinds of things that it wills, next on account of the different modes in which we see that it wills what it wills. Thus they distinguish the will of God, first, into the will of the sign and the will of good pleasure. The latter denotes the decree of God itself, either his effective decree of good or his permissive decree of evil: “He does whatever he pleases” (Ps. 115:3) and “Yes, Father, so it has pleased you” (Matt. 11:25-26; Luke 12:32). But the former generally denotes some sort of indication by which God wills something to be signified to us, either that it would be simply believed and acknowledged, to which pertains his prediction, fulfillment, and remembrance of things or deeds, or, that our actions would be obliged to it as a norm, to which pertains, first, his command, promise, exhortation, invitation, and persuasion; next, his prohibition, threatening, dissuasion, warning, and so forth. Specifically, however, in thus contrasting the former with the latter, we customarily look to the commandment, that is, the sign commanding or prohibiting a specific effect of the divine will, for which reason they also call the will of the sign the will of the commandment.

     Secret and revealed will

XXIII. Furthermore, second, they divide God’s will into his secret and revealed will, according to Deuteronomy 29:29. Understand by the word secret those things that God decreed either to do or to permit and that he has so far not revealed, either by their outcome or by a prophecy. Consequently, they do not supply to us a way to know our norm; indeed, modesty requires that in investigating these things we would not be too curious. But the things that have been revealed to us oblige us immediately to assent and faith, and the things in them that are commanded for our doing or prohibited for our avoidance require obedience on the spot, and thus, putting aside all curiosity, we must carefully study their observance.

     Absolute and conditioned will

XXIV. They employ, third, the distinction between God’s absolute and conditioned will, not of course with respect to the act of God who wills, for in that way all his will is absolute, but with respect to the things willed by God in this act. For God wills that some things occur absolutely but other things under a condition. Thus he wills regeneration, faith, and repentance in the elect absolutely, but in such a way that salvation comes to them under the condition of faith and repentance. But, seeing that this distinction is often stolen and used in a worse sense by the Pelagians and Pelagianizers (as we will teach on it a little further on), it is generally disregarded by the orthodox.

     Decretive and legislative will

XXV. But, fourth, the most accurate distinction of all is between God’s decretive and legislative will, or his will of plan and will of precept. Of these, by the former he determines events, that is, what is to be or not to be de facto, whether it is good or evil. By the latter, he determines what is to be or not to be de jure only. Included under God’s decretive will are: (1) predestination, election, reprobation, and preterition; (2) the covenant of grace, concerning the salvation of the elect, between the Father and the Son; (3) the absolute promises of regeneration, sanctification, faith, and perseverance; (4) the complements of these promises, by discriminating grace, and so forth. To God’s legislative will or will of precept belong precepts and prohibitions, promises and threats. Concerning this distribution, this must be carefully noted: just as the decretive will only determines the occurrence or futurity of a thing, but does not, however, determine its moral goodness and badness (for it determines promiscuously the occurrences of good and evil things), so the legislative will only determines the goodness and badness of the thing willed, while in the meantime it states nothing about the futurity or non-futurity of the same.

     The double consequence

From this we evidently perceive (1) by what reckoning the will of God is always and universally effective: the former, that is, the decretive will, is so according to the event, and the latter legislative will is so according to our duty, while at the same time he wills in earnest by his legislative will many things that never occur, just as also many things occur by his decretive will that he does not will. And so we perceive from this as well (2) that there is nothing in these wills on God’s part that is repugnant, since they do not will the same thing or in the same way.

(Petrus Van Mastricht, Theoretical-Practical Theology: Volume 2: Faith in the Triune God, trans. Todd M. Rester, ed. Joel R. Beeke, [Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2019], Book 2, Chapter 15, §§. 22-25.) Preview.

John Frame:

     Reformed theologians have typically rejected the antecedent-consequent distinction because of its association with libertarian freedom. But they have adopted a rather similar distinction, between God’s decretive and preceptive wills. God’s decretive will is simply what in chapter 11 we called God’s decree. It is his eternal purpose, by which he foreordains everything that comes to pass. God’s preceptive will is his valuations, particularly as revealed to us in his Word (his precepts). The decretive will focuses on God’s lordship attribute of control, the preceptive will on the lordship attribute of authority. God’s decretive will cannot be successfully opposed; it will certainly take place. It is possible, however, and often the case, for creatures to disobey God’s preceptive will.

     The decretive will is sometimes called the will of God’s good pleasure (beneplacitum). This is somewhat misleading, because Scripture speaks of God’s “pleasure” in both decretive and preceptive senses—decretive, for example, in Psalm 51:18 and Isaiah 46:10 KJV, preceptive in Psalms 5:4 NIV and 103:21 KJV. Some have also called the decretive will God’s hidden or secret will, but that, too, is misleading, since God reveals some of his decrees through his Word.

     For that reason I hesitate also to call the preceptive will the revealed will (signum, “signified” will), though that language has often been used for this concept. Preceptive is also somewhat misleading, for it does not always have to do with literal precepts (God’s laws, commandments). Sometimes God’s preceptive will refers not to precepts but to states of affairs that God sees as desirable, but that he chooses not to bring about (as Ezek. 18:23; 2 Peter 3:9). Still, I will use preceptive because of customary usage, and because I don’t know of superior terminology available.

     How is this distinction similar to the antecedent-consequent distinction? God’s preceptive will, like the antecedent will, consists of his valuation of every possible and actual state of affairs. His decretive will, like the consequent will, determines what will actually happen. The difference is that the concept decretive is intended to exclude libertarianism. God’s decision as to what will actually happen is not based on his foreknowledge of the libertarian free choices of men. It is rather based on his own decision to write his historical drama in a certain way.

     It is therefore disingenuous for Arminians to criticize Calvinists for teaching “two wills” in God. Arminianism, indeed all theologies, recognizes some complexity in God’s will (though confessing its ultimate unity), and theologians of all persuasions have sometimes talked about multiple wills in God.

(John M. Frame, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Christian Belief, [Phillipsburg: P & R Publishing, 2013], Chapter 16: God’s Attributes: Power, Will.)

Martin Luther:

     The Diatribe is deceived by its own ignorance in that it makes no distinction between God preached and God hidden, that is, between the Word of God and God Himself. God does many things which He does not show us in His Word, and He wills many things which He does not in His Word show us that He wills. Thus, He does not will the death of a sinner—that is, in His Word; but He wills it by His inscrutable will. At present, however, we must keep in view His Word and leave alone His inscrutable will; for it is by His Word, and not by His inscrutable will, that we must be guided. In any case, who can direct himself according to a will that is inscrutable and incomprehensible? It is enough simply to know that there is in God an inscrutable will; what, why, and within what limits It wills, it is wholly unlawful to inquire, or wish to know, or be concerned about, or touch upon; we may only fear and adore!

     So it is right to say: ‘If God does not desire our death, it must be laid to the charge of our own will if we perish’; this, I repeat, is right if you spoke of God preached. For He desires that all men should be saved, in that He comes to all by the word of salvation, and the fault is in the will which does not receive Him; as He says in Matt. 23: ‘How often would I have gathered thy children together, and thou wouldst not!’ (v. 37). But why the Majesty does not remove or change this fault of will in every man (for it is not in the power of man to do it), or why He lays this fault to the charge of the will, when man cannot avoid it, it is not lawful to ask; and though you should ask much, you would never find out; as Paul says in Rom. 11: ‘Who art thou that repliest against God?’ (Rom. 9.20).

(Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, trans. J. I. Packer, O. R. Johnston, [Grand Rapids: Fleming H. Revell, 2000], pp. 170-171.)

Appendix: Primary and Secondary Causes.

John Piper:

Arminians sometimes disparage Reformed appeals to “secondary causes” between God’s sovereign will and the immediate effecting of a sinful act. But the Reformed introduce this idea of intermediate causes, different from God’s ultimate causing, not because of a theological necessity but because so many Scripture passages demand it. For example, God commissions an “evil spirit” between Abimelech and the men of Shechem to bring about his will (Judg. 9:22–24); Satan leads Judas to do (Luke 22:3) what Acts 2:23 says God brings about; Paul says that Satan blinds the minds of unbelievers (2 Cor. 4:4), but also says that God sends a blinding spirit of stupor (Rom. 11:8–10); Satan stirs up David to take a census (1 Chron. 21:1), which proves to be sin (2 Sam. 24:10), and yet it is written that God is in some sense the cause behind Satan (2 Sam. 24:1); and Satan gets permission from God to torment Job (Job 1:12; 2:6), but when Satan takes Job’s family and makes him sick, Job says, “The Lord has taken” (Job 1:21), and, “Shall we receive good from God, and shall we not receive evil?” (2:10)—to which the writer responds: “In all this Job did not sin or charge God with wrong” (1:22; cf. 2:10).

(John Piper, Does God Desire all to be Saved? [Wheaton: Crossway, 2013], pp. 42-43.)

Note: See further: Concurrence (Concursus) — Primary and Secondary Causes.

Appendix: Compatibilism.

Wayne Grudem:

     One approach to these passages about God’s concurrence is to say that if our choices are real, they cannot be caused by God (see below for further discussion of this viewpoint). But the number of passages that affirm this providential control of God is so considerable, and the difficulties involved in giving them some other interpretation are so formidable, that it does not seem to me that this can be the right approach to them. It seems better to affirm that God causes all things that happen, but that he does so in such a way that he somehow upholds our ability to make willing, responsible choices choices that have real and eternal results and for which we are held accountable. Exactly how God combines his providential control with our willing and significant choices, Scripture does not explain to us. But rather than deny one aspect or the other (simply because we cannot explain how both can be true), we should accept both in an attempt to be faithful to the teaching of all of Scripture. 

     The analogy of an author writing a play may help us to grasp how both aspects can be true. In the Shakespearean play Macbeth the character Macbeth murders King Duncan. Now (if we assume for a moment that this is a fictional account), the question may be asked, “Who killed King Duncan?” On one level, the correct answer is “Macbeth.” Within the context of the play he carried out the murder and is rightly to blame for it. But on another level, a correct answer to the question, “Who killed King Duncan?” would be “William Shakespeare”: he wrote the play, he created all the characters in it, and he wrote the part where Macbeth killed King Duncan. 

     It would not be correct to say that because Macbeth killed King Duncan, William Shakespeare did not kill him. Nor would it be correct to say that because William Shakespeare killed King Duncan, Macbeth did not kill him. Both are true. On the level of the characters in the play Macbeth fully (100 percent) caused King Duncan’s death, but on the level of the creator of the play, William Shakespeare fully (100 percent) caused King Duncan’s death. In similar fashion, we can understand that God fully causes things in one way (as Creator), and we fully cause things in another way (as creatures). 

     Of course, someone may object that the analogy does not really solve the problem because characters in a play are not real persons; they are only characters with no freedom of their own, no ability to make genuine choices, and so forth. But in response we may point out that God is infinitely greater and wiser than we are. While we as finite creatures can only create fictional characters in a play, not real persons, God, our infinite Creator, has made an actual world and in it has created us as real persons who make willing choices. To say that God could not make a world in which he causes us to make willing choices (as some would argue today; see discussion below), is simply to limit the power of God. It seems also to deny a large number of passages of Scripture. [fn. 4: I. Howard Marshall, “Predestination in the New Testament” in Grace Unlimited by Clark H. Pinnock, pp. 132–33, 139, objects to the analogy of an author and a play because the actors “are bound by the characters assigned to them and the lines that they have learned” so that even if the dramatist “makes [the characters] say ‘I love my creator’ in his drama, this is not mutual love in the real sense.” But Marshall limits his analysis to what is possible with human beings acting on a human level. He does not give consideration to the possibility (in fact, the reality!) that God is able to do far more than human beings are able to do, and that he can wonderfully create genuine human beings rather than mere characters in a play. A better approach to the analogy of an author and a play would be if Marshall would apply to this question a very helpful statement that he made in another part of the essay: “The basic difficulty is that of attempting to explain the nature of the relationship between an infinite God and finite creatures. Our temptation is to think of divine causation in much the same way as human causation, and this produces difficulties as soon as we try to relate divine causation and human freedom. It is beyond our ability to explain how God can cause us to do certain things (or to cause the universe to come into being and to behave as it does)” (pp. 137–38). I can agree fully with everything in Marshall’s statement at that point, and find that to be a very helpful way of approaching this problem.]

(Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine, [Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1994], pp. 321-322.)

A. W. Pink:

     It is only as we see the real nature of freedom and mark that the will is subject to the motives brought to bear upon it, that we are able to discern there is no conflict between two statements of Holy Writ which concern our blessed Lord. In Matt. 4:1 we read, “Then was Jesus led up of the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted of the Devil”; but in Mark 1:12,13 we are told, “And immediately the Spirit driveth him into the wilderness. And he was there in the wilderness forty days, tempted of Satan”. It is utterly impossible to harmonize these two statements by the Arminian conception of the will. But really there is no difficulty. That Christ was “driven”, implies it was by a forcible motive or powerful impulse, such as was not to be resisted or refused; that he was “led” denotes his freedom in going. Putting the two together we learn, that he was driven, with a voluntary condescension thereto. So, there is the liberty of man’s will and the victorious efficacy of God’s grace united together: a sinner may be “drawn” and yet “come” to Christ—the “drawing” presenting to him the irresistible motive, the “coming” signifying the response of his will—as Christ was “driven” and “led” by the Spirit into the wilderness.

(Arthur W. Pink, The Sovereignty of God, [Lafayette: Sovereign Grace Publishers, 2008], Chapter 7: God’s Sovereignty and the Human Will, §. 1., The Nature Of The Human Will, p. 164.) Preview. 

Note: See further: Compatibilism — God’s Sovereignty and Human Responsibility.

καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν πρὸ πάντων καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκεν ~ Soli Deo Gloria